WHENCE
THE
THREAT
TO PEACE
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No task is more important today than that of preserving peace and eliminating the threat of nuclear or conventional war. Mankind is at a turning point in its history. Nuclear weapons threaten to destroy not only everything that our civilization has created over the ages but life on Earth as well. What has brought the world to this dangerous point? Where does the threat to peace come from?

This book answers these questions unequivocally and on the basis of objective analysis. The threat to peace comes from the US war machine, the militarist policy pursued by the US Administration and its efforts to conduct international affairs from the position of strength.

The present US Administration began staking on military strength as soon as it took office. Its course is toward escalating the arms race, which embraces all types of weapons and may now spread into space. In recent years the US has been pursuing a policy of aggression and confrontation which stems from its striving to achieve military superiority.

In 1981 the United States adopted an unprecedented program for building up strategic offensive weapons. In the spring of 1983, it announced the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known as the Star Wars program, which exposed the aggressive nature of American imperialism even more. In the autumn of 1983, the United States, ignoring the will of the peoples of Western Europe, began to deploy its medium-range missiles on the territory of several West European countries. Stationed close to the borders of the USSR and other socialist countries, these missiles augmented the US strategic nuclear potential. The year 1985 saw the endorsement of the Pentagon’s directive for the buildup of the US armed forces up to the year 1992, which envisaged various scenarios of war against the USSR and its allies. In 1986 the United States breached the SALT II Treaty, a major international legal document that formalizes the existence of strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and limits the arms race in the central sphere—in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons.

The Summit Meeting in Reykjavik further revealed the actual military and political intentions of the United States. The constructive proposals put forward by the USSR at that meeting created an opportunity for reaching, provided there is the political will to do so, major historic agreements on a substantial reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear weapons and on preventing the arms race in outer space. The US Administration, however, was clearly unwilling to give up its plan to achieve military superiority over the USSR and its imperial ambition “to rule the world.” So responsibility for the failure to use that opportunity lies squarely with the American side.

Such are some of the milestones of the dangerous course of the present Administration aimed at escalating the arms race. Treated in detail in this book, they clearly show the need for all peace-loving forces to resolutely oppose the aggressive US pretensions. The world community is becoming increasingly aware of the need to put up insurmountable barriers to the American military threat.

Washington cannot fail to see that the US militarist policy is arousing growing condemnation in the world and that under the impact of the vigorous peaceful foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union millions of people are coming to realize the need to wage a large-scale struggle against the threat of war, especially nuclear war. Hence the persistent attempts of the White House to camouflage US actions, to dampen growing criticism of American policy and simultaneously to sow mistrust toward the Soviet Union and its policies. For this purpose, Washington, and in its wake much of the mass media in the West, are employing its habitual tactics of
distorting the situation, manipulating figures, accusing the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty of allegedly harboring aggressive designs and assuring people that the United States and NATO are “lagging behind” them militarily. This misinformation is designed to camouflage Washington’s plans, which threaten peace, and at the same time ascribe these aggressive plans to the Soviet Union. All this slander about “Soviet military superiority” over the US and “Soviet military threat” serves to justify the uncontrolled arms race conducted by Washington, its hegemonic plans and preparations for a new world war. People must know the truth about this.

So the aim of the fourth edition of the book *Whence the Threat to Peace* is to tell the readers this truth by acquainting them with new tendencies and the latest international developments as well as with new data on the state of the US and NATO war machines.

Chapter I, “Objective Assessments,” contains data showing that throughout the entire post-World War II period the United States has initiated the development and buildup of all new types of weapons, especially nuclear ones. It also shows that the United States and its NATO allies are biased in their assessment of the USSR’s foreign policy and the defensive character of its military doctrine and in making force comparisons between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

Chapter II, “The US War Machine,” contains data on the US armed forces, which even in peacetime are deployed far from the US borders; their organizational structure and numerical strength provide for the carrying out of aggressive, not defensive actions. In this chapter the authors of the book show that the modernization and buildup of the US armed forces create a threat to peace and that pressure from the American arms manufacturers and military-industrial complex is one of the main reasons why the United States is set on continued militarization and a policy of strength in international relations. The facts cited in this chapter testify to the aggressive essence of the US military doctrine.

Chapter III, “The East-West Military Balance,” cites facts and figures comparing the strategic and medium-range nuclear forces of the sides and contains a comparison of the general-purpose and naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

Chapter IV, “Two Trends in World Politics,” illustrates the attitude of the Soviet and US governments to the issues of war and peace and of building confidence and security, to the solution of disarmament problems, and to the observance of treaties concluded in the field of limitation of strategic armaments.

As was the case with the previous editions of this book this edition contains, besides data supplied by reliable Soviet bodies, information provided by the London-based and other international institutes for strategic studies, and also by official American sources.
Chapter I

Objective Assessments

Scientific and technological progress makes it possible to ensure a life of plenty on Earth, to create the material conditions for the flourishing of mankind. Yet these very products of man’s brain and hand are being turned against him due to selfish class-inspired ambitions and in pursuit of enrichment by the capitalist world’s ruling elite. Naturally, science and technology by themselves do not threaten peace. The threat comes from international reaction, and notably, US imperialism, using scientific and technological advances for aggressive ends. The unprecedented imperialist-instigated arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, is a grave crime against humanity.

Nuclear arms were created by American imperialism. In August 1945 the United States became the world’s first and to this day the only country to have ever used atomic weapons, which it did against the population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was not prompted by any military need. It was an atrocity that will never be forgotten. By that wanton act, Washington counted on intimidating the nations of this planet with its military power in order to establish its domination over the world by means of nuclear weapons. In spite of a nuclear monopoly, the US did not have enough strength at the time to remake the world as it saw fit. And still the years of US nuclear monopoly cost the world dear—they gave rise to the aggressive Cold War policy. A system of US-controlled military blocs and a network of American military bases were created around the globe. Confident of its military strength, Washington has more than once taken steps that placed the world at the brink of a catastrophe.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union has worked consistently and hard toward the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and toward the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, to the benefit of humanity. Back in June 1946, the Soviet Government presented a Draft International Convention to Prohibit the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. The draft called for the production of nuclear weapons to be outlawed once and for all, for their stocks to be destroyed and for their use for military purposes to be declared the greatest crime against humanity. Had the US accepted the proposal of the Soviet Union at the dawn of the nuclear age, the world would have been spared the burden of a nuclear arms race and would not now face the threat of total destruction.

But removal of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of war was not part of US plans. In a bid to perpetuate its nuclear monopoly, the US submitted to the UN Commission its own version of how to resolve the nuclear problem—the so-called Baruch Plan, which, without providing for a ban on the use of atomic energy for military purposes, called only for the creation of an “International Atomic Development Authority” totally subservient to the US. Such a “control” system would have perpetuated its monopoly in nuclear weapons and would have offered an opportunity for constant interference on the part of the US in the internal affairs of other nations which would, in the long run, have subordinated the economies of those countries to the interests of American capital. Washington hoped, via the Baruch Plan, to bring about a situation where the production of nuclear arms would be permitted only to the US and thus to secure its military advantage over the USSR for ever.
The possession of nuclear weapons gave rise to an irresponsible and arrogant attitude on the part of the White House leadership toward the assessment of the character and subsequent development of international events and evoked the false premise that the Soviet Union had no right to take steps to end the US atomic monopoly, to rectify this abnormal situation, or be on a par with the United States militarily. With the use of this "philosophy," the Washington leaders, both in the past and especially now, have tried to justify their militarist course and to shift the responsibility for the arms race onto the Soviet Union which, they claim, has all along been ahead of the US. But no matter what "philosophies" are devised on the other side of the ocean, the undeniable fact is that the roots of the arms race are in American soil and that the US and not the Soviet Union is responsible for its successive rounds. We need only to consider the facts.

In the 1950s, on a pretext of having "fallen behind in bombers," the Pentagon obtained large allocations from Congress and set in motion a crash program for the construction of strategic bombers. When a whole armada of these aircraft had been built in the United States, however, it was "discovered" that the American specialists had deliberately exaggerated the number of Soviet bombers three to four times over.

In the early 1960s, a howl was raised about a "US missile gap," and the US initiated a massive deployment of silo-based Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Then, after about a thousand such missiles were deployed, it "turned out" that there had been no Soviet "missile threat" at all. A former Special Assistant to the US President on Science and Technology, Jerome B. Wiesner commented in 1984 that until recently he presumed that US misevaluations on bombers and missiles followed from the mistakes of US intelligence services. But a thorough analysis of facts had prompted him to come to believe that it was a deliberate manipulation or, at least, auto-suggestion.

At the same time, an American program was launched to build nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. At that time, no one in the world had them. Moreover, in the mid-1960s, the Pentagon began outfitting submarine-launched Polaris A-3 missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs). The following table shows who initiated the buildup of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and who is still building up a superiority in terms of nuclear warheads on them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSBNs</td>
<td>SLBMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the US was the first to begin arming strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), thus starting a new spiral of the nuclear arms race. This sharply increased the total of nuclear warheads. President Reagan alleges that in the 1970s the US was "inactive," showing "restraint." Such allegations do not correspond to the reality. Precisely in this period, although the US had a multiple of the Soviet stockpile of nuclear warheads, the US armed forces were every day receiving an average of three nuclear warheads for strategic delivery vehicles. If in 1970 US strategic delivery vehicles could carry just over 5,000 nuclear warheads to target, their present number is 14,800.

It was also in the 1970s that the US launched a crash program to develop a new type of dangerous strategic weapon—the long-range cruise missile. And in the early half of the 1980s, it set about deploying many
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUCLEAR WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-1940s (used in August 1945)</td>
<td>late 1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC BOMBERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-1950s</td>
<td>late 1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-1950s</td>
<td>late 1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</strong></td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late 1960s</td>
<td>mid-1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-1970s</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEUTRON WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late 1970s-early 1980s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late 1970s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPACE-STRIKE WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1980s (development and testing of separate components)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
thousands of air-, sea- and ground-launched missiles of this type.

In the 1980s, the rate of the arms race in the US rose all across the board. In 1981 the US President ordered the full-scale manufacture of neutron munitions. Seeking at any cost to upset the military-strategic balance in its favor, the US adopted a “comprehensive program of America’s rearmament.” It provides for a buildup of advanced offensive nuclear-missile forces for a first “decapitating” strike, for the development of space-strike weapons and for further qualitative and quantitative growth of the arsenal of chemical and conventional weapons.

In the Pentagon’s scheme of things, that program will enable the US to increase its strategic offensive potential to 20,000 nuclear weapons by the beginning of the 1990s. Simultaneously, the program also provides for completing by 1988 the deployment in Europe of over 570 Pershing II ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (by January 1, 1987, the US had deployed 364) and for manufacturing more than 17,000 new nuclear munitions of varying yield and designation between 1986 and 1989.

What is the purpose of this program and what are the Washington strategists counting on? Their one and only objective is to achieve military superiority. The idea of strategic parity does not suit the US Administration. US leaders refuse to accept the fact that the USSR must only be talked to on equal terms. This explains their attempts to regain military superiority at any cost. Director of the American Institute for Space and Security Studies R. Bowman confessed that the US leaders were tired of parity. The only way they could get back the lever of political pressure was by regaining absolute military superiority.

One of the principal lines in the US policy of gaining military superiority over the USSR is the drive to extend the arms race to space. The Americans are banking on the development of a fundamentally new type of armaments known as space-strike systems, and on the deployment of an extensive ABM system with space-based elements. Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of Defense, said in no uncertain terms that if the US could get a system that would be effective and that would render the Soviet armaments ineffective, the US would return to the situation where it was the only country with nuclear weapons.

In order to gain freedom of action in the arms race, in 1986 the US Administration began undermining the existing treaties and agreements. By backing out of the 1972 Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT II Treaty and by, in fact, refusing to strictly adhere to the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, it clearly shows its unwillingness to be bound by any arms limitation commitments. Instead of agreements the White House would like to have what it calls a regime of temporary restraint based on totally non-binding consent not to deploy more “strategic nuclear delivery systems” or warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs than the other side has. But do these two points alone determine the correlation of the two sides’ strategic forces or, furthermore, the strategic relationship between the USSR and the US in general? They certainly do not.

The essence of this US approach lies in its frantic wish to preserve intact its nuclear weapons based on heavy bombers. Moreover, the Pentagon would like to preserve at least a triple superiority there while depriving the Soviet Union of the right to compensate for it with ballistic missiles, which, for the USSR, are the principal component of its nuclear deterrent. As it is, the US maintains the same position with respect to its sea-launched cruise missiles, carrier-based aviation and forward-based nuclear forces capable of reaching the territory of the USSR. So what kind of “restraint” is this if the US wants to retain the ability to build and deploy thousands of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and other nuclear systems posing a real threat to the USSR? How can anyone possibly speak of “restraint” when the Star Wars program will not only make the process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction impossible, but will add a fundamentally new, truly cosmic dimension to the arms race? This simply cannot be called “restraint,” no matter how much Washington may like the term.
At the Summit Meeting in Reykjavik the Soviet delegation put forward a comprehensive package of compromise proposals, which, once adopted, could really lead to a major breakthrough in all aspects of the struggle for the limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons within a short period of time, and get things moving toward a nuclear-free world. The US President, however, rejected the idea of nuclear disarmament for the sake of his Star Wars program. In its October 29, 1986 issue The New York Times wrote that “…Reagan turned his back on the greatest opportunity any President has ever had to reverse the direction of the nuclear arms race and to nail down major mutual reductions in nuclear weaponry.” By foregoing real nuclear arms reductions in favor of SDI, the American side has shown both a lack of readiness and an unwillingness to reduce the number of nuclear arms.

Parallel with the nuclear arms buildup Washington has launched a multibillion-dollar program of “chemical rearmament of America” despite the fact that the US already possesses the world’s largest stocks of highly toxic chemicals: about 55,000 tons of nerve gas and more than three million units of various other chemical weapons. And just recently, in May 1986, despite resistance from some of their NATO allies, Washington succeeded in forcing upon NATO the decision to begin production (and deployment) of a new type of lethal chemical weapons known as binary weapons. In particular, it is planned to augment the US stockpiles of chemical weapons with binary weapons, and thus to increase their total number to 5 million. These weapons are mostly to be deployed in Western Europe. In the Federal Republic of Germany alone, where the density of American nuclear and chemical weapons is higher today than in the US itself, the Pentagon intends to store an additional 460,000 binary weapons.

The scope of US war preparations is graphically illustrated by the rates of growth of allocations for military purposes. Whereas in fiscal 1981, when the present Administration came to office, they stood at about 190 billion dollars, for fiscal 1987 the President has approved a total military budget of 291.9 billion, while for fiscal 1988 the Pentagon is asking 312 billion dollars. In other words, the allocations on US war preparations average about a billion dollars a day. In the period from 1986 to 1990, the US intends to spend almost 1,800 billion dollars for these purposes.

So the facts mentioned above show indisputably that the United States has been and remains the initiator of the arms race in the postwar period. American veteran diplomat George Kennan called on the Americans not to confuse things by laying all responsibility on their opponents. He reminded the Americans that they were the initiators of the further development of nuclear weapons at each stage; that they were the first to develop and test a nuclear device; that they enhanced its destructive power by developing the H-bomb; and that they were the first to develop the multiple warhead. According to him, the Americans turned down all proposals to repudiate “first use of nuclear weapons” in principle, and they alone used these weapons against other people, against tens of thousands of defenseless civilians. As a result of the race in nuclear and other arms launched by American imperialism, the end of the 20th century is marked by the question: will humanity get rid of the nuclear danger or will the policy of confrontation which enhances the probability of a nuclear conflict gain the upper hand?

Throughout its postwar history the Soviet Union never initiated development of new types of weapons. In structuring its armed forces it had to react to the threats emanating from the USA. The USSR has never aspired to military superiority. Everything that the Soviet Union has done in the defense sphere is aimed at guaranteeing reliable security for itself and its allies. Today the USSR continues to do all in its power to stop the arms race and prevent it from spreading to outer space. It is ready to limit and eliminate any armaments on a reciprocal basis.

The Reykjavik Meeting spotlighted the essence of the issue of disarmament, raised the
cardinal question: are both sides (the USSR and the USA) willing to find radical solutions to matters of nuclear disarmament? The Reykjavik Summit convincing showed that the USSR is not only willing but will undeviatingly intensify its efforts to achieve the prime aim of Soviet foreign policy—elimination of nuclear weapons. The Reykjavik Meeting also clearly demonstrated that in the United States forces opposing disarmament are active. To please them, the US delegation in the capital of Iceland, under various pretexts, evaded accepting Soviet proposals, did not seek the radical reduction of nuclear weapons by both sides but wanted to assure only unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union thus making it defenseless in the face of American nuclear arms and space-strike weapons.

The USA, using various unseemly methods, is trying to camouflage its policy of escalating the arms race. For instance, Washington propagandists claim a certain Soviet advantage in warheads on ICBMs. They declare this to be inadmissible but keep silent about the USA having about 7,000 nuclear warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles while the USSR has only 40 percent of this number, or about the fact that the sum total of nuclear warheads on the USA’s intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles is roughly equal to the USSR’s. They also say nothing about the fact that the USA has multiple advantage in nuclear weapons on heavy bombers.

Furthermore, the Pentagon is trying to scare the international public with stories about the growth of the Soviet Navy, and its now greater capability to operate in remote parts of the world. This is said to challenge the West’s traditional dominance of the open seas. The US President has gone so far as to state that the USA has a “window of vulnerability” in this field. Specifically, the appearance of air-capable ships of the Kiev class and the Kirov nuclear-powered missile cruiser in the Soviet Navy is being presented as a serious threat. This is a deliberate distortion of the actual situation. As distinct from the USA, the USSR has no aircraft carriers. Its air-capable ships are designed to combat enemy naval formations on the seas and oceans bordering on the Soviet Union and present no threat to any other country. By contrast, there are sixteen multipurpose aircraft carriers, each carrying dozens of nuclear-capable aircraft and hundreds of nuclear weapons, in active service in the US Navy. These aircraft carriers are stationed in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific. Five of them are nuclear-powered. Two more Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (the George Washington and the Abraham Lincoln) are under construction. Appropriations for building another two warships of this class are now being considered. All these constitute an offensive potential, a constant threat to peace.

The Washington leaders use yet another nasty ploy—ascribing to the Soviet Union a desire for “global projection of Soviet military power.” Here again, however, the White House is at loggerheads with the facts and, indeed, with its own statements. It has to recognize the fact that, on the basis of equal treaties and agreements, Soviet military contingents are stationed only in the territories of some allied states in Eastern Europe and the countries directly bordering on the USSR—Mongolia and Afghanistan. At the same time, the US armed forces are deployed in dozens of countries and have a ramified network of military installations and bases, mostly near the Soviet Union’s borders.

American nuclear-capable aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered missile submarines and groups of surface combatant ships are on continuous patrol near the shores of Europe, the Far East, Africa and in the Indian Ocean.

The almost 400,000-strong Rapid Deployment Force is kept in a state of constant readiness for transfer thousands of kilometres from the American mainland. According to President Ronald Reagan, the USA intends to conduct international affairs “from a position of strength,” imposing its will on other states. Striking examples of the pursuit of this policy are provided by US actions toward Grenada, Libya, Lebanon and the countries of Central
America; the military aid to reactionary regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America; the declaring of whole geographic areas as zones of “vital interests;” and the establishment of interventionist formations and special commands for the conducting of military operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia and the Caribbean.

Washington is presenting the Soviet military doctrine in a distorted light. Referring to non-existent “Soviet publications” and twisting the statements by Soviet leaders, certain US Administration officials allege that Soviet military doctrine is of an aggressively offensive nature and that the USSR is prepared to win a nuclear war by means of a preemptive strike. Such allegations are entirely groundless, as are the references to the Soviet leadership. No Soviet party or state official has ever said, nor could have said, anything of the sort. The very opposite is true.

Soviet military doctrine is of a strictly defensive nature. It contains no pre-emptive-strike concepts or guidelines for first use of nuclear weapons. The USSR is a most convinced opponent of nuclear war in whatever form. It proceeds from the assumption that a genuine peace can and must be assured without nuclear weapons. A compelling proof of the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine is the USSR’s pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and also its willingness, given reciprocity, to have the level of military confrontation drastically reduced, nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons fully eliminated, and the sides’ military potentials limited to defense-required sufficiency. The Soviet Union seeks neither more security at others’ expense, nor will it agree to less. Equal security for all is the essence of Soviet military doctrine.

In contrast, US military doctrine has been based on pre-emptive strike and a constant readiness for first use of nuclear weapons virtually from their inception. It still continues to be offensive. Its underlying political idea is US world hegemony, an ambition to dictate the Americans’ will in any region, to any state, employing all available means for this purpose, including weapons of mass destruction. From the US doctrine it follows that reliable peace cannot be ensured without nuclear weapons, and nuclear war is viewed as an acceptable tool for achieving political aims.

The tendentiousness and bias of NATO “experts” building up the myth of a “Soviet military threat” are also clearly manifest in the way they appraise the correlation of forces between the USSR and the USA and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. In an attempt to disguise their aggressive plans, NATO strategists have been alleging that there exists a Warsaw Treaty-favoring “disbalance” in conventional arms in Europe. They particularly insist on this now to cover up their own refusal to cut and eliminate nuclear weapons, and to justify their non-acceptance of a Warsaw Treaty proposal to significantly reduce the forces and conventional arms in Europe. The West intentionally distorts the real correlation in military potentials between the sides, gives selective comparisons of individual types of conventional arms and disregards military-economic, human and material resources, geographic position and other factors of the military-strategic situation.

Genuinely objective analysis of this important issue implies viewing military potentials in their entirety, including the population numbers and force strengths of all states of the two military alliances. The forces of France, Spain and US and other NATO members’ reserve formations are groundlessly excluded from Western assessments, while the Warsaw Treaty armies’ numerical strength is considerably exaggerated. However, US Secretary of State George Shultz, addressing the National Press Club in Washington on October 17, 1986, gave a close-to-real appraisal: “So we (that is, NATO—Ed.) have a population and resource base that’s formidable... So when people say that if it comes down to a non-nuclear world and it’s conventional forces, we’re outclassed, I just don’t believe it.”

An example of distortions of reality is the US approach in evaluating the so-called technological base of military production. When the US Administration wants to get military
budget increases from Congress or its allies, it says that the Soviet Union in many fields of military production either surpasses, or has achieved an equal technological level with NATO, and that divisions of the US and other NATO countries are equipped with arms inferior to those of Soviet divisions. But when the Administration is out for restrictions on exchanges of technology with the USSR and socialist-community nations, it says a different thing, claiming the West's superiority in arms development and production methods. So where lies the truth?

The truth is that the sides' technological capabilities tend to level up, though development gaps persist in individual fields. For this reason the sides' armaments in general may also be considered as roughly equal in quality. In addition, it can be said that not only does a strategic balance exist between the USSR and the USA, but a scientific and technological one as well. There is nothing the USA can produce that the USSR cannot. The progress in science and technology has reached a point where the eternal struggle of "sword and shield," of offensive and defensive arms is now solved not in one, but in many areas. The USSR and other Warsaw Treaty states are paying sufficient attention to strengthening their scientific and technological potential in response to NATO's ever-increasing military-economic preparations and will not allow the West an advantage over them in military technology.

There are other unsubstantiated and even absurd claims on the part of the USA and NATO, all geared to present the current rough parity of forces as the West's "lag" behind the USSR and Warsaw Treaty and thus get the Western public to meekly accept arms budget increases and further arms race, primarily, the race in nuclear arms.

A concrete and objective review of the armed forces, the scale of military production, the military strategy and the foreign policy objectives of NATO's chief force—the United States of America—will help to give a clear understanding of all these matters.
Chapter II

The US War Machine

US Military Doctrine and Strategy as Instruments of Aggressive Policy

The military doctrine of a state results from its socio-economic system and policy, and reflects, above all, its attitude to crucial war-and-peace issues. So the military doctrine is determined by the social essence of a state, its prevalent ideology, and its social system and policy.

The US military doctrine is rooted in the idea of global domination which was proclaimed at the turn of the century. Developing this idea in a message to Congress in 1945, President Truman stressed that the victory which the US had scored, had brought the American people face to face with the constant and burning necessity of leading the world. Almost all postwar American presidents have proclaimed this idea in one way or another. The current American military doctrine was formulated in the main soon after the end of World War II when the US had the atomic monopoly. The now declassified official report “American Relations with the Soviet Union,” which President Truman endorsed in September 1946 as a fundamental document, read: “... the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare. A highly mechanized army, which can be moved either by sea or by air, capable of seizing and holding strategic areas, must be supported by powerful naval and air forces. A war with the USSR would be ‘total’ in a more horrible sense than any previous war and there must be constant research for both offensive and defensive weapons.”

In August 1948 the US National Security Council approved the US Objectives with Respect to Russia (NSC 20/1). This Directive stated:

“Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:
“a. To reduce the power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and
“b. To bring about a basic change in the theory and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia.”

Further on the Directive said:
“This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control...”

This is how US leaders formulated the political objectives of the US military doctrine in classified directives in the 1940s. They also projected them into concrete plans of war against the USSR. These plans were drafted in detail, and even specified the number of atomic bombs which were supposed to wipe out Moscow, Leningrad, and other Soviet cities. Way back in 1945, the Pentagon contemplated the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities. In 1948 it planned to drop 200 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities (Charioteer); in 1949 300 bombs on 100 cities (Dropshot); and in 1950 320 atomic bombs on 120 cities (Trojan).

These documents show what the United States had in mind for the world almost as soon as World War II ended. Now US officials in Washington often say that these plans are history. But, in the first place, this was not so long ago, and, furthermore, little has changed since then. Thus, Presidential Directive 59 (1980), which became public knowledge, was even more outspoken in formulating the US goals: destruction of socialism as a socio-political system, first use of nuclear weapons, prevalence over the USSR in a...
nuclear war and its termination on terms favorable for the United States.

Thus, the objectives of the US military doctrine are to defeat the USSR as a state, to destroy its economy, and to do away with communist ideology. President Reagan put it like this: “We'll dismiss it (communism—Ed.) as a sad, bizarre chapter in human history...”

These words are matched by deeds. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are enmeshed in a web of hundreds of American military bases which host tremendous amounts of modern weapons. More than twelve thousand strategic nuclear warheads are trained on the USSR.

And one more thing. Since the United States acquired nuclear weapons it has never denied its intention to use them first. A nuclear first strike was the backbone of all postwar American military doctrines—take “massive retaliation,” “flexible response,” or “realistic deterrence.”

With the advent of the Reagan Administration the cult of crude force has become central to US policy toward the Soviet Union and other countries. The views of the American hawks were expressed in the doctrine of “neoglobalism,” which provides for a vast package of political, economic, ideological, and military measures to “roll back communism,” and for the direct use of armed force against those countries where the US sees a threat to its “vital interests.” The US military doctrine has also become more aggressive. The strategy of “countervailance” vis-à-vis the USSR on both a global and regional scale has formed the basis of this doctrine in the 1980s. US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that the “countervailance” strategy is to reach complete and indisputable US military superiority, to restore US leadership in the world, and to vigorously counter Soviet action throughout the world. The Pentagon’s guidelines justify the arms race politically, and fully suit the reactionary quarters of the United States, and the military-industrial complex, which makes greater profits than the other spheres of material production.

But this is a political foundation of the US military doctrine, the formulation of objectives and tasks. And what about war plans? How are the American leaders going to wage it?

Specific provisions of the military doctrine on this score have been outlined in the Pentagon’s Defense Guidance. Two items in this document deserve special mention.

First, in a nuclear war, the United States “must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.” In order to accomplish this task, it is planned to render ineffective the total Soviet military and political power structure, and to destroy industry critical to military power. All this is planned in the belief that the US can survive a nuclear war and emerge victorious from it.

Second, the warfare plans provide for the first use of nuclear weapons both on a global scale and in the theater of hostilities. In view of this, timely deployment of new nuclear weapon systems in Europe is a priority for the United States. The plans stress that it is necessary for the US to speed up the development of new strategic nuclear systems (MX and Midgetman ICBMs, Trident II SSBN ballistic missiles, new heavy bombers, and long-range cruise missiles). The task is set before the US that it should be ready for waging effective operations using space weapons and refrain therefore from signing treaties that may hamper the development of space weapon systems, systems that will strengthen the available US capability.

The said provisions of the Pentagon document show that the US military doctrine is offensive and stakes itself on the use of nuclear weapons. It foresees continued nuclear arms buildup and in effect precludes any opportunity for ensuring a lasting peace without nuclear weapons. This idea is embodied in the programs for armed forces development, and in specific plans for their use.

The US armed forces are getting ready for different kinds of wars—nuclear and conventional, all-out and “limited,” and for “low-intensity” conflicts. The Pentagon directives lay the main emphasis on preparations for an all-out nuclear war. Such a war against the
USSR and its allies is intended to reach most ambitious political and military-strategic goals, and to make full use of nuclear and conventional arsenals, manpower and economic potentials.

While preparing for an all-out nuclear war, and in an attempt to ensure US survivability, the Pentagon is working on various scenarios of what it calls a “limited” nuclear war. The US leaders contemplate it as being waged far from American territory, primarily in Europe, as a war involving a limited number of nuclear weapons so that the US could avoid nuclear retaliation. With this end in view, the White House is taking steps to deploy in Western Europe over 570 medium-range missiles which, in its opinion, will enable the United States to attain political ends in Europe in a “limited” nuclear war that won’t spread to the rest of the world.

The US doctrine also provides for the conduct of a total war against the USSR and other socialist countries with conventional arms alone. In US view, such a war may engulf Europe which is regarded as the main theater of hostilities, as well as the Middle East, Southwest Asia, the Far East, and all sea and ocean theaters. It could be protracted, in which case it would require mobilization of the material and manpower resources of not only the US, but its allies too. For this reason the White House has accelerated preparations of the US general-purpose forces and military-industrial potential for a protracted war against the USSR and its allies simultaneously in several theaters of war. This policy is reflected in the program for the 1980s and 1990s which is already being implemented, and which envisages overall modernization of the armed forces, improvement of their strategic and tactical mobility, combat readiness and efficiency, training for protracted warfare, building up stocks of material resources, and expanding the mobilization capabilities of the war industry and the country as a whole.

Analyzing the international situation in the context of US-Soviet relations, and regarding the USSR as a “threat” to American interests in the developing countries, the US military doctrine has recently laid special stress on so-called “low-intensity” conflicts. Under this term the American leaders imply various forms of armed violence which do not escalate into a “limited” war, as well as a show of force, political actions and ideological subversion. The United States resorts to such actions so as to counter the domestic political developments in those countries whose governments are not to its liking.

The term “low-intensity” conflicts stands for thoroughly planned and quite polished global actions against national liberation and other progressive movements or governments. Such conflicts include, for example, armed aggression against Grenada in 1983; support for the pro-American reactionary regimes in Central America, and for counterrevolutionary forces fighting against legal governments in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and other developing nations; and military actions against sovereign Libya under a pretence of “combating international terrorism.”

The Reagan Administration views “low-intensity” conflicts not as a special type of combat operations but as a method of implementing one of the provisions of its military doctrine which determines the most expedient way of armed interference in the home affairs of the developing nations in a given situation. It also regards “low-intensity” conflicts as a form of global confrontation with the USSR. This extremely reactionary and aggressive concept of the US military doctrine has been increasingly reflected in recent years in the development and direct employment of the US armed forces.

Provisions of the military doctrine are being implemented in the framework of numerous military-strategic concepts. These concepts specify preparation of the armed forces, economy and nation for war; determine the strategic tasks of the armed forces, as well as manpower and equipment for their fulfilment; map out measures to prepare the theaters of war; and analyze potential methods of starting and waging military conflicts and wars of differing scale and intensity.

Thus, the “airland battle” concept adopted
by the Pentagon in 1982 outlines the use of
general-purpose major field forces and for-
mations in combat operations, primarily in
the European theater. The concept provides
for a surprise joint launch of hostilities by
ground, air, and naval forces applying the
latest means of warfare to defeat enemy
troops, achieve an overwhelming superiority
over the enemy, and capture its territory in a
decisive offensive.

The US military strategy is tried out at
command post and field exercises of differing
scale and purpose, which the US leaders con-
sider important for testing and amending war
plans. The number and scale of exercises on
land, in the air, and at sea are growing with
every year. They are being held as close as to
the Soviet borders as possible. Various scenarios
for wars, including those that involve the use
of nuclear weapons, against the Warsaw
Treaty countries are being tested out more
and more openly during the exercises. The
Pentagon is planning and carrying out major
mobilization deployments and strategic troop
lifts to overseas theaters, mainly to Europe,
and joint operations involving conventional,
chemical and nuclear weapons.

Many troop exercises still have an obvious
anti-Soviet tone: the “enemy” troops wear
Soviet uniforms and use Soviet weapons and
combat hardware. The overwhelming ma-
ajority of the ground and naval exercises of the
US and NATO are manifestly provocative.

Such is the gist of the US military doctrine.
It graphically reflects the global ambitions of
US imperialism as embodied in the Pentagon-
drafted multioptional plans for aggressive
wars, including those that involve nuclear
weapons. The US large-scale material prepa-
rations for war jeopardize peace, pushing
mankind to the brink of disaster.

Armed Forces of the USA

The United States maintains the largest and
technically best equipped armed forces in the
capitalist world. The military and political
leaders of the country regard them as the
major, and, in certain cases, the only means
for attaining their political ends in the inter-
national arena. The overall strength of the US
armed forces together with reserves has grown
by almost 200,000 men in the last two or three
years to exceed 3,000,000. In addition to that,
the armed forces hire more than 1,000,000
civilians. In strength and armaments they sur-
pass the combined armed forces of major
European NATO countries.

Structurally, the armed forces of the United
States consist of the Army, Air Force, and
Navy, including their regular and reserve
components.

The President is commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. He has in effect unlimited
powers in using the armed forces if the US
Congress declares war or if the President
himself proclaims a state of emergency in the
US. In the latter case the President may order
the use of armed force without seeking pre-
liminary permission from Congress. This right
was realized in US aggression against
Grenada in 1983, in the bombing of Lebanese
territory and in its shelling by warships of the
US 6th Fleet the same year, and in the bandit
attacks of the US Air Force on Libya in
March and April of 1986. In all these cases
the President did not request the sanction of
Congress for the use of armed force against
soviet countries.

To prepare for war in different theaters and
to make control more effective, the US armed
forces have set up seven unified and three
specified commands. They form a peacetime
operational structure which is geared to the
execution of wartime tasks.

Under the strategic concept of “forward
defenses” which provides for overseas mil-
itary operations, five out of the seven unified
commands are deployed or have a sphere of
responsibility outside the United States. There
are unified commands in the Atlantic and the
Pacific, in Central and South America, and in
Europe. There is also the unified Central
Command (CENTCOM) with a zone of re-
sponsibility covering 19 states of Southwest
Asia and Northeast Africa plus adjacent
waters. The unified Space Command, set up
in 1985, controls all near-Earth space; there it
is already planning Star Wars under the
Strategic Defense Initiative. It has been decided to establish a unified command of US special-operations forces to incorporate all special-operations units of all services, which are designed for intelligence and subversion both in peacetime and during war.

To accomplish its aggressive schemes, the United States has already permanently deployed its most powerful groups of armed forces in direct proximity to Soviet frontiers in Europe and the Far East. If need be, CENTCOM may quickly deploy forces at the southern frontiers of the USSR. The Pentagon has already drawn up plans for their combat use, which are tested out in annual exercises of the US Rapid Deployment Force in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Depending on purpose and mission, the US armed forces are divided into strategic, general-purpose, strategic mobility forces, and reserves.

Strategic Forces

The backbone of the US military power and nuclear potential is the strategic offensive forces. These include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and strategic aircraft. That is the so-called American strategic triad.

On October 11, 1986 (the Reykjavik Summit), the US strategic offensive forces had 2,208 nuclear delivery vehicles:
- 1,018 ICBM launchers;
- 672 SLBM launchers;
- 518 heavy strategic bombers (including 289 in operational units and 229 in depots).

The vehicles in operational units can lift more than 14,000 nuclear warheads with a yield ranging from 50 kt to 10 mt each in one launch/sortie.

As of January 1, 1987, the ground-based strategic missile forces have 540 Minuteman III missile launchers, 450 Minuteman II and 10 Titan II launchers. In addition to that, 10 fundamentally new MX ICBMs have been placed on combat duty, and another 40 are being prepared for deployment on silo launchers. The US ground-based ICBMs can lift 2,180 nuclear warheads in one launch. More than 90 percent of ICBMs are permanently kept on combat duty, ready for use at any moment. The US military and political leaders regard these forces as a means for delivering a first nuclear strike.

The sea-based strategic forces consist of 38 nuclear submarines equipped with Trident I (384 launchers), Poseidon C-3 (256 launchers), and Polaris A-3 (32 launchers) ballistic missiles carrying nearly half of all strategic nuclear warheads. More than half of SSBNs are on continuous combat patrol in areas from which nuclear strikes at targets in the USSR and other socialist countries can be delivered from different directions.

The combat units of strategic aviation have 291 B-52 and B-1B heavy bombers equipped with modern nuclear weapons (air bombs, SRAM guided missiles, and air-based ALCM-B cruise missiles). In addition to this, there are 60 FB-111A medium bombers specially designed for use in Europe. The basic purpose of the strategic aircraft is delivering nuclear strikes, but the military-political leaders of the US rely on it in other missions as well. In peacetime one of its major missions is a show of force. For this purpose, B-52 bombers make regular flights to regions of US “vital interests”—the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Western Europe, the Far East and Australia, to name but a few. The use of strategic bombers with conventional munitions is actively practised for the tasks of local warfare.

In estimating the US strategic potential, one should take into account the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles and ground-based cruise missiles deployed in a number of West European NATO countries. Although these missiles are not intercontinental in range, they are essentially strategic weapons as regards the USSR because they can hit targets on a considerable part of its European territory and are meant for first-strike purposes.

The US and NATO are planning to have by 1988 in their Europe-based nuclear missile forces 108 Pershing II medium-range ballistic
The US Armed Forces

**THE STRENGTH OF US ARMED FORCES**

Total personnel 3,302,000
including:
Army 1,532,000
Air Force 800,000
Navy (including Marines) 970,000
Organized reserve 1,124,000

**COMPOSITION OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES**

Personnel about 400,000
Divisions 4-5
Combat aircraft over 700
Combat ships 20-30

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**US ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE**

Personnel 355,600
Divisions 4
Separate brigades and regiments 9
Combat aircraft 910
Combat ships 23

**US ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA**

Personnel 22,000
Separate brigades 1

**CONUS ARMED FORCES (INCLUDING ALASKA)**

Personnel 2,425,000
Divisions 25
including those to be transported to Europe at least 13
Separate brigades and regiments 30
Combat aircraft over 4,300
Combat ships (including 6 aircraft carriers) 70

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**2nd FLEET**

Air carrier carriers 5
Escort ships 117
Nuclear-powered submarines 50
Combat aircraft 720

**3rd FLEET**

Air carrier carriers 4
Escort ships 98
Nuclear-powered submarines 25
Combat aircraft 550

**5th FLEET**

Air carrier carriers 6
Escort ships 34
Nuclear-powered submarines 40
Combat aircraft 300

**6th FLEET**

Air carrier carriers 5
Escort ships 20
Nuclear-powered submarines 30
Combat aircraft 200

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**THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE**

ICBM launchers
Strategic bombers
Nuclear-powered ball submarines (SSBN)
SLBM launchers

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**THE NATO TREATY MEMBER STATES**
B-52G STRATOFORTRESS STRATEGIC BOMBER. Range: 15,000 km with internally carried missiles. In addition to SRAMs and nuclear bombs, the bomber has been armed with ALCM-B cruise missiles since 1981. It can carry up to 20 such nuclear missiles with nuclear warheads.

FB-11A SUPersonic BOMBER. The US strategic air force has 60 such planes. Range: 5,100 km. To increase its combat radius, it is equipped with an in-flight refuelling system and external fuel tanks. Combat load: 6 SRAM missiles or 8 nuclear bombs. It can carry up to 15,000 kg of conventional bombs.
NEW POWERFUL PHASED-ARRAY RADAR built in Thule (Greenland), ostensibly as a modernization project. It is planned to build a second radar of this type near Fylingdales Moor in Britain. These radars are intended for an early warning of a ballistic missile attack and can be used in the US comprehensive BMD system. The deployment of such radars outside national territories constitutes a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

missile launchers (Federal Germany) and 464 ground-based cruise missiles (160 in Britain, 112 in Italy, 96 in Federal Germany, and 48 in each of Belgium and the Netherlands). These plans are being intensified. As of January 1, 1987, all of 108 Pershing II launchers and 256 cruise missiles were deployed in Western Europe.

The strategic defense forces of the United States consist of the manpower and equipment of the Army, Air Force, and Navy operationally subordinated to the Aerospace Defense Command of the North American continent. They supplement the potential of the strategic offensive forces and continuously supply the political and military leaders of the United States and NATO with data on the aerospace situation and with intelligence information on a world scale.

The US strategic defense forces include satellites for ballistic missile launch detection, radar and optical posts for tracking ballistic missiles, space objects and air targets, air defense interceptors, and a ramified network of ground and underground command and control centers. About 200 Aerospace Defense Command installations are located on the territory of the USA, Canada, Greenland,
Iceland, other European NATO countries, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and other countries. Many surveillance posts are deployed in immediate proximity to the borders of the USSR, and probe deep into Soviet air space.

The operational systems of the US Aerospace Defense Command are being constantly improved and extended. In the last few years alone two new nuclear missile attack early warning posts, five space surveillance posts, and new control centers of operational air defense districts have been set up. The air-space surveillance system for the continental US and Alaska has been completely modernized and many air defense fighter units have been re-equipped with the latest F-15 fighters. Now the Pentagon is planning E-3A AWACS aircraft for Canadian territory as part of the strategic defense forces.

At present the United States is building (in Texas and Georgia) new powerful Pave Paws radars which can be used for BMD (ballistic missile defense) of its continental part. An over-the-horizon radar for the long-range detection of air targets is going up in Maine. Re-equipment of air defense radar posts has been launched in the northern districts of Canada, and the air defense fighter forces continue to be rearmed. The US is planning to build another three over-the-horizon radars on its territory and to expand the air situation monitoring network in Iceland, and to carry out large-scale organizational and practical measures in the field of civil defense.

Construction of the latest, phased-array radar at the air force base in Thule, Greenland (disguised as modernization) constitutes a direct violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is also planned to build a similar radar at the Fylingdales Moor in Britain. It is well known that the ABM Treaty prohibits deployment of such radars outside national territory.

Not limiting itself to the territory of its neighbors, the USA is building up the number of installations of its Aerospace Defense Command in far-off regions. A new space-monitoring post is being completed on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and another two are slated for deployment in Portugal and on the Mariana Islands in the Pacific. Furthermore, an over-the-horizon radar for monitoring the Soviet Far East is going to be built in Japan with US technology.

To sum up, the United States is deploying its aerospace surveillance installations on a global scale. In future they may be used both for BMD purposes and for ensuring combat use of space-strike weapons.

**General-Purpose Forces**

The US general-purpose forces comprise the Army, Tactical Air Force, and Navy (less nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines). They are the basic component of the US armed forces designed to conduct military operations overseas. In peacetime, their mission is to secure US global political interests.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “deployed conventional forces provide highly visible evidence of the US commitment to deter... attacks against US interests.”

In peacetime, the general-purpose forces engage in muscle-flexing exercises, become involved in “low-intensity” armed conflicts and suppress national liberation movements. In wartime, they carry out ground, air and naval operations, independently or jointly with US allies, in land and ocean war theaters.

**The US Army** is the backbone of the US general-purpose forces. The US Army Field Manual FM 100-1 says that “the Army’s capability to apply force and to establish and maintain land control affords the national command authority flexibility in terms of the range of political and military options available to it.” It has been equipped and is still being provided with advanced, high-precision offensive weapon systems and military hardware. Considering its wartime reserves, the US Army has:

- about 300 ballistic missile launchers, including 150 for sophisticated Pershing IIs;
- more than 14,000 tanks, including 4,700 advanced M-1 and M-1A1 Abrams tanks;
M-1 ABRAMS MAIN BATTLE TANK. Army units have been supplied since 1980 with new M-1 tanks which have almost twice the combat capability of the M60 tanks. American forces in Europe have been the first to receive the new tanks. It is planned to produce about 7,500 M-1 Abrams tanks by 1988. The first 3,200 tanks have been armed with a 105-mm rifled gun, and the rest with a 120-mm smoothbore gun developed in Federal Germany. The M-1 Abrams tanks will also be supplied to the US Marine Corps.
— about 24,000 highly maneuverable infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers;
— up to 17,000 field artillery pieces and mortars, including 4,350 nuclear-capable howitzers;
— over 330 multiple-launch rocket systems, each carrying 12 rockets;
— 17,000 antitank guided missile launchers;
— more than 5,000 air-defense weapon systems;
— about 10,000 Army planes and helicopters, including over 1,000 armed with antitank guided missiles.

The US Tactical Air Force has more than 9,100 aircraft of various types.

The US Navy comprises:
— about 1,000 warships and auxiliary vessels (including the reserve), of which 450 are major combatant ships, including 106 multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines;
— 20 aircraft carriers, including 16 multipurpose flattops (of which 5 are nuclear-powered);
— 5 air-capable ships and 320 other vessels;
— more than 5,000 planes and helicopters, including 2,650 combat aircraft.

In addition, the Marines have over 700 tanks and more than 900 field artillery pieces and mortars, including about 400 nuclear-capable howitzers.

In line with the conception of "forward basing," the main groupings of the general-purpose forces have been deployed even in peacetime and are maintained outside the territory of the United States in possible war theaters.

The most powerful overseas grouping of the US general-purpose forces is deployed in Europe. It consists of 355,000 officers and men, is provided with the latest offensive weapons and equipment, commands a high degree of firepower and, together with the troops of Federal Germany, is the main strike force of NATO's allied armies aimed against the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries. US General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, says the US European Command is muscle in the heartland.

The US European Command accounts for about 30 percent of the US Army regulars, up to 220 launchers for ballistic missiles, 5,000 tanks, 2,500 field artillery pieces and mortars, over 5,000 antitank guided missile launchers, 1,200 Army planes and helicopters, including 330 armed with antitank guided missiles.

The US armed forces in Europe have more than 900 combat aircraft, including over 400 F-111, F-4, and F-16 fighter-bombers which are medium-range aircraft. They are capable of delivering nuclear strikes throughout the territories of the European socialist countries, including the European USSR.

The Pentagon is planning a considerable reinforcement of its European-based armed forces with Army and Tactical Air Force personnel and equipment to be brought from the mainland United States. To ensure rapid buildup of this grouping, it has stockpiled in Europe enough hardware for four Army divisions and is currently setting up similar stocks for two more backup divisions. The US command reckons this puts it in a position to promptly airlift six mechanized and armored divisions with appropriate combat and logistic support units and with a total strength of up to 400,000, and by so doing to sharply increase the US European Command's offensive capability. Work is well under way in Norway to lay in stocks of combat materiel and equipment and logistic supplies for a Marine amphibious brigade. In his report to the US Congress on the Administration's defense budget for the 1988/1989 fiscal year, the Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger said: "We will continue to complement our rapid deployment capabilities by expanding our stocks of prepositioned material overseas."

To carry out operations in NATO's zone of responsibility, above all in Europe, the US Navy maintains its 6th and 2nd Fleets in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; these consist altogether of nearly 200 warships, including 7 multipurpose aircraft carriers, up to 54 nuclear-powered submarines, and 900 combat planes, of which some 300 are carrier-based nuclear-capable attack aircraft that can reach Soviet territory.
In recent years both fleets have been involved in a series of criminal adventures of US imperialism. Ships of the 2nd Fleet attacked Grenada and carried a landing party that invaded that sovereign country. Combat aircraft of the 6th Fleet took part in bombing raids against Libya.

More than 7,000 nuclear weapons are available to the general-purpose forces in Western Europe. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in Europe has at his disposal several hundred submarine-launched strategic nuclear missile warheads.

At the moment some of the nuclear munitions, either obsolete themselves or with delivery vehicles which have become obsolete and been discarded, are being replaced with new ones. Though the grand total of American nuclear munitions in Europe will not increase as a result of this replacement, their destructive power will grow substantially.

The grouping of the general-purpose forces that ranks second in importance is stationed in the Pacific. It has 500,000 personnel, about 180 warships and over 1,100 combat aircraft. Much of this grouping is deployed in the Western Pacific, including South Korea and Japan, that is, in immediate proximity to the Soviet Far East. A special role is assigned to the naval forces, notably the 7th Fleet which is to be greatly reinforced soon and, in an emergency, to be further augmented with major parts of the 3rd Fleet stationed in the Eastern Pacific.

A large US naval task force is deployed in the Indian Ocean, with its backbone consisting of a carrier battle group (up to 15 combatant ships) of the 6th and 7th Fleets. The flattop carries up to 90 combat planes, including 40 nuclear-capable attack aircraft. This task force can be reinforced in emergency situations mainly by airlifting the interventionist...
F-111 FIGHTER-BOMBER. Combat radius: up to 2,000 km. Nuclear-capable. A number of such aircraft, based in Britain, took part in the US piratical air raid on Libya in April 1986.

Rapid Deployment Force to the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

To reduce the time required for a buildup in the Indian Ocean zone, hardware and 30 days' logistic supplies for a Marine amphibious brigade and Army and Air Force units have been prepositioned on ships permanently anchored at Diego Garcia Island.

The US armed forces in the zone of Central and South America are maintained to secure US control of the Panama Canal, to ensure US military presence in the region, and to suppress the national liberation movements there. As General Paul Gorman, former commander of these forces, has said, they are a “sentinel of US interests in Latin America.” For this same purpose a regional US Forces Caribbean Command has been formed consisting of ground, air and naval components.

The general-purpose forces in the continental USA are a strategic reserve meant chiefly to reinforce US armed forces overseas, above all in Europe. Most of these forces are part of the Readiness Command, whose prime mission is to organize rapid transportation of units and formations to overseas theaters of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that the USA has great capabilities for a rapid airlift or sealift of these forces to any corner of the world.

For the purposes of applying political pressure and creating a threat of armed intervention in any region of the world, primarily in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and increasing the direct military threat to the Soviet Union from the south, the United States has formed the interventionist Rapid Deployment Force, which is subordinate to the unified US Central Command (CENTCOM). The total strength of the Rapid Deployment Force approximates 400,000 officers and men. Its backbone is made up of 4-5 highly mobile Army divisions (to be increased to six), several independent brigades, and special-operations
and logistic support Army units. Attached to this force are 11 tactical air wings (more than 700 combat aircraft), 28 strategic bombers, airborne command posts, tanker aircraft, reconnaissance and AWACS planes of the USAF; three carrier battle groups, one surface action group, five shore-based maritime patrol aircraft squadrons, an amphibious Marine division and an amphibious Marine brigade of the US Navy.

According to Pentagon spokesmen, the strength of the Rapid Deployment Force may be augmented and its composition changed by the additional inclusion of two amphibious Marine brigades, tactical aircraft units and combat and logistic support units.

So, in addition to the groups deployed by the US in the west and the east, invasion forces have also been formed for action in the south.

**Worldwide Military Command and Control System**

The United States has set up a worldwide command and control system to run its armed forces deployed around the world. This system consists of nearly 130 top-level government and military agencies, including the staff of the President as the Commander-in-Chief, the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the command and control bodies of the unified commands in strategic zones (Europe, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and Central and South America), the unified Central Command, the unified Aerospace Defense Command, the commands of the Army, Air Force and Navy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and so on. It also comprises a large number of primary and alternate command centers hardened against nuclear attack, airborne and mobile ground command posts, and the requisite primary and standby command, control and communications systems.

All command centers operate around the clock. A SAC command post is continuously airborne. In the Pentagon’s military preparations special importance is attached to the development and improvement of wartime command, control and communications systems, and particularly mobile (space, airborne and ground) components thereof, which are capable of surviving and functioning effectively even in a nuclear environment.

The US worldwide military command and control system makes extensive use of automated systems. In times of crisis and in wartime the command centers and airborne JCS command posts can issue orders to employ strategic offensive forces directly to ICBM launch control centers, to the crews of strategic bombers that are airborne, and to those of nuclear-powered missile submarines patrolling the high seas.

By and large, the US worldwide military command and control system is maintained in a state of standby readiness even in peacetime to ensure continuous command and control of ground, air and naval forces during nuclear or conventional warfare.

**Ramified Network of Military Bases**

The United States has formed a far-flung network of military bases and installations in all strategically important regions of the world in order to carry out its neoglobalist policy, a policy from a position of strength. Large air and naval bases, Army and Marine garrisons, Pershing II and GLCM bases, and launch-pads for tactical and surface-to-air missiles—these and other military facilities are intended to ensure a large US military presence in many foreign countries on a permanent basis even in peacetime, a fast buildup in an emergency, and early preparation for action against the countries of the socialist community, primarily the Soviet Union, as well as against newly-liberated nations.

At present, the United States has close to 1,600 military bases and installations with a total of more than 500,000 personnel in 34 foreign countries and their overseas territories. The United States is using these facilities to exert direct pressure on the governments in question and keep them in the mainstream of US policy, and also to threaten
Major US Military Bases and Installations on Foreign Territories

- Pershing II ballistic missile bases
- GLCM bases
- Army and Marine bases
- Air bases and airfields
- Naval bases, stations and ports
- Surveillance, communications and navigational installations, and radar posts
### Territories

#### US Military Bases and Installations on Foreign Territories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>Number of bases and installations</th>
<th>Including main (major) ones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>over 50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>over 700</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>about 700</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>over 1,000</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PACIFIC AND FAR EAST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>over 30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>about 130</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>over 120</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>about 70</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>about 350</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE AMERICAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermudas</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>about 20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>about 50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantánamo (Cuba)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>over 20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>about 130</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER REGIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa and the adjacent islands</td>
<td>about 40</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>over 15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego Garcia I.</td>
<td>about 20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries and territories</td>
<td>about 20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>about 100</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altogether</strong></td>
<td>about 1,600</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### National Military Bases, Airfields and Ports Used by US Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Number and types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1 airfield, 1 naval base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8 airfields, 1 naval base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3 air bases, 2 naval stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3 airfields, 1 port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1 airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>5 airfields, 2 naval stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3 air bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2 air bases, 1 naval station, 1 port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
progressive and bolster up reactionary regimes.

US military facilities abroad include depots of nuclear and chemical weapons, ammunition and other supplies, air and outer space scanning posts, shore-based sonars, signal intelligence and communications centers, navigation and control facilities for space-based military systems, and other elements of the infrastructure essential to the operation of the US armed forces.

The majority of US military bases and installations are located in immediate proximity to the countries of the socialist community, including the Soviet Union. The Americans have more than 270 major military facilities in West European countries alone. Because the Pentagon regards these countries as a springboard for attack on the Warsaw Treaty states and for a policy of statesponsored terrorism against other nations, the West European countries in question are held hostage to the Pentagon’s nuclear arms policy and hegemonic ambitions. Notably, the number of US military installations in Western Europe is steadily increasing. More bases are being built at a fast rate in Britain, Federal Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy for new first-strike nuclear delivery vehicles spearheaded against the Soviet Union. The US is expanding overseas facilities to make them capable of handling large US troop contingents, and is building depots for arms, military equipment and supplies. Every year the United States allocates over 500 million dollars for the construction of bases and other installations. At the same time, the Pentagon contemplates moving the US forces stationed in Europe closer to the frontiers of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The Pentagon attaches great importance to NATO’s southern flank, Turkey, where the United States has 60 military facilities. The US Defense Department sees that country as a bridgehead for military operations against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in the Balkans and as a transit base to be used by the Rapid Deployment Force in the event that it is sent to the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The United States is completing the first stage of a program to build a system of C-5A GALAXY MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. The principal means for rapid airlift of heavy arms to overseas theaters. Range with full 100-ton load: over 6,000 km.
military bases in the Middle East and South-west Asia, which it has declared a zone of its "vital interests," and on the routes expected to be used by the Rapid Deployment Force on its way to the region. A multipurpose military base is going up at top speed on Diego Garcia. The modernization of existing bases and facilities and the construction of new ones is being completed in Oman, Somalia and Kenya; these have been used by US forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. In the next few years, the United States is planning to spend some 300 million dollars on military construction in the region and along troop movement routes. Furthermore, the US armed forces are using national bases and airfields in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and a number of other countries. The "strategic cooperation" agreement with Israel grants the United States unrestricted use of military bases and the right to build logistic support facilities in that country.

In the Far East and the Western Pacific, where its second largest overseas force is stationed, the United States has about 350 military bases and installations along the perimeter of the Asia-Pacific region and in the mid-Pacific. There are over 120 US bases and facilities in Japan and about 130 in South Korea, where it has been decided to site US Lance missiles equipped to carry conventional, nuclear and neutron warheads. The Subic Bay and Clark Field bases in the Philippines are the largest in the Pacific. The USA has over 15 bases and other facilities in Australia.

The United States and countries hosting US bases spend enormous sums on the upkeep of these bases and the construction of new ones. Japan alone allocates around 300 million dollars out of its national budget annually for building US military installations on its territory.

In Africa (South Africa, Morocco, and Liberia) and on islands near it, the Americans are using some 40 military facilities.

Furthermore, the United States continues its unlawful occupation of the Guantánamo naval base—a part of Cuban territory that it uses as a major springboard for aggression against socialist Cuba and newly-liberated nations in Central America. The United States has turned the territory of Honduras into a bridgehead for direct aggression against Nicaragua. It has invaded Grenada and is turning the island into a US outpost in the southern part of the Lesser Antilles. And it rendered direct support to Britain's aggressive actions in the region of the Falkland Islands (the Malvinas).

The ramified network of US military bases and facilities abroad, and the plans and practical measures to expand this network are central to the US policy of neoglobalism, whose objective is world supremacy.

The Bid for Military Superiority

Buildup of the Strategic Nuclear Potential

An intensified buildup of the nuclear potential, primarily of strategic nuclear weapons, is a key trend in the US war preparations and efforts to secure military superiority over the USSR.

In an attempt to justify this course, the Reagan Administration repeats its allegation, which long ago became hackneyed, that in the 1970s its predecessors did nothing to upgrade strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time it says nothing about the fact that by the 1970s the United States had deployed more than 1,000 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs and nearly 700 heavy bombers. The United States had one and a half times as many delivery vehicles and three times as many warheads as the USSR had. Nevertheless, in the 1970s the United States increased its total of ICBM and SLBM warheads by 300 percent. The average increase for the US strategic triad as a whole (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) was 100 percent. The United States had 5,000 warheads on strategic delivery vehicles in 1970 and 10,000 such warheads in 1980. Such are the facts.
ICBM MX. Latest ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missile tipped with ten 600-kt independently targetable warheads. Range: 10,000 km. Accuracy (CEP): 90 m. Has more than three times as many warheads as the Minuteman III, and almost six times as great an aggregate yield, and is three times as accurate. The first ten missiles were made operational in 1986. All in all, it is planned to deploy 100 such ICBMs.

New US Programs Building Up Strategic Offensive Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of delivery vehicles</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1986-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midgetman</td>
<td>500-1,000</td>
<td>1992-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident II</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1989-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52s carrying cruise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missiles</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1981-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1Bs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1985-1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATB bombers</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1992-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sea-based</td>
<td>about 4,000</td>
<td>1984-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air-launched</td>
<td>over 3,000</td>
<td>1981-1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it increased the number of its nuclear warheads in the 1970s, the United States also laid the groundwork for a massive modernization of its nuclear potential. The development of the MX ICBM and of the B-1B strategic bomber proceeded quickly. The construction of a new generation of nuclear-powered missile submarines and the manufacture of Trident I (C-4) SLBMs was begun. Research and development (R&D) work on the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile and a family of long-range ground-, air- and sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles went into top gear.

With technological preparations completed, in the late 1970s the United States began major programs to modernize its strategic triad, converting 300 Minuteman III ICBMs to carry MK12A re-entry vehicles, each consisting of three enhanced-yield warheads, and equipping 12 Poseidon SSBNs with Trident I missiles (the two programs were completed in 1983).

Furthermore, work was begun on a B-52 modification capable of carrying ALCM-Bs (so far, ALCM-Bs have been installed on 132 B-52s, and by 1990 the number of such aircraft equipped with strategic cruise missiles is to rise to nearly 194).

The first Ohio-class nuclear-powered missile submarine, equipped with 24 Trident Is, was launched in 1979. Eight such submarines
Lafayette-class SSBN (length 129.5 m)

Ohio-class SSBN (length 170.7 m)

OHIO NUCLEAR-POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE (below, compared with Lafayette-class SSBN). In November 1981, the US Navy acquired the Ohio—the first SSBN of the Trident system. This submarine, having a displacement of 18,700 tons and a length of 170.7 meters, carries 24 Trident I (C-4) missiles. The combat capability of one Ohio-class submarine is superior to that of 10 SSBNs with 160 Polaris A-3 missiles. In 1989, the Reagan Administration plans to equip Trident-system submarines with a still more powerful missile, the Trident II (D-5). The range of the Trident II is half again as great as that of the Trident I, its payload is nearly 100 percent greater, and it is 400 percent more accurate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trident I (C-4)</th>
<th>Trident II (D-5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (km)</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of warheads</td>
<td>8 × 100-150</td>
<td>7 × 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and their yield (kt)</td>
<td></td>
<td>14 × 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy (CEP) (m)</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relative dimensions of Trident I (C-4), left, and Trident II (D-5), right, in launchers of an Ohio-class nuclear-powered missile submarine.
are now in operation and six more are being built. An Ohio submarine has almost twice the displacement of a Poseidon submarine, 1.5 times the number of its missile launchers, and 2.5 times the aggregate yield of its warheads. In combat capability, one Ohio-class SSBN is superior to ten Polaris nuclear-powered missile submarines.

As was said above, with the coming to power of the Reagan Administration, the United States dramatically intensified its efforts to build up strategic arms. In 1981 it adopted a comprehensive “strategic program” for the period up to 1990, adding new strategic programs to the earlier ones.

Special emphasis is laid on the building up of strategic ballistic missiles. In the 1990s the US Navy is to have 20 submarines with a total of 480 Trident II missiles on board. Under the Pentagon’s tactical and technical specifications, the Trident II SLBM has as great hard-target kill capability as the MX ICBM, which proves that it is a first-strike nuclear weapon.

New ground-launched ICBMs are being developed fast as well. MX ICBMs are now on assembly lines and their deployment has been going on since June 1986. Equipped with ten 600-kt warheads, an MX is several times as effective as a Minuteman III. Altogether, the Pentagon intends to deploy 100 MXs, making some of them mobile.

Meanwhile, a new high-accuracy mobile ICBM, the Midgetman, is being developed. This project has been actively pursued since 1983. Presently, the Pentagon intends to deploy, starting in 1992, 500-1,000 Midgetman ICBMs. Furthermore, it has been announced that another mobile missile system will be developed.

New B-1B strategic bombers have been manufactured for the US Air Force since mid-1984. These planes are being adopted by the US Strategic Air Command. Besides B-52 aircraft, the Pentagon plans by 1989 to buy 100 B-1Bs, each capable of carrying up to 30 long-range cruise missiles. B-52s will continue to be rearmed with such missiles as well. The second generation of air-launched advanced
B-1B STRATEGIC BOMBER. Range: 12,000 km. Maximum combat load: 56,700 kg. The aircraft can carry up to 30 cruise missiles (ALCM-Bs).

ICBM MIDGETMAN. The Pentagon has been working on the Midgetman, a land-based lightweight strategic missile (left) since 1983. Range: 11,000 km. Warhead yield: up to 1.5 Mt. In order to enhance its survivability the missile will be mounted on hardened mobile truck-launchers. Two prototypes of such launchers (top) were tested for resistance to the shock wave of a nuclear blast in 1986. The missile is to be adopted in 1992. In all, 500-1,000 Midgetman ICBMs will be deployed. According to experts, the entire program will cost 38 billion dollars.

Stealth cruise missiles with an increased range will begin to be produced in 1987. Altogether, up to 1,500 such missiles are to be made. The Pentagon also has plans for the manufacture and purchase of 1,600 AASM supersonic strike missiles for strategic bombers.

Work is being stepped up on a strategic advanced technology bomber (ATB) which, as it is based on the essentially new Stealth technology, the Pentagon believes could escape existing air defense systems and thus be used in a surprise attack. The first such aircraft will begin to be built in 1987, and by the mid-1990s the US Strategic Air Command is to have 132 ATBs, in addition to its B-1Bs and B-52s.

On completing the deployment of MX ICBMs, Trident II SLBMs, air-launched cruise missiles and new strategic bombers, the Pentagon will have increased the total number of nuclear warheads that can be delivered by its strategic offensive forces in one launch/sortie by at least 50 percent in the 1980s alone. Also, by the mid-1990s the US Navy is to be supplied with about 4,000 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, including more than 750 with nuclear warheads; these are to be installed on 150 nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships. The missiles would be able to pinpoint targets anywhere in the USSR and other socialist countries.
Weapons for Outer Space and the Creation of a Large-Scale Antiballistic Missile Defense

In addition to building up strategic nuclear armaments, the USA is also developing weapons to be deployed in outer space.

Back in the early 1960s major research was conducted into the development of interceptor satellites (Projects Bambi and Saint); antisatellite missile systems were deployed on Kwajalein and Johnston Islands in the Pacific and at the Vandenberg Air Force base in California; and missiles to intercept target satellites were launched repeatedly. At the same time work was carried out to develop weapons for hitting targets in the atmosphere and on Earth from space. For example, development was started of a rocket plane—an orbital aircraft (Project Dyna-Soar) designed to strike against ground targets. In its space-related activities the Pentagon was then guided by the words of President Johnson to the effect that the nation which would dominate outer space would also dominate the Earth.

In the 1970s the Pentagon continued intensive research into space-based combat systems, developed new means to intercept artificial Earth satellites and studied the possibilities for using Spartan antimissiles and Trident and Minuteman ballistic missiles for these purposes. Work continued on the development of new antiballistic missile systems. This is confirmed by General Rogers, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In an interview given to the French magazine Science et vie in October 1985 he said that when he was Army Chief of Staff, he supervised all ABM research, and the instructions given to them were: (a) to step up research to prevent the Russians from gaining an edge; (b) to develop a prototype and test it. This research was in full swing in the US as early as 1972.

All those years the Soviet Union had been working hard to convince the USA of the danger of military encroachments on outer space (USSR memorandums of March 18 and April 30, 1957, and March 15, 1958). It proposed to conclude treaties banning the deployment of any types of weapons in outer space and prohibiting the use of force in space and from space against the Earth. But the militarists would not yield to common sense. The United States stepped up work to use outer space for military purposes.

Washington made a particularly sharp turn towards the militarization of outer space when the Reagan Administration came to office. Since 1981, on personal instructions from the US President, work has been accelerated to select the most promising ways of developing effective weapons for destroying targets in outer space, and targets in the atmosphere and on Earth from space. A special presidential directive on US national space policy, with its numerous imperial claims to US domination in outer space, was issued. US military and political leaders regard scientific and technological superiority in military applications of outer space as a prime objective. The gambit is for fundamentally new space weapons. Allocations for military space programs have increased: in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 they reached 8.5 billion, 9.3 billion, 12.9 billion and 15.8 billion dollars, respectively. The allocations for militarizing outer space are to grow still further in real terms: in 1988 they may be as high as 20 billion dollars.

While stepping up the race in the latest space weapons, the United States is also working hard to develop antisatellite systems which are based on existing technologies and which can be made operational by the end of the current decade. Work is under way on developing an ASAT antisatellite system based on the F-15 aircraft armed with SRAM-Altair missiles. The system is intended to destroy targets at altitudes of up to 1,000 km by homing non-nuclear warheads. It is planned to continue its testing in 1987. The intention is to have up to 40 such systems in two Air Force squadrons stationed on the US West and East coasts and, if necessary, to station them on the territory of other allied states or on aircraft carriers cruising in the world oceans. Of course, this is not being done for defense. It is offensive weapons and preparations for aggression that are involved. According to Thomas Karas, the author of
numerous studies in the field of US military space programs, “there is not much point in building up our own antisatellite forces unless we are planning to strike first, to start nuclear war.”

The manned reusable Shuttle-type spacecraft are being put to obviously military uses: various means for detection and destruction of space targets are being developed for them. They are also to be used for developing and testing fundamentally new weapon types. On the basis of the experience gained in the course of the Shuttle Program, a Pentagon-commissioned effort is under way to develop manned and unmanned space planes that could take off from Earth, space platforms or large transport aircraft.

In developing space weapon systems the US Department of Defense cooperates closely with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Invariably, up to 25 percent of the NASA budget is spent on programs connected with military uses of outer space. Cooperation between NASA and the Defense Department in the use of Shuttle spacecraft was outlined in a special memorandum of March 27, 1980. A NASA program which costs more than 12 billion dollars continues; it envisages the creation of a long-term military orbital station by the early 1990s. Components of the worldwide military command and control system of the US armed forces can be deployed on such stations in outer space.

Large land-based projects are being built in the continental United States to direct and support active operations in space. The Defense Department is building a consolidated space operations center near Colorado Springs, Colorado, a space defense operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, and

![ASAT AIR-LAUNCHED ANTISATELLITE MISSILE SYSTEM](image) (An F-15 firing a SRAM-ALTAIR interceptor missile). The missile carries a homing warhead designed to knock out space targets at altitudes of up to 1,000 km. The program costs 3,600-4,500 million dollars.
EXPERIMENTAL HOMING INTERCEPTOR PROJECTILE. Designed to knock out ICBMs beyond the atmosphere. Being developed by Lockheed. Due to be installed on land-based multiple-warhead BMD missiles. Such a projectile propelled by a rocket launched from the Kwajalein atoll on June 10, 1984, scored a direct hit on a real Minuteman ICBM warhead at an altitude of over 150 kilometers. The development and deployment of multiple-warhead BMD missiles, including those armed with homing interceptor projectiles, is prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty.

a special military space Shuttle launch complex at the Vandenberg Air Force base, California. Due to be operational before 1990, these facilities are to ensure control of outer space; to choose and implement measures to protect US satellites; to guide air-launched antisatellite missile systems; and to launch Shuttle spacecraft into polar and near-polar orbits under Defense Department programs.

The scope of space weapon development in the USA is also evident from the organizational structure of the bodies charged with direct preparations for war in space. That structure is being constantly refined. Space commands have been set up in all branches of the US armed forces: in 1982 SPACECOM (Air Force), in 1983 NAVSPACECOM (Navy), and in 1986 it was decided to form a US Army Strategic Defense Command. A unified space command under the JCS was established in 1985 for the centralized control of preparations within all the armed forces of the US for war in space.

The Pentagon’s efforts to turn outer space into a battlefield are camouflaged by Washington’s propaganda about some invented “Soviet military superiority in space,” by blatant misinformation that the United States is developing space weapons only because
MANNED SPACE SHUTTLE, used to orbit military satellites and conduct surveillance from outer space. Adapted for testing various types of weapons, detecting and destroying space targets, and deploying space-strike weapons. Weight: 70-80 tons. Payload: up to 30 tons. Service altitude: 100-600 km. Following the Challenger disaster in January 1986, three space shuttles remain in operation and another one is to be built. For military launches a special site has been constructed at Vandenberg Air Force base, California. The program has cost about 30 billion dollars.

similar projects have already been “launched” in the USSR. All these are deliberate lies. In actual fact, the United States seeks to extend the arms race to yet another sphere—to outer space—and to threaten the Soviet Union and other nations from there.

In March 1983, a most menacing Star Wars program, officially named the Strategic Defense Initiative, was announced in the US. It is now being implemented at a rapid pace, with some 70 billion dollars allocated for research and development in its framework alone in the current decade.

Washington is trying to present SDI as an innocuous “instrument” for “studying ABM technologies” which is allegedly necessary for taking a decision in the early 1990s on the feasibility of deploying an ABM defense system on US territory. In fact, SDI is an extensive military program for developing strike weapons and deploying them in space, an attempt to turn outer space into a potential theater of war, to gain military superiority through space. Dreams of world domination have hypnotized the US ruling circles and the SDI program has become the centerpiece of the Reagan presidency. Some 7.5 billion dollars has already been spent, more than 50 R & D projects have been launched and 400 firms and research institutions in the US given 1,200 contracts in the SDI framework. Britain, Federal Germany, Italy and Israel are already involved in SDI at government level. Japan is preparing to sign an appropriate agreement.

What are Washington’s plans? First, to create a large-scale space-based ABM system for US territory which would guarantee the
destruction of incoming enemy missiles. The system is to be composed of various types of weapons, such as high-energy lasers, particle beam weapons, antimissiles (including multiple-warhead) with conventional or nuclear warheads, and electromagnetic rail guns. In the past few years, there has been a growing emphasis on developing particle beam weapons, as well as X-ray lasers produced by nuclear explosions and microwave and kinetic energy weapons. Second, at the same time to build up considerably the strategic offensive arms for quite a definite purpose of achieving the potential for a first, “disarming” nuclear strike.

To put it differently, the Washington strategists, on the one hand, are seeking to deploy new space-based strategic strike forces which, combined with offensive strategic arms, would enable the USA to deliver a first nuclear strike at the Soviet Union with impunity, and, on the other, to cover US territory with a multitiered antimissile defense system and thereby disable the USSR from delivering a retaliatory strike. Disregarding the lessons of history and the actual alignment of forces, they nurture dangerous plans for finding, by means of space weapons, a method of assured destruction of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and at the same time for making the United States “invulnerable” in a nuclear conflict, in short, for sparing themselves, while plunging others into the horrors of a nuclear war. The illusory hopes for victory in a nuclear war and for world dominance are the core of the Washington strategists’ philosophy. Therein lies the real danger of the US Star Wars plans for the whole of mankind.

By their characteristics, the space arms developed under the SDI program are offensive weapons. They can be used for surprise destruction of the other side’s vital spacecraft, in particular, its missile early warning satellites, so as to “blind” it, to take it unawares, and ruin its chances for countering a nuclear attack.

Having a considerable range (up to 4,000-5,000 km), space weapons can destroy not only targets in space, but those on Earth, in the atmosphere and at sea from space. Scientists say that such a space strike could in a matter of minutes throw an industrialized country several centuries back into the Middle Ages.

The space-strike weapons envisaged by the SDI program are, in effect, global weapons. Placed in orbit and equipped with a flight maneuver system, they can quickly appear over the territory of any state and threaten its security. With their stand-by readiness and almost instantaneous action, they would leave no time to take countermeasures.

The US Star Wars program is highly dangerous both militarily and politically. It is jeopardizing the entire system of international law as regards arms limitation and reduction and the strengthening of security. If implemented, it could well cancel what has been created over decades. The White House has set about ruining the treaty system by withdrawing from the 1972 Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT II Treaty. Next in line is the 1972 ABM Treaty. The SDI program runs counter to that treaty. Article I of the ABM Treaty commits each party “not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense,” while under Article V they undertake “not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.” By seeking to take ABM components into space, the USA is directly threatening these fundamental ABM Treaty provisions.

Washington sometimes invokes Agreed Statement D to the ABM Treaty. But all provisions of the Treaty comprise an integral whole and are designed to ensure compliance with the chief commitment contained in Article I. Agreed Statement D is an integral part of the ABM Treaty and cannot be opposed to other provisions of the Treaty, notably Article V prohibiting the development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. Statement D provides for an opportunity to develop and test ABM weapons based on physical principles other than those existing on the date of signa-
MULTILAYERED BMD SYSTEM WITH A SPACE-BASED SEGMENT. According to the Pentagon concept, the basic components of such a system will be essentially new types of weapons, including lasers and kinetic energy weapons based on orbiting space platforms. These weapons will have characteristics enabling them to strike at any targets both in space and on Earth. The 1972 ABM Treaty bans the development of such weapons, let alone their deployment.

US Concept of a Multilayered Ballistic Missile Defense System with a Space-Based Segment:
1—ICBM boost phase; 2—battle station; 3—early warning satellite; 4—submarine-launched missile lofting an X-ray laser into space; 5—ICBM post-boost phase during which the missiles deploy their warheads and decoys; 6—a powerful land-based laser; 7—orbital reflecting mirror; 8—warheads in mid-course phase; 9—BMD sensor responsible for the identification, acquisition and tracking of targets; 10—space platform carrying kinetic energy weapons; 11—warheads in terminal phase; 12—air-launched antisatellite missile system; 13—long- and short-range antimissiles.
SPACE BATTLE STATION EQUIPPED WITH AN ELECTROMAGNETIC RAILGUN, designed to destroy ballistic missiles and other space and air targets. Being developed by many US firms under Defense Department contracts. Ultimate goal is to create railguns capable of firing 2.5-3 kg projectiles with a muzzle velocity of 35 km/sec, over a range of 3,000-5,000 km.

ORBITING LASER BATTLE STATION, designed to knock out satellites, ballistic missiles and other targets. Being developed by TRW Inc. and Rocketdyne under the supervision of the US Department of Defense.
SKETCH OF A NUCLEAR-POWERED X-RAY LASER. This system being developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is designed to knock out ballistic missiles in boost phase. It will also be capable of hitting satellites in orbit. The X-ray lasing action is initiated by a nuclear explosion. The appropriate testing involving underground nuclear explosions has been conducted in Nevada.

ture of the ABM Treaty, but only with respect to limited ABM areas (with a radius of 150 km) that each party can have under Article III of the Treaty, and only with respect to stationary land-based systems deployed there. Therefore, the USA has no legal grounds for implementing the SDI program.

The US Administration proposes to the USSR to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and thereby to pave the way for implementing the US plans for large-scale space-based ABM systems. It must be made abundantly clear that the USSR will never agree to blow up the ABM Treaty.

SDI fully undermines the Treaty, makes it senseless, and thereby destroys the mechanism checking the nuclear arms race. It is directly aimed at deploying weapons in space and, by virtue of this, would inevitably become a powerful catalyst to the arms race in all fields. In so doing, it would dramatically weaken the security of the USSR and the USA, and world security in general. The program is the chief obstacle to a nuclear-free world.

There is a fundamental contradiction in the US approach to the ABM Treaty. While claiming that it wants to go on observing it, the United States is in fact seeking to undermine and ultimately scrap that vital document. It was no accident that the USA has made a number of steps to weaken it. At first, there appeared various “interpretations” of the Treaty, followed by a proposal to replace it by a new treaty which would “squeeze in” SDI and provide for the deployment of a space-based ABM system. But if SDI is in accord with the ABM Treaty, as Washington insists, why then did President Reagan propose in Reykjavik that a new treaty be signed to replace the existing ABM Treaty of unlimited duration, while making cuts in strategic offensive arms?
The USSR is in favor of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime. It wants the parties not to use their right of withdrawal from the Treaty for as long as possible and not to do anything that might breach the limitations it envisages. The USA, though agreeing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a certain number of years, would like for all these years to conduct SDI research and testing of space-based ABM systems or components in space, and to start deploying new space-strike weapons immediately upon the expiry of the non-withdrawal term. Ostensibly "concerned" for the future of the Treaty, the USA is, in fact, seeking to erode and undermine it both piecemeal and in toto.

The American side is consciously ignoring the key premise of the ABM Treaty, which says that the conditions for limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms can only be created by renouncing the deployment of a territorial ABM system, and is deliberately seeking to distort the meaning of the Treaty by giving it an interpretation that suits it at present. After all, accepting this key premise of the ABM Treaty would mean recognizing the soundness of the Soviet stand and the need to jointly search for accords on non-deployment of weapons in space, and to renounce the illusory hopes to gain military superiority over the USSR through space.

SDI research into the development of nuclear-powered weapons is endangering many other international agreements, such as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1967 multilateral Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies which prohibits taking weapons of mass destruction to space, and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. All these documents were signed by official US representatives.

Therefore, the key issue today is preventing an arms race in space and preserving the ABM Treaty. The Star Wars weapons, if they emerge from laboratories to be stationed in space and, consequently, blow up the ABM Treaty, will bring the world to such a point beyond which processes with unpredictable consequences will begin. "Any attempt to strengthen deterrence by adding strategic defenses to strategic offensive forces," said former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in October 1986, "will lead to a rapid escalation of the arms race. Each side would develop not only missiles and antimissiles but also anti-antimissiles, anti-anti-antimissiles, and so on. ... Were we to drop futile war-fighting notions, we would see that many things we already have or are busily acquiring are either superfluous or downright dangerous to us."

Development of General-Purpose Forces

The US gives much attention to enhancing the combat capability and combat readiness of the general-purpose forces, to preparing them in advance for operations of long duration in areas far removed from US territory. For this purpose, these forces are constantly equipped with the latest arms and materiel; the organizational structure and composition of command-and-control elements and units are being streamlined; the logistic support system is being improved; strategic and tactical mobility is increasing. The units of general-purpose forces are being prepared for diverse missions in wars of various scale and duration, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.

Theater nuclear weapons. As part of the buildup of general-purpose forces, the US military command attaches great importance to expanding the theater nuclear forces (or non-strategic nuclear forces, NSNF), and especially in Europe, although the Pentagon admits that the US NSNF are available for use worldwide. The delivery vehicles and nuclear munitions of the US armed forces deployed in Europe have undergone substantial qualitative change. As a result of repeated modernizations, their range, accuracy and kill capability have been heightened. The obsolete and tactical missiles have been scrapped and
The USA has 640 nuclear-capable aircraft as medium-range delivery systems (1,000 km and over) for the European theater. In addition, West European NATO countries have over 200 nuclear delivery vehicles with a range of more than 1,000 km. In accordance with the decision of the December 1979 session of the NATO Council since 1983 the USA has been deploying Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with a range of up to 2,500 and 2,600 km respectively, on the territory of West European countries.

All in all, it is planned to deploy 572 such missiles (108 Pershing IIs and 464 GLCMs).

The deployment of all Pershing II ballistic missiles in the FRG was completed in 1985. It is planned to complete the deployment of cruise missiles in 1988 (160 in Great Britain, 112 in Italy, 96 in the FRG, 48 in Belgium and 48 in the Netherlands).

The USA has stored over 7,000 nuclear munitions in more than 150 depots in Western Europe.
The coverage of the new US medium-range missiles deployed in Europe.
PERSHING II MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE. Range: 2,500 km. Nuclear-tipped, with a 100 kt warhead. Accuracy (CEP): 35 to 40 m. A total of 108 launchers for these missiles have been deployed in Federal Germany and put in combat readiness. All launchers are reloadable. Pershing II missiles are intended for a surprise attack against targets on the territory of the European USSR.

replaced with new, more accurate and longer-range ones. On the territory of Federal Germany, in place of the 108 Pershing IA missiles with a range of 740 km, the same number of medium-range (up to 2,500 km) Pershing II nuclear missiles have been deployed. Of the 464 GLCMs with a range of up to 2,600 km scheduled for deployment in Britain, Italy, Federal Germany, and Belgium more than 250 have been stationed so far. These nuclear missiles are first-strike weapons designed for surprise attack on major targets in the European part of the USSR and on the territory of other Warsaw Treaty countries.

The nuclear-capable artillery of US forces in Europe has been modernized. Today, all 155-mm and 203.2-mm artillery pieces can fire nuclear shells. Their range has increased from 15 to 30 km.

Mass production of neutron weapons continues. One of the priority areas of research work conducted in this sphere is the development of a 155-mm neutron artillery shell to be put into service in the late 1980s. The new shell will be a third type of US neutron munitions (the first two types—the warhead of the Lance missile and the 203.2-mm artillery shell—were put into service in the early 1980s). Neutron weapons are designed for mass destruction of personnel and make it possible to conduct offensive operations almost immediately after use.

GLCM LAUNCHER. Range of missile: 2,600 km. Accuracy (CEP): 30 m. Warhead yield: up to 200 kt. Over 250 such missiles have been deployed in Britain, Italy, Federal Germany and Belgium. In all, it is planned to deploy 464 such missiles on the territories of these countries, as well as in the Netherlands. GLCMs are intended for a massive nuclear strike against targets practically throughout the European USSR.
The nuclear potential of the US Navy is being built up. Fourteen surface ships and 25 submarines have already been equipped with 300 Tomahawk cruise-missile launchers. In all, some 200 such vessels are to be armed with cruise missiles of this type, with the number of nuclear cruise missiles to come close to 800 by 1995. Work is under way on the development of nuclear weapons of four new types: Sea Lance and Asroc II anti-submarine guided missiles intended for arming submarines and surface ships, respectively; Standard II shipborne surface-to-air guided missiles; and new depth-charge aerial bombs.

The US land forces are being modernized under the large-scale Army-90 program, which provides for re-equipping them with more destructive weapon systems, heightening their strategic mobility and increasing their capability for sustained operations overseas. The purpose of the measures taken is to prepare the land forces for offensive operations on any scale in any armed conflicts outside the US—from so-called low-intensity operations for supporting reactionary regimes and suppressing national liberation movements to wars involving the use of nuclear and chemical weapons.

The basic direction in building up the land forces is to increase their striking and fire power, and to enhance their maneuverability in the battlefield and combat capability as a whole. The tank systems of the land forces are

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**M-2 BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE.** Adopted by the US Army in 1981. Nearly 3,500 such vehicles have been supplied to the Army, and by late 1990 there will be about 7,000 such vehicles. The M-2 vehicle is armed with a twin TOW antitank guided missile launch tube (ready-use ammunition: 7 missiles), a 25-mm automatic gun (ready-use ammunition: 900 shells), and a 7.62-mm machine-gun (ready-use ammunition: 2,200 rounds). Fuel endurance: 480 km. The armor protects the crew from small arms fire, fragments and 25-mm hard-core shells fired from a distance of 300 m. The system is also available as the M-3 Bradley scout vehicle.
being constantly renewed. In the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the land forces received several modified versions of the M48 and M60 tanks which were new at the time. In the late 1970s, they began to be replaced by the more powerful M60A3 battle tanks. The year 1980 saw the beginning of the serial production and deliveries to the troops of new and more sophisticated M-1 Abrams tanks (more than 4,700 such tanks have already been supplied, including some 1,800 delivered to Europe), M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and M-3 Bradley scout vehicles (about 3,500 such vehicles have already been delivered). In all, it is planned to supply the land forces with some 7,500 Abrams tanks and about 7,000 Bradley fighting vehicles, as a result of which the total number of their tanks will grow by more than 40 percent and the striking and fire power and maneuverability of troops will increase.

The buildup of the land forces' fire power is effected through developing qualitatively new weapon systems, increasing the number and improving the quality of existing field artillery pieces and ammunition, developing, in cooperation with the US Air Force, a highly-effective Assault Breaker reconnaissance attack weapon system intended for in-depth strikes. Since 1983, the troops have been supplied with large quantities of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). The salvo of one such 12-tube rocket system is equal to that of three 203.2-mm howitzer battalions. More than 20 MLRS batteries, each having nine launchers, have been deployed to date. Research and development is under way on a cluster warhead for the MLRS with six hom-
ing submunitions. The expected range of this rocket system will be some 40-45 km.

Between 1960 and 1986, the number of nuclear-capable artillery pieces in the land forces increased from 280 to more than 4,000. A 25-percent increase of nuclear-capable artillery in Europe is planned by 1990. It is to be secured by providing the divisions of the land forces with a larger number of 155-mm and 203.2-mm artillery pieces.

The land forces are being re-equipped with antitank weapons, including helicopter-borne ones. The obsolete antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) of the 1960s have been replaced by

AH-64A APACHE
HELICOPTER GUNSHIP.
Carries 16 Hellfire antitank guided missiles (with laser homing warheads) and a 30-mm gun. The program up to 1989 envisages delivery of 536 such helicopters to a sum of about six billion dollars.
more sophisticated Tow and Dragon missiles. A third generation of these missiles—Hellfire ATGMs—has been developed and their deliveries have started to the troops (more than 15,000 ATGMs have already been purchased by the Pentagon; there are plans for purchasing about 50,000 such missiles). ATGMs now in service are being modernized. Their number is growing along with their qualitative improvement. There are more than 2,100 improved Tow ATGMs in land forces. Since 1983, more powerful Tow IIIs have been supplied to the troops, including those in Europe. In all, it is intended to deliver 141,000 such missiles. The Copperhead antitank semi-active laser-homing artillery shell with a range of 16 km is being put into service. More than 10,000 such shells have already been supplied to the troops. Deliveries have started of AH-64A Apache helicopter gunships each equipped with 16 Hellfire ATGMs. The first battalion of such gunships was deployed in 1986. By the end of the 1980s the number of antitank weapon systems in the land forces is to almost double.

The organizational structure of units is being modernized. A new table of organization of the so-called Division-86 is being adopted. The plans of the US command envisage that such divisions will have a high offensive potential and fire power, increased mobility, effective antitank and air defense weapon systems, and the ability to conduct effective operations in the conditions of em-

F-16 FIGHTER-BOMBER. Combat radius: over 1,000 km. Nuclear capable. Maximum combat load (missiles, rockets, and bombs): 6,700 kg. In service with the USAF since 1979.

ploying weapons of mass destruction and radioelectronic means of warfare. Two new types of divisions (motorized and light infantry) designed for rapid airlift to any region of the world and for operations in unprepared theaters, such as those in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and Central America, have been introduced in the land forces.

A drastic reorganization is under way in the special-operations forces intended for intelligence, subversion and other similar activities in various regions of the world in time of peace and war. The special weapon systems they are armed with are being improved and the strength of these forces is being increased. In May 1987 it is planned to complete the establishment of a joint command of special-operations forces, which will include all special-operations forces and materiel of the armed services deployed in the continental United States. The Pentagon has even established the post of assistant secretary of defense for special-operations forces and low-intensity conflicts.

In the buildup of the tactical aviation great attention is paid to further increasing its striking power, enhancing its combat readiness and ability to conduct sustained combat operations. Since 1976 the US Air Force has received all the planned 727 A-10 Thunderbolt attack aircraft for close ground support. Air Force units have been supplied with 116 F-4C Wild Weasel special-purpose aircraft designed to detect and immediately destroy land-based air-defense facilities with guided missiles and conventional bombs. The deployment of the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which now includes 34 E-3A aircraft, has been completed. The Air Force has received all its 42 EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft. The purchase and supply continue of up to 270 all-weather F-15 fighters and F-16 fighter-bombers a year. Altogether, 4,000 aircraft of this type are to be produced.

The new aircraft are delivered, first of all, to the forward-based air groups, especially in Europe, where in recent years the number of fighter-bombers has increased by more than 20 percent to total 650. Over 80 percent of the aircraft are intended for offensive operations and two-thirds of all aircraft are nuclear-capable. The US command is making efforts to ensure the possibility of tripling the num-
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FIGHTER (ATF). Tactical aircraft proposed by Lockheed as a competition design. Will be based on Stealth technology and have artificial intelligence and other advanced electronic equipment.

The number of US tactical aircraft in Europe in a matter of 10 days (to more than 2,000 aircraft).

The US preparations are in full swing to deploy in Western Europe a fundamentally new weapon system—a PLSS (precision location strike system), which has a greater firepower than that of existing systems and is designed to neutralize air-defense systems and ensure in-depth offensive operations by tactical aviation and other forces.

The United States is continuing to build up its naval forces, to which Washington assigns a special role in its aggressive global strategy, considering them a major instrument for show of force and direct military intervention. The implementation of the program announced by the US Administration for increasing the overall number of ships in the regular naval forces up to 600 in the 1980s is in full swing. According to Pentagon officials, the aim of the program is to ensure that maritime superiority can be maintained by the United States and its allies in key ocean areas. The US Navy has now received 175 new ships, including five Ticonderoga-class missile...
cruisers and 36 Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. Three out of four Iowa-class battleships have been reactivated, modernized (equipped, among other things, with Tomahawk cruise missile and Harpoon antiship missile launchers) and recommissioned as regular naval ships. The fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt has been built and funds have been earmarked for the construction of two more nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

Surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines are being equipped with Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads. This will considerably broaden the traditional functions of the US Navy; from now on not only aircraft carriers but also escort ships can strike at remote land-based and coastal targets. The possibility of delivering strikes with all types of cruise missiles from torpedo tubes in submarines and launchers in surface ships enables the US Navy Command to equip any submarine or large surface ship operating off the shore of any country with high-accuracy nuclear-tipped Tomahawk missiles having a range of 2,600 km.

The US Navy is modernizing its air force by providing it with new nuclear-capable F/A-18 Hornet and AV-8B Harrier aircraft.

JACKSONVILLE NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE (of the Los Angeles class). Displacement: 6,900 t. Armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles (with conventional and nuclear warheads), Harpoon antiship missiles, Subroc antisubmarine nuclear weapons, and torpedoes. The US Navy has 36 such submarines.
TICONDEROGA GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, an important new asset in the buildup of the striking power of the US Navy's aircraft carrier forces and surface action and amphibious groups. Displacement: 9,200 t. Armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles (with conventional and nuclear warheads), Harpoon antiship missiles, air defense and antisubmarine missiles, guns, and torpedoes. It is planned to build 27 such cruisers.

Research and development in tactical aviation is oriented to modernization of existing and creation of new air-to-surface and air-to-air weapon systems.

The firepower of the Marines, one of the major instruments of US aggression and military interference in the affairs of sovereign states, is growing. In the late 1980s the M60 tanks currently in service with the Marine Corps will be replaced by M-1 Abrams tanks. The number of field artillery pieces in the Marine Corps has grown. The 105-mm guns are being replaced by new 155-mm howitzers. As a result, virtually all the Marine Corps artillery has become nuclear-capable.

The Marine Corps aviation is being supplied with a new heavy assault helicopter, the CH-53E Super Stallion, which can carry more than 90 percent of organic materiel in service with an RDF Marine amphibious brigade. To make the Marines' landing operations on enemy shores more effective, the landing craft of the Navy are being modernized and new amphibious ships and air-cushion landing boats are being built to ensure the deployment of US armed forces in any region of the world.

To increase the mobility of the RDF Marines the United States has built 13 depot ships to carry heavy armaments and stocks of logistic supplies for combat operations of three Marine amphibious brigades. The first group of such ships has been stationed in the East Atlantic, the second in the Indian Ocean and the third in the West Pacific. For the same purpose special ships are being built which are capable of unloading combat equipment and other cargoes in unprepared shore areas. Plans are afoot to supply the Navy with eight high-speed container ships,
six of which will be re-equipped to sealift a mechanized division of the land forces. The ships will be on 5-day readiness for embarkation.

Extensive R & D work is being conducted in military radioelectronics to meet the needs of all armed services. Special attention is paid to increasing the survivability of the strategic command, control and communication centers and developing land-, sea-, air- and space-based intelligence and early-warning facilities and satellite communication and navigation systems.

To make a breakthrough in the battle management system, which has so far been based mainly on microelectronic and computer technology used in civilian industry, it is planned to implement a strategic computer program, which envisages increasing the speed of computers hundreds and thousands of times without increasing their weight or size, all at a cost of one billion dollars over a 10-year period that began in 1984.

Research is under way on developing powerful “intellectual” computer systems for troop and weapon management facilities. Such systems should be able to quickly evaluate data supplied by numerous sensors and take decisions on the use of weapons. The adoption of such systems, however, is fraught with dangerous consequences because the likelihood of a failure in a sophisticated electronic device will increase substantially. Even simpler systems fail and, as was many times

NEW JERSEY BATTLESHIP. Displacement: 58,000 t. Reactivated, this battleship has been modernized and armed with the latest weapon systems, including Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon antiship missiles. For several months in 1983 the New Jersey, as part of the US Navy’s task force in the Eastern Mediterranean, systematically shelled civilian targets in Lebanon, using, among others, its 16-in main battery guns.
the case in the United States, may mistakenly signal a missile attack on the USA. According to the Defense Monitor bulletin, the US early-warning systems had given 20,784 false alarms between 1977 and 1984.

Preparation for Chemical Warfare

The US armed forces gained vast practical experience of using chemicals for military purposes during the war in Indochina where they made extensive use of defoliants. More than two million Vietnamese, over 60,000 American servicemen and several thousand Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders were affected. Some 150,000 hectares of tropical forests, 44 percent of pasture land, 70 percent of the coconut palm groves and 10 percent of arable land in Vietnam were contaminated. Irreparable damage was inflicted on land and water ecological systems. In expert opinion, it will take more than a hundred years to restore the destroyed mangrove forests. The genetic effect of the agents on people is even more dreadful. More newborn infants with congenital deformities are one such effect.

Armed with the experience of the Vietnam war, the United States is preparing for chemical war now. It has stockpiled an enormous amount of ready-for-use chemical weapons. The US stocks of highly toxic agents today amount to about 55,000 tons, deadly nerve gases and blister and blood toxic agents accounting for a major part of them. Over 3 million artillery shells, hundreds of thousands of land mines and charges and tens of thousands of air bombs and other chemical munitions are stored at military depots. The Pentagon maintains ten large chemical weapons depots for chemical ammunition and lethal toxic agents in containers in the continental USA, the Pacific area and Western Europe. The total volume of toxic agents in the ready-for-use chemical ammunition stored on the territory of Federal Germany alone amounts to more than 4 million liters. In expert opinion, the US toxic agents stockpiles are sufficient to kill the whole population of the globe many times over.

Nevertheless, the US Administration intends to step up the chemical arms race, to increase and qualitatively upgrade the arsenals of chemical weapons.

In the past few years the USA has developed a new generation of chemical weapons—binary chemical ammunition—and has prepared their production. The USA plans to spend from 10 to 20 billion dollars on a program for such ammunition in all fighting services. It is planned to bring the number of filled chemical munitions to 5 million as a result of such a program. A plant producing
binary munitions has been built, and assembly lines with a production capacity of 700,000 shells and air bombs a year have been prepared for commissioning at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The production capacities for manufacturing other military-chemical products at other factories are being modernized and built up. Work is under way to increase the number and capacity of toxic agents depots and storage facilities, specifically in Western Europe. Plans are afoot to deploy binary chemical ammunition in NATO Europe, and particularly in Britain, Federal Germany and Italy.

Along with expanding material plant for fundamental research relating to the development of newest types of lethal toxic agents, the United States is actively using the scientific and technological achievements and potentials of its allies. Britain, Federal Germany and Israel, jointly with the USA, participate in developing chemical ammunition. Fulfilling the Pentagon orders, many research institutions, private firms and transnational corporations are carrying out research to develop toxic agents against which no individual and collective defenses yet exist. The search for deadly agents is conducted also among toxins of animal and vegetable origin.

Training for operations involving chemical weapons is being conducted on a large scale, the number of chemical warfare experts is...
being increased and organizational measures to form chemical troops brigades are being carried out in the US armed forces. The program of training troops to fight in chemical-war conditions has been substantially extended. US military manuals say chemical weapons must be used at the earliest stage of a conflict. For instance, the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5 envisages delivering strikes to the whole depth of the enemy defense by the whole set of nuclear, chemical and conventional means.

At McClellan Fort, Alabama, there is a special center for training chemical-weapons specialists. Personnel training in chemical warfare has been sharply stepped up in all US armed services and reserves. Troops are being provided with individual and collective protective equipment against toxic agents. The US armed forces are continually developing land and sea chemical warfare techniques in their operational and combat training. In the past few years chemical warfare held a central place in the Reforger annual American military exercise in Europe and the Team Spirit joint US-South Korean exercise.

Development and Stockpiling of New Weapons of Mass Destruction of People and Nature

Along with the massive equipment of the armed forces with nuclear and chemical weapons, the US leaders devote great attention to the development of new mass destruction weapons for use against man and living nature in general.

It has been said already that in 1981 the US Administration took a decision on the full-scale production and stockpiling of neutron weapons which Pentagon spokesmen are trying to portray as “humane.” They claim that these weapons will kill only the crews of Soviet tanks by neutron radiation and do very little damage to dwelling houses and structures and, therefore, civilians have nothing to fear. Not only is the cynicism of such pronouncements obvious, but they are also patently false. A neutron munition includes a charge of fissionable material whose yield is commensurate with the yield of tactical nuclear ammunition. This means that a zone of destruction and fire similar to that caused by a nuclear explosion would emerge from a neutron munition blast.

The powerful neutron flow generated by an explosion of a neutron munition is particularly dangerous to people. It can spread over long distances, effectively penetrate through protective structures and cause much graver radiation damage to the human organism than smaller-energy neutrons emanating from an explosion of a nuclear munition. If a person affected by such radiation does not die immediately, he would be doomed to long agonizing suffering. The advocates of neutron weapons do their utmost to conceal the most sinister effect of this type of weapons—the effect produced by high-energy neutron radiation on the future generations of people. Geneticists hold the view that even negligible doses would cause biological disorders in the human organism which would have a bearing on many generations to come. So the phrase-mongering about neutron weapons being “more humane” is a lie designed to distract broad sections of the public from the real threat posed.

Despite the decision officially announced by the US President in 1969 to stop developing biological weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction ratified by the USA in 1975, the US Defense Department continues with an extensive biological program. Along with the further qualitative development of the existing types of biological weapons, the Pentagon’s microbiological centers are working to develop new microbes—causing diseases occurring in humans, animals and plants. The latest genetic engineering methods are widely used to obtain modifications of microorganisms with affecting properties unknown before. Since 1980 the US Defense Department has been engaged in over 60 military-oriented research projects. Hundreds of millions of dollars are allocated for re-
search and development in the sphere of biological weapons.

Dozens of laboratories with a high degree of antiepidemic defense have been set up in the USA in the past few years to carry out work on agents of diseases particularly dangerous for man and animals, as microbiological centers of the Defense Department have been expanded and modernized.

Economic and Military Foundation of American Imperialism

Financing of Militarism

Under the Reagan Administration US military spending has been growing at unprecedented rates. The sum of funds annually allocated to the Pentagon as the official military budget alone has doubled from 140.7 billion dollars in fiscal 1980 to 284.9 billion in fiscal 1987. Between 1988 and 1992 the sum of military allocations will add up to about 1,800 billion dollars.

The growth in the military budget occurs mostly at the expense of various civilian programs. This has led to a considerable rise in the share of allocations for military purposes in the expenditure part of the US Federal Budget, from 22.7 percent in fiscal 1980 to 29 percent in fiscal 1987. There will be further redistribution of tax-payers’ money in favour of the arms business over the next five years. In fiscal 1992, 31.5 percent of the overall expenditure in the Federal Budget is to be allocated for that purpose.

The US military-political leadership is trying to gain military superiority over the USSR closely intertwines the interests of the military-industrial corporations and the military and state machinery and is leading to an unprecedented expansion of arms production. The arms corporations together with the military and state bureaucracy have formed a mighty military-industrial complex which has acquired such dimension in the US as to be earnestly called “a state within a state.”

The United States has a powerful arms industry, the world’s largest in terms of both production and number of arms factories. Pentagon orders are handled by 30,000 main contractors and more than 50,000 subcontractors.

As compared with fiscal 1980, budget allocations to the Defense Department for research and development have grown 2.7-fold to stand at almost 37.6 billion dollars in fiscal 1987. The yearly allocations for the purchase of arms and combat hardware have increased almost 2.5 times from 35 billion dollars in fiscal 1980 to 85.8 billion in fiscal 1987. The share of this expenditure item in the Defense Department’s budget has risen from 25.1 to 30.1 percent.

Thus, in fiscal 1987 the Pentagon will receive over 120 billion dollars for technical modernization of armed forces. Priority here is given to the offensive weapon systems of the Air Force and Navy which are the main instrument of the US policy of neoglobalism.

On the whole, from 1988 to 1992 (fiscal) the US Defense Department will receive more than 740 billion dollars for its technical modernization programs. Over the same period more than 45 billion dollars will be allocated for military nuclear programs to be tackled by the Department of Energy. An even greater sum (53 billion dollars) will be allocated to NASA for research and development which have acquired a marked military character since the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Industrial Foundation of American Militarism

The Washington course of arms buildup and military superiority over the USSR closely intertwines the interests of the military-industrial corporations and the military and state machinery and is leading to an unprecedented expansion of arms production. The arms corporations together with the military and state bureaucracy have formed a mighty military-industrial complex which has acquired such dimension in the US as to be earnestly called “a state within a state.”

The United States has a powerful arms industry, the world’s largest in terms of both production and number of arms factories. Pentagon orders are handled by 30,000 main contractors and more than 50,000 subcontractors.

In fiscal 1984 the Pentagon placed contracts with various companies for the supply
The Pentagon's orders in industry are filled by 30,000 main contractors and over 50,000 subcontractors. All in all, about 300,000 private companies meet the needs of the US Department of Defense in materiel and services.
of armaments, combat hardware and other military materiel worth about 150 billion dollars. Nearly half of that sum has gone to 25 major arms and combat hardware manufacturers. Four corporations, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell International, Lockheed and General Dynamics, which specialize in the production of offensive weapons (nuclear missiles, aircraft and atomic-powered warships), have been awarded contracts worth more than five billion dollars each.

Enterprises which fill the Pentagon's orders are scattered all over the US. However, with the Reagan Administration coming to power, California has built up a noticeable lead to take about 25 percent of all contracts today awarded by the Defense Department.

In recent time the US Administration has been putting through a number of measures for further expansion of the production base and a higher mobilization readiness of the arms industry. Primary attention is given to the industries specializing in the production of offensive weapon systems, including those based on new physical principles, which are very close to mass destruction weapons in terms of combat characteristics.

The nuclear industrial complex of the US meets the demand of all armed services for nuclear explosives of various types and designation, from nuclear artillery shells in the kiloton class to strategic nuclear weapons with a capacity of up to 10 megatons. These weapons are produced at seven plants.

The US is rapidly modernizing and expanding its nuclear industrial complex. In 1985 new production facilities went on stream at the Pantex plant near Amarillo, Texas. As a result, the US potential in production of nuclear weapons, including neutron munitions, has grown much higher. One should also mention the expansion of the industrial base for the production of fissionables for nuclear weapons. In 1984, in addition to the four operational reactors turning out those materials, a fifth reserve reactor was put into service, and there are plans for a sixth production reactor. All these measures are aimed to secure the ongoing long-term program for the production and supply of up to 30,000 new nuclear weapons to the US armed forces.

A powerful industrial base has been set up for serial production of MX ICBMs. About 70 US companies are involved in the production of the main components of that missile. US industry is also actively preparing to produce Midgetman ICBMs and Trident II SLBMs.

A solid production base has been built for the mass output of strategic cruise missiles of various basing modes. It comprises four powerful factories with the latest technological equipment, including a new plant of the Boeing company at Kent, Washington, which turns out air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). General Dynamics has modernized one of its plants in San Diego, California, while McDonnell Douglas has built a new one at Titusville, Florida, for the production of Tomahawks and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Also in San Diego, General Dynamics is setting up a production base for the so-called advanced cruise missiles (ACMs).

The production base of US shipbuilding is the largest among the capitalist countries. It comprises 25 large and about 80 medium-size specialized shipyards for the construction of warships with advanced weapon systems and conventional and nuclear propulsion units. In particular, the shipyard at Groton, Connecticut, specializes in the production of Ohio-class submarines, while the yard at Newport News, Virginia, turns out Nimitz-class all-purpose nuclear aircraft carriers. Both yards are also building nuclear-powered submarines of the Los Angeles class.

US shipyards, in addition to building new vessels, have in recent years stepped up work on demothballing and making operational Iowa-class battleships, armed with Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, and on retrofitting aircraft carriers and other warships to extend their service life.

The military aircraft industry is one of the best developed branches. Military aircraft production facilities are being constantly improved as robot engineering complexes and flexible manufacturing processes are installed.
An Ohio-class SSBN being built at the shipyards of General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division in Groton, Connecticut.
American aircraft companies are creating new production capacities to fulfil the Pentagon’s increasing orders for the manufacture of the latest aircraft models.

In 1986, a new assembly plant was completed in Palmdale, California, to produce the Stealth advanced technology strategic bomber. At a recently modernized plant in Pico Rivera, California, work continues to build the bomber prototype. Regular output of aircraft is being stepped up at recently built large plants: of AH-64A Apache helicopter gunships in Mesa, Arizona, and of B-1B strategic bombers in Palmdale, California. New automated plants in Columbus, Georgia, Greer, South Carolina, and Wilmington, North Carolina, have been geared to supply components for these and other models.

In the armor industry, with its more than 40 plants, pride of place belongs to tank-building plants in Detroit, Michigan, and in Lima, Ohio, and to a plant of self-propelled assault guns and armored recovery vehicles in Bair, Pennsylvania.

A large-scale program (costing 10 billion dollars) to modernize the production of ammunition is continuing. It involves the retooling of a number of enterprises: a big new plant with an annual capacity of 1.5 million 155-mm projectiles with submunitions has
In fiscal 1950-1984 the USA exported:

- 38,500 aircraft and helicopters;
- 34,300 tanks;
- 55,200 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles;
- 26,200 ships;
- 33,100 field and antitank guns;
- 430,700 missiles of various classes.

All in all, in fiscal 1966-1985 the USA sold 224.8 billion dollars' worth of weapons and materiel to other countries, including 70 per cent in the latter half of that period.
been built under this program in Picayune, Mississippi.

The US Administration’s drastic increase in military spending has been a veritable “gold mine” for the captains of the military-industrial complex. The rates at which sales of war-related products of the leading military-industrial corporations rocketed in the early 1980s were measured in two-digit figures. Despite the tremendous book of military orders (146 billion dollars in fiscal 1985), which guarantee profits for years to come, the Pentagon’s main contractors are already gearing themselves for future orders of supersophisticated weapon systems. For example, Lockheed (fourth largest volume of contracts in fiscal 1984) has adopted a long-term investment program envisaging 900 million dollars annually for R & D and production modernization.

According to leading companies, the biggest profits for the arms industry in the 1990s will come from missiles, space systems, and electronics.

Radioelectronic equipment is currently being increasingly installed in every weapon system. For example, radioelectronic components now comprise an average of 33 percent of the cost of aircraft equipment, approximately 45 percent of missiles, 66 percent of space hardware and up to 88 percent of control and monitoring systems. For the 1987 fiscal year, approximately one-third of all appropriations earmarked for R & D and purchases were on radioelectronic parts for military uses—42.1 billion dollars. The sum does not include the cost of Defense Department secret programs, which likewise and to a considerable extent are linked with radioelectronics.

Military-industrial companies are pinning great hopes on the Star Wars program, appropriations for which are to be doubled in the next five years. American experts say that in the R & D stage of SDI alone, military-industrial corporations can get orders worth 70 billion dollars in the next ten years. It is indicative that Kenneth Adelman, Director of the US Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, said that to give up SDI would be “killing the goose that lays the golden egg.”

The USA—Biggest Exporter of Arms and Military Equipment

Under President Reagan’s special directive of July 8, 1981, arms sales are regarded as an essential element of US global military strength and an indispensable component of its military policy. In one of his earlier reports to the Congress, the US President pointed out that arms sales by the United States pursue the following aims: to influence the political orientation of countries that possess strategic reserves; to exercise a greater influence on governments and military leaderships of countries whose political orientation is of much importance for the US in global and regional terms; to produce an impact on individual governments as regards questions involving US interests. Besides, arms export has developed into a powerful factor for economic and financial enslavement of other countries by drawing them into a ruinous arms race.

The US supplies arms and military equipment to more than 150 countries. In the past decade (1976-1985 fiscal years) US war exports totalled a huge sum of 157.8 billion dollars. The largest markets for US weapons remain the Middle East and Southwest Asia (over 50 percent of US arms export) and West European states (more than 24 percent).

As previously, the main importers of American arms in the past decade were: Saudi Arabia (which bought 43 billion dollars’ worth of US arms, including over 70 F-5 and F-15 fighter planes and five E-3A AWACS aircraft, 250 M60 tanks, more than 1,500 armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of missiles of various types); Israel (11 billion dollars, comprising more than 200 F-15 and F-16 fighter planes, over 300 M60 tanks and more than 1,700 armored vehicles, some 11,500 missiles of various types); and Britain (10 billion dollars, including 111 Polaris and
Trident strategic missiles, and more than 9,000 missiles of other types).

It now transpires that the US secretly supplied its arms to Iran for further expansion of the war with Iraq. Some of the weapons were destined for Afghan counterrevolutionaries. Besides, money earned from arms sales was diverted to the Somoza contras to wage an undeclared war against Nicaragua.

American military aid is being increasingly given to reactionary and dictatorial regimes. In 1981-1984, for example, El Salvador and Honduras were accommodated with some 550 million dollars in military aid. Recent years have seen a considerable rise in US allocations to support all sorts of anti-government and counterrevolutionary groupings in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In 1980-1985 the Afghan counterrevolutionaries were given more than 950 million dollars, including more than 480 million dollars in 1985. All in all, during 1980-1985 the US funded over 1.9 billion dollars on the undeclared war against Afghanistan, through various channels. Arms supplied to counterrevolutionary groupings include such modern weapons as Stinger antiaircraft missiles. The US Congress has approved 100 million dollars for the Nicaraguan contras for the 1987 fiscal year, in addition to the 111 million dollars provided in fiscal 1982-1986.

US military exports feature virtually all modern types of weapons and military equipment, also including some nuclear delivery vehicles (F-16 and F-111 planes, and Polaris, Trident and Lance missiles). By the end of 1984, the US Department of Defense had export orders worth over 65 billion dollars and providing for the delivery of more than 1,000 aircraft and helicopters, some 30 combatant ships and boats, 1,200 armored personnel carriers, about 700 tanks, 350 field artillery pieces, and 43,000 missiles of various types.
Chapter III

The East-West Military Balance

One major fact should first be noted: a rough military balance between the USSR and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, has arisen and is being maintained both in the world at large and in Europe, where the most powerful concentrations of armed forces face each other.

But then the present level of military confrontation is excessively high. The stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world have reached critical proportions. Even a small part of the nuclear weapons now present in the world is enough to destroy all life on Earth. Continuation of the arms race on Earth and, more particularly, its spread into space could raise the nuclear parity to a limit that would stop it being a military and political deterrent and add to the probability of outbreak of nuclear war.

The realities of the nuclear and space age make it imperative to halt the arms race and find a way out of the confrontation fraught with nuclear catastrophe. That is the only reasonable option.

The USSR has invariably pressed for elimination of nuclear and radical reduction in conventional arms, for ending the arms race on Earth and preventing one in any new area, and for totally abolishing the threat of nuclear annihilation of humanity in the lifetime of the present generation. This policy was expressed in the program for complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000, as set forth in the Statement of January 15, 1986 by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The points of that program formed the base for the major proposals for reduction and elimination of nuclear arms the USSR advanced at the Soviet-American Summit Meeting in Reykjavik on October 11-12, 1986. Should they have been accepted by the American side, that would have signalled a turning point in every area of the campaign for nuclear disarmament and would have opened up workable opportunities for movement toward a nuclear-free world.

An entirely different policy has been pursued by the United States of America. Its major efforts have been directed toward achieving military superiority over the USSR by building up the nuclear potential and conventional armaments, and by creating an entirely new class of weapon—space strike systems. The United States’ commitment to the Star Wars program has thwarted the achievement of historic agreements in Reykjavik and is an obstacle to deep cuts and subsequent total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, putting weapons up in space would upset the strategic stability and propel unprecedentedly and for decades to come every area of the arms race, making it uncontrollable. The negative consequences of such a turn of events would be impossible to predict. But one thing is quite certain: the appearance of space strike weapons and the buildup of the strategic nuclear potential would add nothing to the security either of the US or any other country and, on the contrary, the threat of war would drastically increase.

Before taking a closer look at where and what the Washington course toward the utmost escalation of US military power leads to, let us answer this question: what is the real balance of military strength of the two sides at present?

Let us examine the facts.

The USSR-US Strategic Nuclear Balance

By the early 70s, an approximate balance had been struck between the two powers in the quantity and quality of strategic nuclear arms. While the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was being prepared, the balance of strategic armaments was
checked and rechecked by competent Soviet and American experts. The Treaty registered a rough parity of strategic arms: in terms of delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers)—roughly 2,500 for the USSR and about 2,300 for the US, and the US holding an advantage in nuclear warheads.

The SALT II Treaty was signed by the leaders of the USSR and the USA in the summer of 1979. However, Ronald Reagan, who succeeded Jimmy Carter at the White House, and representatives of his administration started making allegations that no parity existed and that the USSR had left the USA far behind in strategic offensive arms. Much was said to the effect that the USA had some “window of vulnerability” which had to be “closed” without delay. How so? Is it conceivable to achieve, in a year or two, any superiority, let alone substantial superiority, in strategic arms which take years to produce? Or had some new facts come to light, which had previously been overlooked?

But no new facts had come to light. The allegations of the US “falling behind” and having a “window of vulnerability” were needed to bury the SALT II Treaty which fixed the parity and restrained the pushing of the Pentagon's military programs through Congress. Up to a certain point, the SALT II Treaty did not require that the USA make any substantial reductions in its appropriate systems. But as the American military programs were pressed on, the Treaty became more and more of a hindrance to the US strategic arms buildup. In 1980-1984, with new Ohio-class missile submarines becoming operational within the US Navy, the Pentagon had to dismantle eight Polaris missile submarines and then three submarines with Poseidon missiles in 1985-1986. The continuing refitting of heavy B-52 bombers to carry long-range cruise missiles compelled the White House to choose between dismantling ballistic missiles with independently targetable warheads by way of compensation and abandoning the SALT II Treaty. What the White House actually chose we all know: it publicly renounced both the Interim Agreement (SALT I) and the SALT II Treaty.

There is no substance to US Administration claims that the USSR has broken the principle of equality and equal security. The USSR has never done so. The existence of the strategic parity has been confirmed by many American experts and, until recently, by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Reykjavik, the Soviet delegation handed President Reagan a table of the strategic offensive arms inventories of the two sides as of October 11, 1986. It shows that the Soviet Union has slightly more delivery vehicles (2,480 as against 2,208) than the USA, whereas the USA still has more warheads on them. On balance, the rough parity is still there. The Americans did not object to that assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Offensive Arms Holdings of the USSR and the USA (October 11, 1986)*</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBM launchers including: ICBMs equipped with independently targetable warheads</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>1,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM launchers including: SLBM launched equipped with independently targetable warheads</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM and SLBM launchers, total including: ICBM and SLBM launchers equipped with independently targetable warheads</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>1,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombers including: heavy bombers equipped to carry cruise missiles</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers, total including: ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry independently targetable warheads and cruise missiles</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>2,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, total</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These data were supplied by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to the US President Ronald Reagan during their meeting in Reykjavik.
It would seem that the truth is obvious and has to be recognized. But that appears to be a far from easy thing for the US leaders to do. They keep on silencing some facts, accentuating others or just making insinuations whenever it comes to assessing the strategic forces of the two sides. For example, they contend that the Soviet Union has some 70 percent of its nuclear warheads mounted on land-based ICBMs while the USA has about 20 percent. But they say nothing about the fact that this does not upset the parity in strategic capabilities since the USA has over 80 percent of the nuclear warheads on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles and on heavy bombers, that is, several times more than the numbers deployed in the comparable components of the Soviet strategic forces.

In comparing the sides’ strategic nuclear munitions, the Pentagon deliberately understates the US figure by almost 2,000 units. The Soviet indices are inflated by adding the munitions which the Pentagon alleges may appear if Soviet ICBMs have acquired a MIRV capability with the number of warheads chosen at random by Washington strategists.

Another stratagem of theirs. The Soviet strategic arms are augmented by 270 medium-range bombers, known as Backfire in the West, and 39 ballistic missiles installed on diesel submarines. However, these two categories of hardware have no relation whatsoever to strategic weapons. At the same time, the US strategic arms are sent down by excluding over 200 B-52 heavy bombers and 32 SLBMs carried by two Polaris submarines which are in reserve but which under SALT II should be included in the limits fixed by that agreement. As a result of such juggling with figures, the US allegedly has about 2,000 strategic delivery vehicles as against almost 2,800 for the USSR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff used these fictitious figures in the report to Congress on the US Military Posture for FY 1986.

Washington often alleges that heavy Soviet ICBMs (SS-18) are destabilizers. However, such accusations do not hold water. Twenty years ago, with the US having considerable superiority over the USSR, the Americans did not call the heavy Soviet ICBMs destabilizers. However, now that the USSR is capable of adequately returning a blow by striking at US territory, these missiles have become the “main source of instability.” The Soviet heavy ICBMs, just as other ICBMs, are part and parcel of the USSR strategic nuclear potential to be reduced by 50 percent by the end of 1991, if the proposals the USSR advanced in Reykjavik were accepted. The heavy ICBMs would have been halved too.

Claiming objectivity, Washington deliberately overlooks such an important fact as the existence of thousands of US forward-based nuclear weapons near the Soviet frontier capable of hitting targets, including strategic ones, deep inside the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, these weapons complement the US strategic potential. The Soviet Union does not have analogous weapons with regard to US territory. Is then the American comparison of the sides’ strategic systems justified? Such ploys are designed to justify unprecedented military programs and camouflage the aims the US Administration is pursuing in fueling the arms race. US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger claims day in and day out that the United States is the runner-up and needs to restore American military might strategically. However, as Weinberger admits (the report to Congress on the FY 1987 Military Budget), the aim is not to restore the equilibrium but to determine USSR-US relationships in a new manner in order to build its relations from strength and in prospect from greater strength. This points to the desire to upturn strategic parity at any cost and reach military superiority. That is why feverish efforts are being made to build up the US strategic nuclear forces and develop space-strike weapons.

However, the US course against strategic parity has no prospect. With the sides’ present record on economic matters, combat technology, and military capability, no efforts by either for military superiority could spell success. The other would not permit that. Nowadays no one can win in an arms race. As Mikhail Gorbachev put it, “Both sides had
better get used to strategic parity as a natural state of Soviet-American relations. What should be discussed is how to lower the level of this parity through joint efforts, in other words, to carry out real measures for reducing nuclear armaments on a mutual basis."

**Correlation of Medium-Range Nuclear Systems in Europe**

In terms of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO have long had an approximate parity. The West has a lead in some medium-range systems, while the USSR in others. On the whole, since the 1970s, before a session of the NATO Council (December 1979) decided on an arms buildup, each side had in Europe about 1,000 medium-range delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft).

Many Western officials have often admitted that there is a balance in medium-range weapons in Europe. The former West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, said more than once that preserving a balance of forces in Europe and elsewhere was a prerequisite of detente and that such a balance continued to exist. In an interview to the newspaper *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger* in February 1981, after the NATO decision on an arms buildup, he said that, despite the SS-20s, the balance of forces had not changed in the USSR's favor. At that time US leaders too repeatedly confirmed the existence of such a balance in Europe.

Military balance has never suited the United States. Alleging a Soviet military threat and distorting the real correlation of forces in Europe, in December 1979 the United States forced its allies to rubberstamp a decision to install 572 new US medium-range missiles in Europe.

The formal pretext for the decision, it seems, was the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles instead of the outdated medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 systems which, incidentally, had not worried the West. However, the strategic situation in Europe did not change with the Soviet Union starting to replace the obsolete SS-4s and SS-5s with newer SS-20 missiles. For every two SS-20s it deployed, the USSR was removing three older missiles. Before the SS-20 deployment, the USSR had in its Western part some 600 ground-launched medium-range missiles, and their number has now dwindled to 355, a third of which are obsolete. All SS-5s have been removed. With an increase in the number of warheads on the Soviet missiles, the aggregate nuclear yield of the Soviet medium-range missiles has more than halved in the meantime. All this is well known. For reasons of its own, however, the West keeps silent about this.

There is evidence that the NATO arms buildup decision was motivated not by the emergence of the Soviet SS-20s. It transpires that the first contracts for Pershing IIs were signed in 1969 and those for cruise missiles in the early 70s. In 1975, on the insistence of the then US Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, the Pentagon had its budget increased for these purposes. The same year, with not a single Soviet SS-20 yet installed, NATO decided to modernize its nuclear potential in Europe.

The Soviet Union took moves against a growth in the level of military confrontation in Europe and to prevent a buildup in the medium-range nuclear systems there. In March 1982, the USSR unilaterally announced a moratorium on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Furthermore, the USSR even reduced such systems. At the Soviet-US talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe, the USSR did everything for a mutually acceptable solution to cut down the medium-range nuclear weapons in the region.

The United States, however, was against any Soviet-proposed compromises because it was keen on deploying its medium-range Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Western Europe. In 1983 Gen. Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said that most people believed the United States was modernizing its weapons because of SS-20 missiles. It would have been modernizing them, he said, even if the SS-20s had not been deployed.

Installing new US missiles in Europe is clearly aimed at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union, and not only in medium-range weapons, but in the strategic field as
well. In deploying medium-range nuclear missiles in NATO countries in Europe, the United States is thinking not of European security. Washington wants to make the continent the main theater of operations and to dampen any retaliation to US territory if an act of aggression is committed against the USSR. This is one of the reasons why, having reluctantly accepted their own zero option in Reykjavik, US officials now say that they would prefer an “intermediate” option leaving some of their medium-range missiles in Europe.

Now to the present situation in Europe with regard to medium-range missiles. By the end of 1986 the United States had installed 364 missiles (108 Pershing IIs and 256 cruise missiles) in Western Europe. All told, NATO has 542 medium-range missiles in Europe (364 are American, 64 British, and 114 French). In its European part the USSR has 373 medium-range missiles (243 SS-20s, 112 SS-4s and 18 sea-launched SS-N-5s). NATO has more missiles (and more warheads on them) than the Soviet Union. Considering its air forces in Europe, NATO has more medium-range delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads on them than the Warsaw Treaty. However, in view of the Soviet retaliation measures (deployment of longer-range theater missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and some other measures) against the deployment of US missiles in Europe, there is every ground to speak about an approximate parity in the sides’ medium-range nuclear weapons in that part of the world.

Correlation of NATO and Warsaw Treaty General-Purpose Forces

The problem of the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Treaty general-purpose forces is now particularly acute. Why?

The fact is that the simple, understandable and yet large-scale proposals of the Soviet Union in Reykjavik have opened up real prospects for a nuclear-free Europe and a nuclear-free world, and destroyed the myth of the “intransigence” of the Russians and their unwillingness to disarm. At the same time they have revealed the political and military ambitions of the US and NATO leaders, their eagerness to retain nuclear weapons at all costs and possibly increase their stockpiles even further. In false justification they refer to an alleged Soviet and Warsaw Treaty superiority in conventional armaments, saying that should Europe and the world be left without nuclear weapons the West could become the victim of this superiority.

However, the world public has testimonies from such authoritative international organizations as the London Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute which, though they are not free from exaggerating data on the Warsaw Treaty forces, show that the Warsaw Treaty has no superiority over NATO and that a rough balance does exist in conventional arms. The London Institute reports have for a number of years, including 1986, pointed out that “the conventional overall balance (between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty—Ed.) is still such as to make general military aggression a highly risky undertaking” for either side, since neither of them has sufficient “overall strength... to guarantee victory.” This is the main criterion of the sides’ correlation of forces. A 1986 US Brookings Institution report states plainly that the conventional arms correlation is not only close to parity, but is even in the West’s favor.

Yet certain Western quarters, referring to particular disproportions existing in the structure of the sides’ armed forces, disproportions which, however, do not undermine the general parity, sometimes try to pass them off as overall superiority of the Warsaw Treaty in conventional arms.

What ploys does the West use to distort reality? It does so by ignoring the sides’ human resources; by not including the armed forces of France and Spain in the count; by not giving complete data on the armed forces of the USA and its allies; and by disregarding US and NATO reserve units and depot stocks of arms and equipment.

Further, it does so by deliberately overstating the amount of the Warsaw Treaty’s armaments, while understating NATO’s. For NATO only the armaments of peacetime regular forces without their reserve components
are considered, and again the armed forces of France and Spain are not counted. No account is taken of the structural changes occurring in the NATO forces and the related marked increase in quantity of new tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems, helicopter gunships and other types of weaponry.

It is being groundlessly asserted that the Warsaw Treaty divisions surpass NATO's in the quantity of tanks and artillery. Meanwhile, far from inferior in these weapons, some of the NATO divisions exceed the Soviet ones in them. In addition, they have more helicopters and antitank weapons, which significantly enhances their combat capability. In fact, two or three wartime divisions could be deployed on the basis of each West German division.

As to tactical aircraft, their number is exaggerated for the Warsaw Treaty by including air defense planes in its "offensive" air potential.

So what is the real picture of the correlation of forces and conventional arms between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty? First of all, it should be noted that NATO keeps large armed forces in Europe and the adjacent waters, and has a clear edge over the Warsaw Treaty in quite a number of arms, including tactical nuclear weapons, attack aircraft and antitank means. Therefore, based on overall, not selective, assessments, there can only be one conclusion: the combat capability of the NATO armed forces roughly matches that of the Warsaw Treaty's. Facts bear this out.

For example, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have approximately equal numbers of troops. Paul Nitze, special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters, confirmed this when he told Congress that the question of troop levels was not an area where the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Treaty had superiority. He added that NATO's number of servicemen was roughly the same as the Warsaw Treaty's. The NATO countries have superiority in reserve contingents, since their combined population is more than 50 percent larger than the Warsaw Treaty states' (620:375 million). NATO also has an advantage in military industrial capacity and in a number of certain types of weaponry.

A comparison of existing battle-ready divisions may also give a definite idea of the correlation of conventional forces between the sides. Precisely battle-ready, as they alone can be used to start military actions without additional mobilization measures. Those in Europe include: for NATO (counting France and Spain)—94 (including about 60 independent battle-ready brigades); for the Warsaw Treaty—78. Moreover, a full-strength US division numbers 16,000-19,000 men, and a West German division over 23,000, whereas a division of the Warsaw Treaty armies does not exceed 11,000-12,000 men. Consequently, here too NATO has an important advantage.

Now let us turn to the question of tanks. The Warsaw Treaty states did have more tanks, though this superiority became much smaller with Spain's entry into NATO. When it suits them, the US and NATO leaders count only those of their tanks that are under Joint Allied Command in Europe. In this way they lower the number of their tanks to 12,000-13,000. Actually, over 18,000 tanks are directly available to the NATO forces (counting those of Spain and France). Besides that, about 4,500 US and nearly 6,000 West European tanks are concentrated in depots in Europe. Consequently, about 30,000 tanks are available to NATO. In addition, NATO has several times more antitank weapons.

There is nothing to support allegations of Soviet "tank threat". James Schlesinger, when he was US Defense Secretary, wrote in a report to Congress that "modern antitank weapons deployed in sufficient numbers can help to offset the Warsaw Pact's quantitative superiority in tanks. Accordingly," he added, "we do not believe it necessary to match the Soviet Union in numbers of tanks..." It was precisely in this way that the USA and other NATO countries thought it possible, on their own admission, to secure an equality of combat potentials in both the tank and antitank weaponry. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and current Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger confirmed this again just recently. The latter, in a report to Con-
gress on the military budget for fiscal 1987, declared that "an adequate balance of conventional forces does not require equal numbers of tanks, aircraft or infantry."

As for the correlation of tactical aircraft between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, it favors NATO. The ratio is 1.2:1 in combat planes and 1.8:1 in helicopters.

In 1986 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to Congress that NATO still had an advantage over the Warsaw Treaty in fighter-bombers and attack planes, but that it continued to be inferior in interceptors. Defense Secretary Weinberger has admitted the NATO Air Force's superiority over that of the Warsaw Treaty; in his report to Congress on the military budget for fiscal 1986, he pointed out that the US "tactical air forces have long been considered superior to the Soviets in terms of combat capabilities."

Thus, assessing the correlation of the sides' general-purpose forces objectively, on factual evidence, the overall picture is as follows: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have approximately equal personnel strengths and roughly the same amount of artillery, but the Warsaw Treaty is somewhat superior in armor. NATO has an edge in the number of battle-ready divisions, in antitank weapons and fighter-bombers, which is offset by the Warsaw Treaty's somewhat larger number of air defense interceptor-fighters. On the whole, there is a rough balance in conventional armaments.

NATO and Warsaw Treaty Navies

Estimating the Soviet Navy, the Pentagon leaders allege that it has been transformed from a basically coastal defense force into an ocean-going force designed to extend the military capability of the USSR all over the world. This allegation betrays a desire to ascribe to the Soviet Navy the main features and political role typical of the navies of the US and other NATO countries.

A short historical survey of the Soviet Navy's development effectively disproves such claims. Until the mid-1950s, even US military leaders had no doubts about the defensive nature of the USSR's naval development. But since then everything has been invariably turned upside down to make matters look as if the USSR has been going out of its way to build up naval power, while the US Navy was marking time and making no headway.

But it is a fact that the US Navy has the world's most formidable aircraft carriers and air-capable ships, advanced nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles, big surface ships, including battleships, and a powerful amphibious potential to sealift over a long distance at least one Marine amphibious division (over 40,000 troops with arms and equipment for offensive operations).

US Navy ships are intensively armed with Harpoon antiship missiles of 120-km range and Tomahawk cruise missiles whose nuclear warheads can hit targets at a range of up to 2,600 km. The US naval aviation includes more than 800 nuclear-capable aircraft with a radius of action over 900 km. What other purpose than aggression is served by the more than 200,000-strong US Marine Corps (compared with the 12,000 Soviet naval infantry), armed with all modern attack weapons?

NATO's large naval task forces are permanently stationed in strategic parts of the world, which enables the Pentagon to use offensive weapons against targets in the territory of the USSR and other socialist countries. US ships more and more often conduct exercises in close proximity to the Soviet shores in the Black Sea, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and off the shores of the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Pentagon bosses make no secret of the fact that the US Navy is committed to offensive tasks. Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, said at the congressional hearings in the Senate Appropriations Committee in February 1986 that the Navy would remain the chief instrument of the United States in reacting to crises and contingencies.

The US Navy is designed to strike at land-based targets rather than sea-based ones. So it was only natural for the USSR to respond to the US Navy's growing strike capability and its moving closer to the Soviet frontiers by providing the Soviet Navy with ships, aircraft.
and weapons capable of countering the threat posed by American naval forces. To defuse a potential threat from American aircraft carriers, ships armed with long-range missiles and amphibious forces, and to discover their intentions in good time, a Soviet naval presence must be maintained in those parts of seas and oceans from where the United States threatens or may threaten the Soviet Union.

The following is a comparison of the numbers of major combatant ships and naval aircraft in the Navies of the United States and of the Soviet Union.

The United States has 20 aircraft carriers, five of them nuclear-powered, while the Soviet Union has none. The US Navy has 12 air-capable ships, including helicopter carriers and versatile amphibious ships, while the Soviet Navy has only six air-capable ships, including two antisubmarine cruisers. The US Navy has three battleships and nearly 230 other big surface ships armed with cruise missiles to fire at sea- and land-based targets; the Soviet Navy has no such battleships and just half the number of US missile ships and barely a quarter of NATO’s. The United States has 150 percent more naval aircraft; moreover, the Soviet naval aviation is designed for fighting naval forces, rather than striking at the American continent. In his report to the US Congress on the Administration’s defense budget in fiscal 1988 and on defense programs for fiscal 1988-1992 Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger spoke of “an overall maritime balance favorable to the United States.”

What prospects are there for the future? A JCS report to Congress in 1986 said that in the future the “US naval capabilities will continue to outpace the Soviets. The US Navy,” it said, “will maintain its open-ocean superiority...” These are not just empty words. The US is still vigorously building up its naval might. In 1986 it commissioned its fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Theodore Roosevelt, and its third battleship, the Missouri. Two more nuclear-powered flattops are under construction, and work has proceeded apace to reactivate and modernize a fourth battleship, the Wisconsin. Every year the US Navy acquires about four nuclear-powered Los Angeles-class attack submarines, planning to boost their number to 67 by 1995. The fire power of the SSN-21-class submarine, still under development, will be twice that of a Los Angeles-class sub. Over the past three years the United States has built five missile cruisers of the Ticonderoga-class and is planning another 13 for the forthcoming five years to achieve a total of 27. Work is proceeding apace to build ships of other types and to develop new destroyers and frigates armed with guided missiles, as well as amphibious ships.

The ultimate goal which the Pentagon’s leadership plans to achieve was spelled out by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his report to Congress on the defense budget for fiscal 1986. He predicted that the US fleet “will continue to grow as new ships authorized in previous years are delivered to the Navy faster than older vessels are retired from service...

“We are also moving steadily closer,” he added, “to our goal of an extended fleet of 600 deployable battle force ships, including 15 deployable carriers, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines, a one-third increase in amphibious lift capacity and expanded support forces.”

These are the facts which some Western quarters prefer not to disclose as they strive to misinform and mislead world public opinion concerning the actual US-Soviet balance at sea.

* * *

Thus, objective data show that there is approximate parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty both in nuclear and conventional arms. The existing approximate military balance between the USSR and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, is an objective reality which their leaders cannot but see.

The task is, while preserving parity, to achieve a radical reduction in the level of military confrontation and thereby strengthen strategic stability. The USSR is doing everything for that. By building up all types of nuclear weapons and abandoning the SALT II Treaty, the United States seeks to upset the military parity and ensure military superiority for itself.
Now, standing at the threshold of the third millennium, mankind is faced with the most dramatic turning point in its entire history. The issues of war and peace have moved to the foreground of international life. This is quite understandable, for never before has the world faced such a serious danger. Too many weapons have been stockpiled all over the world and their further buildup is certain to push the world toward the brink of catastrophe. There is only one way out: to stop the arms race on Earth at once and to prevent its spreading to outer space.

The character of present-day weapons leaves no country any hope of safeguarding itself solely by military and technical means, by building a defense system, even the most effective one, because there can be no winning in the arms race, let alone winning a nuclear war. Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, on doctrines of “containment” or “deterrence.” In this nuclear and space age, security is increasingly seen as a political goal, and it can only be attained by political means.

In the context of Soviet-American relations, security can only be mutual, and if we take international relations as a whole—it can only be universal. This means that all countries must learn to coexist and to keep peace on this planet which, under present-day circumstances, has grown too fragile for wars and the policy of force.

"Now that the world has huge nuclear stockpiles and the only thing experts argue about is how many times or dozens of times humanity can be destroyed," said the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, "it is high time to take practical steps to abandon the policy of brinkmanship, of the equilibrium of fear, and go over to normal, civilized forms of relations between the states of the two systems.”

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has given a clear-cut answer to the key question of the present epoch. To promote peace and ensure progress of all nations we must put an end to the stockpiling of the means of destruction and rid mankind of the burden of nuclear arms. The Soviet people are convinced that nuclear disarmament is the most reliable guarantee that nuclear catastrophe will be prevented. The struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons is a struggle for mankind's survival.

Indeed, it is “struggle,” because practical progress toward these lofty goals meets with resistance from those quarters in the West who continue to cling to the obsolete “positions of strength” policy and to seek military superiority in the hope of attaining world hegemony. In a bid to go on with their old imperialist policies, these quarters, linked with the military-industrial complex, place their narrow selfish interests above people's legitimate and natural desire for peace and show no regard for the future of nations.

Military confrontation, and the formidable dangers it entails for all nations, necessitates new approaches in world politics. Notably, renunciation of the policy of confrontation, tensions and military buildup aimed at using blackmail, threats and armed force in international relations.

The Soviet Union demonstrates its readiness and resolve to adopt a new line in world affairs, one proceeding from the need to promote general security and prevent a nuclear war, by putting forward large-scale disarmament proposals and taking unilateral measures to lower the level of military confrontation and prevent it from rising again. The foreign policy platform worked out and endorsed at the 27th CPSU Congress is graphic evidence of the USSR's sincere desire for peace. "We are sincerely extending a hand of
friendship and cooperation,” Mikhail Gorbachev said, “to all who favor immediate negotiations on a complete end to nuclear tests, who favor reduction and total destruction of nuclear weapons, and development of international relations on the principles of equality and universal security. Our door remains open to negotiations. But it should also be clear to all that our peaceableness has nothing in common with weakness. The peaceful labor of the Soviet people is reliably protected. The mighty Armed Forces of the USSR have everything necessary to defend the gains of socialism.”

A comprehensive program for eliminating nuclear and other mass destruction weapons by the end of this century, contained in General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev’s Statement of January 15, 1986, is a concrete expression of the Soviet Union’s stance on the issue of war or peace. Work to implement that program is central to the Soviet foreign policy for the coming years. It should be noted that the program is no utopia, but a thoroughly thought-out plan of consistent actions whose implementation, while bringing people closer to a nuclear-free world, would harm no one’s security. Therein lies the guarantee of the practicability of the Soviet program, of its being realistic.

The Summit Meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986 showed the world that the Soviet program for a nuclear-free world was realistic. The meeting also showed that the Soviet Statement of January 15, 1986, was not a utopia, as some people in the West claimed, but a concrete, far-reaching plan of action, the implementation of which could be started immediately.

In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union suggested coming to terms on a package of measures for decisive progress toward a nuclear-free world in the conditions of non-militarization of outer space. The package envisaged the following:

On Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA). The USSR and the USA would eliminate their SOA in two stages during 10 years, that is, by the end of 1996. Earmarked for elimination are all components of Soviet and US SOA (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers).

At the first stage (until the end of 1991) the sides would eliminate 50 percent of their SOA so that by the end of the period each of them would have no more than 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and no more than 6,000 warheads on them.

The number of sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers should be limited for each side to agreed ceilings.

On Medium-Range Missiles (MRMs). The sides would reach an agreement on eliminating both US and Soviet MRMs in Europe. Negotiations should start immediately on missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers stationed in Europe, with a freeze placed on the number of these missiles such as the sides have at the moment. At the same time an accord would be reached on Soviet MRMs in Asia and on corresponding US commitments. Under that accord the USSR would cut back its MRMs to 100 warheads in the Asian part of the country and pledge to deploy the remaining missiles in a way that would make their reaching targets on US territory impossible. The American side, likewise, would have the right to deploy on its territory no more than 100 warheads on MRMs stationed in such a way as not to reach Soviet territory.

On Issues of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM).

The Soviet Union wants the 1972 Treaty of unlimited duration to be preserved indefinitely. No steps are to be taken to erode or undermine the Treaty.

To this end, the sides would assume an obligation not to use their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and would comply strictly with all its provisions. An understanding would be reached that during this period all work to develop, test and deploy space components of an antimissile defense system would be banned, except laboratory research and testing. This would not affect work on stationary and ground-based
antimissile defense systems and their components, including systems operating on new physical principles, permitted under the ABM Treaty in specified areas.

The sides would agree that in the three to five years following the said ten-year period they would negotiate the issue of antimissile defense as a whole, drawing upon the research carried out in this area, and with regard to the new situation that would have developed after the elimination of the strategic offensive arms of both sides.

On Nuclear Testing. The sides would agree to start talks immediately to ban nuclear testing entirely and completely on a bilateral basis. At a certain point, they would invite Britain to join the talks. The start of negotiations on a nuclear test ban is a condition for the elaboration of a strategic arms agreement.

The talks would also deal with verification, lowering the permitted maximum of explosion yields and reducing the number of tests, and with the future of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-American Treaties concerning underground nuclear explosions.

In Reykjavik the Soviet side advocated the most stringent verification, including on-site inspection where necessary, of compliance with the entire range of proposed measures.

For the sake of agreement in Reykjavik, the USSR made important compromises:
— it renounced its insistence on counting as part of the US strategic forces the American medium-range missiles and forward-based nuclear weapon systems capable of reaching Soviet territory;
— it took into consideration the US concern about Soviet heavy missiles, expressing readiness to reduce their number by half;
— it agreed that heavy bombers not equipped with long-range cruise missiles but carrying only nuclear bombs and SRAM missiles should be included in the upper limits imposed on delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons, by analogy with single-warhead missiles;
— it proposed dismantling all Soviet and American MRMIs in Europe, and leaving the British and French nuclear weapons out of account;
— it agreed to reduce its medium-range missiles in Asia;
— it declared its readiness to negotiate about missiles with a range under 1,000 km in Europe and to freeze them at the levels which both sides have at present.

Soviet flexibility at Reykjavik enabled the USSR and the US to reach an understanding concerning the possibility of resolving the issue of both strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles. A realistic prospect opened up for deep cuts in and complete destruction of the nuclear stockpiles. Never before had the sides been so close to agreeing on a formula for banning all nuclear testing for all time.

However, potential accords failed to materialize in Reykjavik because of the US stubborn unwillingness to create conditions for translating the achieved understanding into practical agreement through consolidating the ABM Treaty. The American side insisted on its right, in contravention of the ABM Treaty, to test SDI technology in space as well as in the laboratory, and to deploy a large-scale ABM defense system ten years hence. That the Soviet Union could not accept. SDI made agreement at Reykjavik impossible.

Yet the meeting in Iceland took the Soviet-American, and, indeed, East-West dialogue as a whole, a stage further, and promoted work for nuclear disarmament to a point where still greater efforts are needed to drastically reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear arms altogether.

Proceeding from the positive achievements in Reykjavik and taking into account the reasons behind the failure to bring matters to a successful conclusion, the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear arms and weapons in space tabled a major new package of proposals on the entire range of issues under discussion. The Soviet proposals give a good impetus to talks and raise the possibility of achieving accords within a reasonably short time and in full conformity with the principle of equality and equal security.
The Soviet Union’s consistent stand, and its commitment to the positive results of Reykjavik are evident in all major components making up the essence of the Soviet proposals, namely in a package approach to the issues, in the Soviet Union’s call for the Soviet and US strategic offensive arms to be phased out by the end of 1996, for the removal of all Soviet and US medium-range missiles from Europe, for the prevention of an arms race in space through consolidating the ABM Treaty, and for all nuclear testing to be ended on a bilateral basis. The Soviet Union’s commitment to the purpose and the spirit of Reykjavik is also reflected in its specific proposals on resolving the said issues, including the problem of verification. Not only does the Soviet Union state its determination to carry forward the cause of Reykjavik—it acts accordingly.

By contrast, the US Administration misinterprets the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting and has backed away from the understanding reached—witness the US posture at the Geneva talks. There, contrary to the stated intention to build on Reykjavik, the US side has completely abandoned its Reykjavik position and reverted to its former stance.

The US proposals at Geneva represent a farrago of old views mixed with the concessions which the Soviet Union included in its package.

For example, on strategic offensive arms the American side—despite the Reykjavik understanding—now says that at the second stage, following the 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms, it will be ready to reduce ballistic missiles alone, leaving heavy bombers intact. Evidently, the Americans are hoping to gain a more than threefold advantage in terms of nuclear weapons carried by strategic aircraft. The US is once again talking about introducing subceilings on some types of arms, which are designed to erode the structure of the Soviet strategic forces.

The US is advancing conditions hampering the handling of the medium-range missile issue. Specifically, the Americans want to negotiate over shorter-range missiles rather than medium-range—despite the unambiguous Soviet offer of a freeze and immediate talks on shorter-range missiles in Europe, pending the elimination of Soviet and US medium-range European-based missiles. The West is seeking to link the medium-range missile issue with those of conventional and chemical weapons, in an apparent attempt to make it more difficult to put the understanding reached on medium-range missiles into effect.

There has been no positive change in the US attitude toward the key issue, that of space arms. It has, in effect, repeated its Reykjavik proposal concerning the ABM Treaty, which blocked nuclear arms accords. The US is still against barring the arms race from space, and refuses to consider any proposals that may limit its Star Wars program.

So Reykjavik clearly revealed two trends, two lines in world politics. One is pursued by the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations; it is aimed at stopping the arms race and averting the war danger. The other is pursued by those US and NATO quarters who continue to rely on force in international affairs and are after military superiority, which they think indispensable to carrying out their neoglobalist plans.

However, the shaping international situation—though still complex and dangerous because of the imperialist forces’ efforts—opens new opportunities for enhancing security of nations and building a world free of nuclear arms. These opportunities are rooted in the persistent peace policy of the Soviet Union, all countries of the socialist community on the international arena, in the mounting peace action by the nonaligned and neutral countries, and in the activities of large sections of the world public—political parties, mass organizations, religious groups, etc.—to put an end to dictatorial practices and militarist preparation. The new way of political thinking is gaining more and more ground.

One indication of this is a growing support for the Soviet concept of an all-embracing system of international security, a concept which reflects a new political philosophy and is designed to promote dialogue aimed at reshaping international relations on a basis of
durable peace for all peoples and nations. Its essence is that violence or threat of violence should be totally eliminated from international relations. For in the present situation no nation, however powerful, can rely on military technology alone for protection. It is political efforts by all nations, big and small, developing and developed, regardless of their political and social systems, that can bring about effectual security for all peoples and nations and provide peaceful conditions for their progress.

The Soviet concept covers all major aspects of international life—political, military, economic and humanitarian. In each of the said areas, the USSR has been speaking up for a mode of action that would make peaceful coexistence a rule of international life.

Further evidence that the idea of an all-embracing system of international security is valid was the Delhi Declaration signed during Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to India in November 1986 and setting out the principles for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. This document is of worldwide importance not just because it bears the signatures of the leaders of two nations which have a combined population of a billion, or one-fifth of humanity. The ten principles the declaration contains are a broad outline of what peaceful coexistence means in our time. To strengthen the fabric of peaceful coexistence, all the members of the world community must be sure of their security. The Delhi Declaration proclaims the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, instead of a balance of “nuclear terror,” as the immediate objective.

The question of creating an all-embracing system of international security came under thorough and committed discussion at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in 1986. This question was put on the agenda on the initiative of a group of socialist countries. In the course of the discussion, socialist countries, guided only by one criterion—the need to achieve mutual understanding and greater security—demonstrated their readiness to take into account the considerations of the forum’s other participants. In consequence, the draft resolution was amplified to include provisions defining UN objectives in contributing toward the creation of a system of all-embracing security which would play an important part in shaping a nuclear-free world and ensuring the international legal order.

The General Assembly resolution, overwhelmingly approved by the UN members, referred to the interconnection between disarmament and the settlement of crises and conflicts, economic development and cooperation, observance and protection of human rights and basic freedoms. As a matter of fact, the UN made an unambiguous choice in favor of a new mode of political thinking. The discussion within the UN framework over the idea of an all-embracing system of international security reflected the growing anxiety of the international community because the policy of confrontation, “crusades” against socialism, and imperialist doctrines of intimidation by nuclear and, now, space weapons become an increasingly unbearable and mortally dangerous burden for humanity.

The joint initiative of the socialist countries was opposed by the United States and France only. Britain, although it abstained during the voting, objected to it all along.

This stand taken by the Western powers brought into focus the intention of their reactionary circles to cling to outdated methods in politics and their fear of a prospective reshaping of international relations in line with democratic principles.

The men in Washington realize perfectly well that such a recast—and this is what the overwhelming majority of the world community is calling for—would imply giving up the policy of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations and that of suppression of national liberation movements by all means. Yet this is a US national policy today. There are enough facts to that effect.

Military strength and violence have always played a dominant role in US history. The United States has launched over two hundred wars and colonial crusades during the two centuries of its existence. While self-righteously posing as a champion of freedom
and democracy, American imperialism has been striving for imposing its own scheme of things everywhere and blocking the peoples’ struggle for national and social liberation and progress.

In recent times, the doctrine of “neoglobalism” underlies the aggressive US policy of provocation. “The essence of this doctrine,” Mikhail Gorbachev points out, “is total contempt for the generally recognized principles of international relations, encroachment on the sovereignty of nations, and an old futile attempt at robbing the peoples of their right to live as they see fit.” The doctrine of “neoglobalism” provides for using military force by the US, up to and including an outright armed intervention, in various parts of the world which it has declared to be the zones of its “vital interest,” and for intensifying subversive operations against legitimate governments that are not to Washington’s liking, as well as for lending assistance, including military aid, to all kinds of reactionary regimes and counterrevolutionary groupings.

In the postwar period (since 1945), the US was either an initiator of or a party to most of the armed conflicts which claimed some ten million lives. Thus from 1946 to 1982, as Admiral James Watkins, US Chief of Naval Operations, testified, the United States used its armed forces in about 250 instances. According to American sources, Washington contemplated the employment of nuclear weapons on 19 occasions, threatening the USSR directly on four of them. Bad memories of the infamous actions of American troops, aircraft and warships exist almost everywhere in the world—in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America.

Here are some examples.

In 1954, CIA-trained rebel forces with American air support invaded Guatemala to topple the democratic Arbenz government.

In 1958, a total of 14,000 US Marines and ground troops, backed by the Sixth Fleet, landed in Lebanon to help the reactionary government suppress mass popular action.

In 1961, there was an abortive intervention in Cuba to overthrow its revolutionary government.

In 1965, US Marines and paratroopers invaded the Dominican Republic to suppress a popular uprising and bring a counterrevolutionary junta to power.

In 1965-1972, the US conducted wanton aggression against the peoples of Indochina. Its consequences are still felt. The aggression involved close on 600,000 US troops with air and naval support.

In 1973, there was a fascist coup in Chile, following a military rebellion engineered with CIA participation.

In 1982-1983, there was an act of direct intervention in the affairs of Lebanon under the umbrella of a “multinational peacekeeping force.” Punitive operations against the national patriotic forces, and the shelling and bombing of population centers in the highland Lebanon caused numerous civilian casualties.

In 1983, there was an unprovoked act of international violence and state-sponsored terrorism—the armed invasion of defenseless Grenada. The occupation of that country, with its legitimate government brought down and a puppet regime to Washington’s liking installed, was designed to turn it into yet another US military base.

1984-1986 saw a succession of acts of gross US interference in the affairs of sovereign nations; this policy still continues. The US has set out to crush the liberation movement in the countries of Latin America at any cost. It organized a massacre in El Salvador and has been financing and supplying with up-to-date arms the bands of counterrevolutionaries engaged in what is, to all intents and purposes, an open war against Nicaragua. It sponsors subversive actions against the national liberation forces of Guatemala.

US activities in Central America are a veritable undeclared war against the peoples of that region, which looks very much like the initial escalation of the war in Vietnam. It involves all kinds of actions: arms supplies, smuggling in of mercenaries, and acts of subversion, everything within a hairbreadth of direct aggression.

Warlike ventures and recurrent threats against Cuba as well as escalation of aggres-
sive US ambitions in Africa and the undeclared war against Angola have assumed dangerous proportions. With the help of South Africa, the United States intends to destabilize the situation in the countries neighboring on Pretoria, to crush SWAPO and to strengthen US positions in Southern Africa.

In 1986, the US carried out a pirate armed attack on Libya. That action by the US, following fabricated charges of Libya being involved in international terrorism, was yet another indication of the intrinsically aggressive American approach to independent developing nations and the irresponsible policy of provoking regional conflicts.

In 1986, the US grossly intervened in the Gulf war by selling arms to Iran in violation of its own embargo, thereby pouring fuel into the flames of what is a senseless and murderous conflict between Iran and Iraq.

US policy in the Middle East and Southwest Asia sharply exacerbates the situation in this explosive region. Today, the whole world sees the horrendous fruits of the American-Israeli “strategic cooperation” agreement which is increasingly developing into a lever of outright power pressure on the countries of that region. The acts of Israel and its patrons create a threat to all Arab states and turn the Middle East into a dangerous seat of international tension. In accordance with the American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, the US is planning to store in Israel weapons, munitions and military equipment for the US Rapid Deployment Force.

The US Sixth Fleet forces operating in the Eastern Mediterranean that comprise nuclear weapon systems, submarines and surface ships, including amphibious forces, and combat aircraft, can be used as a forward-based detachment of the Rapid Deployment Force.

US policy in other parts of the world is equally dangerous and expansionist in nature. Thus the US has turned Pakistan into a bridgehead for an undeclared war against Afghanistan and has been doing all it can to make the Pakistani territory an American support base for supremacy-seeking ambitions in Southwest Asia and in the Persian Gulf. The US has been expanding assistance to the puppets in South Korea and backing the subversive activities of the Pol Pot groups against people’s Kampuchea. It seeks to make Japan get more involved in the Pentagon’s aggressive schemes in the Pacific.

An aggressive US presence is invariably evident in any of the flashpoints around this planet. And whatever trappings American propaganda may use for disguising the imperialist policy of violence and arbitrary action, people all over the world are unequivocally and emphatically demanding that this policy be dropped and standards and principles of peaceful coexistence be firmly established in international affairs.

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The Soviet Union attaches great importance to confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. Experience shows that with political will it is possible to search for and come to agreement on issues of security, even in today’s complex international situation. Proof of this is the successful conclusion in September 1986 of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The confidence-building measures worked out in Stockholm are a major advance over Helsinki agreements achieved in 1975 and a fundamentally new stage on the way to creating an atmosphere of confidence and security, which meets the vital interests of all European peoples. A greater openness and predictability in relations between the participating nations, which are of essential importance for overcoming mutual suspicion and reducing the risk of an armed conflict, have been secured in Stockholm.

Speaking of the significance of the forum Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: “This is a victory of common sense, a gain for all the thirty-five countries attending the Conference. They managed to rise above differences and reach accords which are important not just in themselves but also improve the prospects for a stable situation in Europe. The success at
Stockholm can serve to expand the atmosphere of trust on an international scale as well."

Accords in Stockholm were reached thanks to the active and flexible position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and to the constructive efforts of the neutral and nonaligned countries. The Stockholm Conference succeeded in introducing new confidence- and security-building measures, incorporating in its final document an important section on the nonuse or threat of force. Progress was made in lessening military activity in Europe, in placing major military maneuvers of ground forces and troop lifts to Europe under control.

New provisions were introduced concerning a prior notification of states' military activity. Earlier, in keeping with the Helsinki Final Act, notification had been made 21 days before military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops, whereas under the Stockholm agreement notification is to be made 42 days before military maneuvers beginning at the level of 13,000 troops or at least 300 battle tanks. Information on the activity of Air Force units jointly with ground forces shall be included, if more than 200 sorties are planned. Participation in military activity by amphibious and airborne troops, if 3,000 or more troops are to be involved, is also subject to notification.

Despite strong resistance from the United States, an important agreement was reached on notification to cover ground forces lifts from areas beyond the zone of confidence-building measures to Europe and on notification of troop concentration.

Detailed provisions were agreed upon on extending invitations to observers of any military activity, including maneuvers, troop movements or troop concentration, if 17,000 or more troops are to be involved. This confidence-building measure will enable all the participating states to become convinced that the activities in question conform to the notification and pose no threat to anyone.

Exchanges between the participants of yearly plans for military activity subject to notification are an essential new confidence-building measure worked out in Stockholm. This procedure has been in effect since January 1, 1987, and plans thus exchanged enable all the participating states to get an idea of the scale and the number of military exercises planned for every coming year.

It is only thanks to the persevering efforts of the socialist countries, which acted conjointly with a number of neutral and nonaligned states, that the conference succeeded in elaborating measures to scale down military activity. Under the agreed-upon provisions, all the participating states shall give one another two years' notice of military maneuvers involving 40,000 to 75,000 troops no later than November 15 every year. Major military maneuvers involving 75,000 and more troops are not to be held at all if two years' notice thereof has not been given.

All these measures are of an obligatory nature, making it incumbent upon the participating states to strictly observe the provisions of the Stockholm document.

In Stockholm the Soviet Union once again most convincingly demonstrated its readiness to accept any sensible measures of verification concerning observance of agreements concluded. Thanks to the USSR's constructive stand, an accord was reached that every participating state will have up to three on-site inspections on its territory a year.

The Stockholm agreements are a proof that there are great reserves for relaxation of tension in Europe and that the logic of confrontation is on its last legs, while the trend toward building peace, confidence and security is gaining momentum.

At the same time it must be said that at the Stockholm Conference, just as at talks elsewhere, two attitudes to solving issues of European security clearly manifested themselves. From the very beginning of the Stockholm Conference, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries advocated businesslike negotiations and comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures with respect to the participating states' military activity; whereas, the United States and its closest NATO allies were seeking unilateral advantages, impeding the search for mutually acceptable solutions. This tendency
was particularly pronounced in the striving of the US and NATO to keep the activity of the Air Force and Navy beyond control. This activity is a means of implementing the policy of force or threat of force and is aimed at preventing confidence-building measures from covering the territories of the US and Canada, despite the fact that the military strength there, which is designed for transfer to Europe, has a certain impact on the security of European countries. This is the sole reason for the failure to finally reach an understanding on all issues put on the agenda at the first stage of the Conference in Stockholm. Under these circumstances, the socialist countries suggested putting off till the second stage of the Conference questions of notification of major independent air and naval maneuvers, limits to the scale of military exercises, and extending confidence-building measures to the territory of all participating states.

On the whole, the document adopted in Stockholm is the first major agreement in the military-political sphere since the signing of the Soviet-US SALT II Treaty of 1979. After a long period of stagnation, this document is an indisputable victory for common sense, political realism and responsible attitudes.

The results of the Stockholm forum can serve as a starting point to negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments reductions in Europe and for the parallel examination of confidence-building measures that were put off till the second stage of the Stockholm Conference. The Vienna meeting of the representatives of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is to play an important role as a follow-up to this process. It is to complement the mandate for the next stage of the Stockholm Conference and to take a decision on holding at its second stage negotiations on a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and on further confidence- and security-building measures on the continent.

Reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe is an important and burning issue. However, the sharp difference in the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, on the one hand, and those of the United States and its closest NATO allies, on the other, is making itself felt in this sphere as well.

In the Address of Warsaw Treaty Member States to NATO Member States, to All European Countries of June 11, 1986, adopted in Budapest, the socialist countries put forward an integrated program of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The new proposals of the socialist countries complement their efforts toward eliminating nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time they are of a perfectly self-contained nature, and, if put into force, would substantially scale down the danger of war in Europe.

The Warsaw Treaty states have proposed a sizeable reduction in every component of the ground forces and tactical aviation of the European countries and of the appropriate American and Canadian forces and equipment deployed in Europe. Theater and battlefield nuclear weapons with a range of up to 1,000 km would be subject to reduction at the same time as conventional armaments.

The proposed reductions would be effected while constantly maintaining military-political parity at lower levels without diminishing anyone's security. The components of armed forces to be reduced would be disbanded by integrated military formations and units and small units of equal value, along with their organic arms and combat equipment, including nuclear weapons. Their personnel would be subject to demobilization.

The Warsaw Treaty states have proposed as an initial step a one-time mutual reduction in the numerical strength of the forces of states in the opposing military-political alliances by 100,000 to 150,000 troops on each side within one or two years. Immediately after that, the Warsaw Treaty states will be prepared for further cutbacks, so that, given the reciprocal readiness on the part of the countries of the North Atlantic alliance, the ground forces and the tactical aviation of both alliances in Europe be reduced early in
the 1990s by approximately 25 percent as against their present level. This reduction would total more than half a million troops from either side.

The suggestion is to work out such a procedure for reducing troops and conventional armaments that would lead to the lessening of the risk of a sudden attack and to consolidation of strategic military stability in Europe. To this end the sides should agree on major reductions at the very beginning in the tactical aviation of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and also on troop reductions along the boundary between the two alliances. They also should develop and implement additional measures such as limitations on large-scale military exercises (affecting their number and scope); exchanges of more detailed information on those exercises, including data on the manpower and equipment brought into Europe from other regions for the duration of the exercises; establishment of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons on the continent; gradual reduction of military activities by both alliances; cooperation between their members on arms limitation and disarmament issues.

Troop and conventional arms reductions would be carried out with reliable and effective verification with the use of both national and technical means and international procedures, up to and including on-site inspections. Along with verification measures for the reduction process itself, the socialist countries suggest monitoring the military activities of the remaining troops. Adequate forms of verification should also be applied to the coordinated confidence-building measures. There are provisions for the exchange of general numerical data, as well as that covering specific parameters.

An important element of the program put forward by the socialist countries is the provision that all parties to the agreement on troops and conventional arms reductions in Europe should pledge not to increase their ground forces or tactical aviation outside the zone of reductions. This applies both to the territory of the USSR and the US, and to other parts of the world.

As is stressed in the Budapest Address, the Warsaw Treaty states are also in favor of shedding mutual suspicion and mistrust as regards the actual intentions of both military-political alliances and individual states. They point out that in the interests of security in Europe and in the whole world the military concepts and doctrines of the two military alliances must be based on exclusively defensive principles.

The USSR and its allies proceed from the conviction that the problem of troop and conventional arms reductions in Europe must be tackled with the participation of all European states. In their opinion, the best forum for that purpose is the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

NATO was clearly stalling for time with its reply to the socialist countries’ far-reaching initiative. When the Warsaw Treaty members suggested a meeting of the working groups of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and a meeting between the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Joint Armed Forces and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as well as a meeting between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO Secretary Generals, NATO’s reply to that proposition was essentially negative.

In December 1986, the issue of talks on troop and conventional arms reductions in Europe was considered at a regular session of the NATO Council in Brussels. However, the decisions adopted in that connection were once again far from being constructive. Despite having seemingly accepted some of the ideas from the Budapest Address (notably, the need for a broad approach to conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals), the NATO Council has in effect made no positive proposals for resolving that problem. It follows from NATO documents that the North Atlantic alliance sees its primary objective in redressing the allegedly existing conventional gap in Europe, which in effect means unilateral reductions in the arms and troops of the Warsaw Treaty members without any matching reductions on the NATO
side. Moreover, NATO is insisting on the precondition that the Warsaw Treaty members recognize the fact of their “superiority.”

Such a NATO “reply” to the Budapest proposals of the Warsaw Treaty members shows that the NATO leadership is trying to present the problems connected with making Europe free of nuclear weapons and those concerning lowering the level of conventional arms confrontation there as insoluble. A vicious circle is thus being created. The attainment of nuclear arms elimination in Europe is blocked under the pretext of the absence of verification measures for conventional arms reductions, while on the path to such reductions insuperable barriers are raised by the introduction of all sorts of artificial linkages, terms and reservations, such as the demand for elaborating a special verification “philosophy” for conventional weapons first.

All this attests to the NATO leadership’s intention to delay even the taking of the decision concerning the beginning of talks on troop and conventional arms reductions in Europe. In the West they talk a lot about an imaginary “Soviet threat” in Europe and the impossibility of nuclear disarmament while there is such a high level of conventional armaments there. However, when it came down to discussion and adoption of concrete reduction measures, it turned out that NATO had somehow lost all interest in such reductions.

Why? The answer is simple. The reactionary NATO circles are clearly afraid lest such talks should interfere with their plans for a further buildup of the bloc’s military potential which is far from being defensive.

NATO’s negative stand continues to block the successful completion of talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe that have been going on since 1973.

In search of a compromise, the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia advanced on February 20, 1986, a detailed draft of an Agreement on the Initial Reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of Ground Forces and Armaments with a Subsequent Non-Increase in the Levels of the Armed Forces and Armaments of the Sides and Associated Measures in Central Europe. The draft provided for reducing the ground forces of the USSR and the US in Central Europe in the course of a year by 11,500 and 6,500 men respectively, and for withdrawing them piecemeal to within national boundaries, complete with their organic armaments and combat equipment. All signatories to the agreement were to freeze for the next three years the levels of their armed forces and armaments on a collective and a national basis (or only on a collective basis, within each military alliance).

The draft agreement of February 20, 1986, which contained compromise solutions on a number of important controversial issues, including the problem of verification, created the required conditions for businesslike and effective talks. But the NATO countries have been in fact avoiding a businesslike consideration of the draft and continue to insist on totally unacceptable demands. In particular, they seek to put under control areas of the USSR that have nothing to do with Central Europe.

For many years the Soviet Union has also been working hard to ban chemical weapons and abolish their stockpiles. In recent years only the USSR has advanced a number of far-reaching initiatives in this field. In 1982, it submitted to the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. On April 22, 1986, fresh Soviet initiatives were tabled at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. They further developed the task formulated in Mikhail Gorbachev’s Statement of January 15, 1986 of eliminating chemical weapons and the industrial base for their manufacture as soon as possible.

These initiatives provide for specific measures to announce the location of every facility producing chemical weapons, including binary weapons, regardless of whether such facilities are state or private property.

The Soviet Union is actively working for an early conclusion of a convention banning chemi-
ical weapons that is being worked out at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The proposals made by the Soviet Union created the necessary conditions for reaching agreement on the total destruction of the industrial base for making chemical weapons and marked a step forward in agreeing upon provisions for the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union also made other proposals that opened up a realistic way towards the solution of the package of problems concerning the non-production of chemical weapons by both private and state enterprises. These proposals contain new elements regarding procedures for on-site inspections on request, which take into account the positions of practically all other participants in the talks. Thanks to the Soviet proposals, the task of eliminating chemical weapons has come closer to being accomplished. The new Soviet initiatives have opened up the way for speedy agreement upon a future convention.

At the same time, one cannot but feel anxious that as progress is made in the talks on banning this barbarous weapon of mass destruction, the United States is showing far less readiness than other states to seek solutions and compromises.

The US has also taken a non-constructive stand on the issue of verification of compliance with a future convention. The draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, tabled by the US at the Disarmament Conference in 1984, contains proposals patently unacceptable to other participants: for example, a proposal on verification provides for no control over private enterprises, including those owned by transnational corporations, which make up roughly 65 percent of the industrial capacities for manufacturing chemical weapons.

A decision, approved by NATO under US pressure, to begin production of binary weapons in the USA has dealt a serious blow to the talks. The moves by the United States and its closest NATO allies to add a new spiral to the chemical arms race are posing a real threat to international security, above all to the security of the European peoples. It is obvious that as soon as binary weapons appear in American arsenals, they will inevitably be emplaced in areas for which they are designated, first and foremost, in Western Europe. The danger of chemical weapons spreading to other parts of the planet will likewise grow.

Efforts by the USSR to promote peaceful cooperation in outer space have a special place in international politics. In response to an appeal by the 40th session of the UN General Assembly to its member-countries to submit their considerations on the development of international cooperation in outer space toward preventing a space arms race and promoting peaceful space exploration, a program of joint practical measures for the peaceful use of outer space was proposed in a letter by Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, addressed to Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary-General, in June 1986. This program has three stages and is aimed at creating strong material, political, legal and organizational foundations for Star Peace by 2000. It is aimed at uniting the efforts of as many states as possible in the peaceful exploration of outer space. "This pooling of efforts," Nikolai Ryzhkov stressed in January 1987, answering questions put by a TASS correspondent, "must proceed on a just and equal basis, with account taken of the present level of development of space technology and prospects in this field, as well as of the actual requirements of cooperating states."

To consider the problem of outer space in its entirety, the Soviet Union has proposed that an international conference or a special session of the UN General Assembly on outer space be held not later than 1990 to approve a program of action for the 1990s, with prospects for the subsequent 10 to 15 years, and to establish a World Space Organization and, under its aegis, specialized programs for specific projects.

As far as the exploration and use of outer space is concerned, the Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate on a broad scale with foreign companies, states and international organizations on a mutually advantageous basis, including in the commercial field. It offers services that include launching of for-
eign satellites by Soviet booster rockets; leasing out in geostationary orbit of Soviet Gorizont communications satellites placed at a point registered by users; survey from space of the territory of individual countries and sales of data obtained from remote sensing; and use of Soviet technological equipment or provision of Soviet spacecraft for installation of a customer's instruments for production or purification of materials in space conditions.

The program of international cooperation for the current five-year plan period (1986-1990), which is being implemented under the auspices of the USSR Main Administration for the Development and Utilization of Space Technology for the National Economy and Research (Glavkosmos), covers many themes and is entirely oriented toward peaceful uses of outer space. The list of the major projects of this period includes the exploration of Phobos, a satellite of Mars, with photographs and TV pictures of its surface, plus a number of other complex programs which the USSR is carrying out together with socialist countries, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, the USA, Finland, France, Federal Germany, Sweden and European Space Agency.

All this shows that the Soviet Union actively and consistently works for open, fully accessible and fair cooperation in space exploration, cooperation that would open to mankind the door to a peaceful third millennium.

At the 41st session of the UN General Assembly, to counter the sinister US Star Wars plans, the Soviet Union advanced a constructive program for Star Peace, which envisages prevention of an arms race in outer space and the pooling on that basis of efforts by states for mutually advantageous cooperation in exploring outer space for peaceful purposes, including the establishment of a World Space Organization.

The upshot was a resolution that called for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By stating the need to refrain from steps running counter to that goal, the UN General Assembly in fact gave its answer to US attempts to make Star Wars plans a sacred cow. The resolution was also clearly in favor of international cooperation in outer space. The only country to abstain from voting was the USA. Even the closest US allies distanced themselves from the position taken by the American delegation.

The results of the voting on the draft resolutions on limiting the arms race and on disarmament at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly once again demonstrated the fundamental difference between the stands of the USSR and the USA on these vital issues. The Soviet Union did not vote against any of the resolutions and abstained only in six cases. By contrast, the USA voted against 28 of the 70 resolutions on disarmament issues adopted by the UN General Assembly. In 16 cases it did so either alone or together with one or two of its allies. The United States abstained from voting on 9 resolutions.

The USA has also taken a negative stand on the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons which was more than once approved by an overwhelming majority of states that voted for the corresponding resolutions of the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have assumed a unilateral pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. If all nuclear powers did the same, this would be, in effect, tantamount to prohibiting nuclear weapons altogether.

The Warsaw Treaty member states have repeatedly made a proposal to the NATO countries on the mutual non-use of armed force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations. In March 1986 the Warsaw Treaty member states reaffirmed their proposal on concluding an agreement that would be open to all European and other interested countries. In the current complicated international situation, fraught with the threat of nuclear catastrophe, implementation of these specific proposals of the socialist countries would result in real progress toward building confidence, increasing security and promoting cooperation.

The Soviet Union actively works for inclusion of the Asia-Pacific region, the importance of which in world affairs is ever growing, into
the general process of creating a comprehensive system of international security. In his speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986 General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a set of major initiatives aimed at increasing security and cooperation in this region. In Mikhail Gorbachev's speeches in India in November 1986 this set was supplemented with new constructive proposals.

On the whole, the Soviet line is as follows:
— without mechanically applying European experience to Asia, to utilize all of its positive elements that can take root on Asian soil and serve the security of the countries on this continent;
— to mobilize all possible means for attaining this goal, including bilateral accords, subregional agreements and finally a regional agreement on security questions if it becomes possible with the passing of time;
— to pay special attention to the need of settling the conflicts existing in Asia, making use of all possibilities, including contacts between the USSR and the USA, for this purpose;
— to build up military and political stability by reducing the numerical strength and limiting the activity of the naval forces of the USSR and the USA in the region; to hold talks with the United States and interested Asian countries on confidence measures in the military sphere as applied to Asia and the adjacent areas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
— to hold multilateral talks on guaranteeing security of sea lanes, as well as on safeguarding the coastal states' sovereignty over their natural resources;
— to encourage and support the movement for establishing peace zones, specifically for turning the Indian Ocean into such a zone;
— to draft an international convention on combating terrorism involving sea and air routes and to participate in that convention.

Naturally, this is not a full list of measures for creating a system of security in Asia but they represent the most important steps to be taken at the current stage.

Acting in these directions, it is quite possible to settle the issues relating to stronger peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, despite the complicated and sometimes contradictory situation there. At all events, it is clear that, as distinct from the US, which banks on building up its military presence and fuelling conflicts in this area, the Soviet Union proposes and is campaigning for a truly peaceful alternative.

The difference between the Soviet and US approaches to resolving the nuclear disarmament issue was expressly manifest in the matter of banning nuclear tests. Cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests is the simplest and most realistic way to stop the nuclear arms race. Without nuclear tests it is impossible to improve nuclear weapons or create their new types. If the USSR and the USA come to terms on ceasing nuclear explosions, this would get things moving in the entire process of nuclear disarmament.

Seeking to achieve termination of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Union introduced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions on August 6, 1985 and called upon the USA to join in.

How did Washington respond? It responded by stubbornly continuing its tests. The USA used various far-fetched excuses to explain its refusal to join the Soviet moratorium, in particular, the claim that it was lagging behind in the number of nuclear explosions. It is common knowledge, however, that the United States has carried out more nuclear explosions than all the other nuclear powers taken together. The number of explosions it has conducted exceeds the respective figure for the USSR by approximately one-third. The USA has also conducted more blasts than the USSR in each individual medium (in the atmosphere, underground and underwater).

Washington's claims that it is impossible to establish effective verification over compliance with a nuclear test ban are also groundless. As repeatedly stated at the top level, the Soviet Union is prepared for any verification measures in this field. Such verification could be fully ensured through the use of both national technical means and international
procedures, including on-site inspections. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to use the assistance offered by the Delhi Six in verifying termination of nuclear tests. It also proposed to the United States that the idea of a supranational verification system be considered.

A vivid proof of the Soviet Union’s willingness for the strictest verification of the termination of nuclear explosions is the agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the US Natural Resources Defense Council in keeping with which American seismic equipment was installed at the Soviet nuclear testing ground in the Semipalatinsk area in the summer of 1986.

The true cause of Washington’s unwillingness to renounce nuclear explosions lies in its desire to change the existing balance of forces in its favor by developing new armaments—the MX, Trident II and Midgetman strategic missiles and nuclear warheads to be used for different purposes in space-strike weapons in keeping with the Star Wars program. Other reasons do not exist. Nuclear blasts resound in Nevada precisely for the sake of creating such means of destruction.

While Washington continued its test series (in all, the USA carried out 20 officially announced and 4 unannounced nuclear weapon tests in the period from August 6, 1985 to January 1, 1987), the Soviet Union, displaying restraint and responsibility for the destinies of peace, extended its moratorium for several times. The Soviet side expected that common sense would prevail in Washington. This, however, did not occur.

Furthermore, according to US press reports, in just the first three months of 1987 Washington is going to carry out five nuclear tests. And 1987’s total number of nuclear explosions, in the opinion of US experts, may exceed the number of explosions carried out in the previous year.

As the USA stubbornly pursues its nuclear test program to create and build up new nuclear arms, a situation has developed where continuing the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions may seriously harm the security of the USSR and its allies. The USSR cannot display unilateral restraint in the military field ad infinitum.

In this context, after profound and all-round consideration of the matter, the Soviet Government in its Statement of December 18, 1986, stressed that the USSR is ready to go on adhering to its moratorium after the January 1, 1987 deadline. But it will resume nuclear tests after the very first US nuclear explosion in 1987. The Statement stressed that if the USA ceases its nuclear tests, the USSR any day, any month will be ready—on the basis of reciprocity—to stop its program of such tests.

In other words, the USSR continues to regard the moratorium as an important and real factor in the matter of terminating nuclear weapon tests. It is for immediate full-scale negotiations on a total ban on nuclear tests at any level and at any forum, given the participation of the USA.

The USSR wants to see the start of such bilateral Soviet-American negotiations. It is also willing to resume the tripartite negotiations involving Britain that several years ago, before they were unilaterally broken off by Western partners, came close to specific agreements.

The USSR is likewise ready to come to terms on the calling of a special international conference to solve the test ban problem. At all these forums the Soviet Union considers it necessary to agree as soon as possible on a radical solution to the issue of terminating nuclear weapon tests once and for all.

If the USA is not ready for this, the USSR is willing to negotiate a step-by-step solution to the problem as well. Ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-American treaties and the introduction of interim restrictions on the amount and power of nuclear explosions could be initial steps.

The aim of the USSR is not merely to set the mechanism of talks on banning nuclear weapon tests into motion, but to achieve quick practical results.

Time will show if Washington will be able to reciprocate these Soviet far-reaching peace initiatives.

Of great value from the point of view of strengthening the foundations of world peace
and progress along the road of nuclear disarmament are the observance of earlier concluded agreements in the field of strategic arms limitation and the consolidation of the regime thereby established. These agreements, including SALT I and SALT II, provide an important starting base from which to advance to new, ever more effective accords aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation and at building a nuclear-free world. As to the USSR, it has always strictly and faithfully observed its commitments under the agreements to which it is a signatory. This applies both to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded in 1972, and to the 1979 SALT II Treaty, which the USSR regards as important obstacles to an unrestricted spiral in the arms race.

As to the current US Administration, it acts altogether differently. From the outset it has sought to undermine rather than reinforce these agreements.

Conspicuous in the chain of such Washington actions is a US breach of the aggregate limit established by SALT II of 1,320 MIRVed ICBMs and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles when it equipped a 131st American heavy bomber with long-range cruise missiles at the end of 1986. Thus, the United States tore up a treaty which fixed military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA and for a whole number of years restricted the arms race in its key area of strategic offensive arms.

The decision for a strategic arms buildup and abandoning SALT II was prompted by none other than Washington's desire to upset the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA and gain military superiority. These actions are fraught with serious consequences for international security.

The SALT II Treaty was undoubtedly a serious obstacle to military preparations in the USA. That was why Washington decided to get rid of it.

The interests of those who run the military-industrial business, involving the creation of a large-scale antimissile system with space-based elements and space-strike weapons, now also come into contradiction with the ABM Treaty. Through the Star Wars program, the USA wants to extend the arms race into space, turning outer space into a bridgehead for establishing American hegemony. This is why the US Administration views the ABM Treaty as the next target after SALT II. The US Administration is now gradually undercutting that treaty too.

The timing for blasting the SALT II Treaty—the end of 1986, or soon after the Soviet-American Summit Meeting in Reykjavik—can only be regarded as a major provocation, as an attempt to halt the tendency toward lessening international tensions. This step is a logical part of the campaign of attacks on the historic Reykjavik vision of a nuclear-free world which so frightens militarist circles in the USA.

Washington is making a big blunder. Breaking the limits of the SALT II Treaty will not strengthen US security.

After six years in office, the Reagan Administration is proving that it has done nothing constructive for arms limitation, but has been destroying much in this field.

The December 5, 1986 Statement by the Soviet Government emphasized that these moves by Washington gave "the Soviet Union reasons to consider itself free from commitments assumed by it under the 1972 Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty. Even so, the Soviet side believes there is still a chance to halt the dangerous course of developments provoked by the irresponsible moves of the current US Administration. It is to be supposed that in America and beyond, there is still enough political wisdom and feelings of self-preservation to prevent the breaking of the strategic arms limitation accords framework developed in the past 15 years.

"Considering that the issue is so crucial to the whole of mankind and that the key to limiting the strategic arms race must be safeguarded, the USSR will as yet refrain from going beyond the limits established by the SALT I and SALT II Treaties."

The USSR's stand received a lot of appreci-
ation and support throughout the world. The Soviet Union's drive for peace and international security is in marked contrast to the irresponsible attitude of the current US Administration.

* * *

The question is: Who threatens peace? The country making proposals to end the arms race at all international forums, or the one rejecting these proposals out of hand and blocking progress toward disarmament in all areas? The state proposing that nuclear weapon tests be banned forever and pledging unilaterally not to be first to use such weapons, or the one basing its military doctrine on the idea that nuclear war is thinkable and backing this idea materially with the most sophisticated nuclear armaments? The country proposing that a treaty to ban the use of force in relations between states be concluded, or the one advocating the cult of force and arbitrariness in the international arena? The country that has been campaigning vigorously for ridding the world of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons in the forthcoming 15 years, or the one that has been avoiding serious discussion of the issue using all sorts of far-fetched pretexts so as to keep its arms buildup projects intact, plan their unrestrained expansion till the year 2000 and launch an arms race in space?

The answers to these questions are obvious.
Conclusion

Readers can think over these facts that make it possible to see the military and political situation in the world and the reasons behind its complication in a true light. The book clearly and objectively replies to the question put in its title: the real threat to peace comes from US military might, practical activities by the US ruling circles and reactionary forces in other NATO countries to intensify military preparations, to further the arms race on Earth, their attempts to transfer the arms race to space, and the Pentagon’s scenarios for wars, nuclear and conventional, global and local.

The book convincingly points to the political hypocrisy of the US Administration, whose words are not matched with deeds.

Alleging a dedication to peace, they furiously resist any initiatives to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons and lessen military confrontation.

Alleging a readiness to get rid of nuclear weapons, they are giving the green light to unrestrained buildup of precisely these arms.

Alleging a desire to seek strategic stability and confidence, they are striving to upset the military-strategic balance and achieve military superiority, which makes the strategic situation all the more unpredictable. The attempts to conduct world affairs from the position of strength, to organize “crusades” against the USSR, calling it the “empire of evil,” and against other socialist countries do nothing to promote confidence.

Peace is not facilitated by the reckless concepts of a first nuclear strike, a “limited” war in Europe, or a world nuclear war. The Star Wars program undermines rather than strengthens world peace and security. Stationing more and more US first-strike weapons, Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, in Western Europe does not make for regional or world security. On the contrary, every new US missile in Europe is another step toward the abyss.

Recent military and political actions by the US Administration present an alarming picture. These include scrapping the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT II Treaty, destroying the contractual foundation for limiting the arms race, and showing a reluctance to conduct constructive talks on this score; new programs to increase offensive weapons, both nuclear and conventional; and successive nuclear blasts. Further, these are rejecting consolidation of the regime of the ABM Treaty, refusing calls not to test ABM elements in space, and striving to put weapons into orbit as soon as possible. Also, they include the production of binary chemical weapons and the deployment of Lance tactical missiles in South Korea. Finally, there are the “neoglobalist” actions against Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola and Mozambique, and the policy of arbitrariness in international relations, including military interference in the affairs of states.

It would be naive to think that the US Administration’s efforts to build up nuclear weapons and develop new space-strike arms and an antimissile shield for America are directed only against the Soviet Union. Washington’s aspiration for domination in space and the world constitutes a direct threat to all countries, to all of humanity.

The book shows that an approximate military-strategic equilibrium exists worldwide as a deterrent to the aggressive plans of the imperialists and their attempts to rewrite history. Mikhail Gorbachev said: “Realizing the scope of the military danger and being aware of our responsibility for the future of the world, we will not let the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, be upset. We will continue to pursue this policy, because we have forever learned the lessons that history has taught us.”

Any attempts by Washington to violate the existing military-strategic balance, to change military parity in its favor, would lead only to
a new round in the arms race, to greater military danger. Unless such attempts are stopped now, the arms race may go out of control and even parity would no longer be a factor of military and political deterrence.

There is now no more important task than to put an end to the arms race on Earth, to prevent its spread to outer space, and to abolish all nuclear and other mass annihilation weaponry. Of crucial importance in this regard is the USSR’s detailed program, announced on January 15, 1986, to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The realization of this program would allow the human race to enter the third millennium without the threat of “nuclear winter,” under a peaceful sky with a secure future.

Peace is promoted by the major Soviet initiatives scrutinized in the book, particularly those bearing on a total and universal ban on nuclear weapon tests, cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, prohibition of chemical weapons and elimination of the industrial base for their production, and space exploration for peaceful purposes.

The world public regards the Soviet-US Summit in Reykjavik as a major historic event, as a political touchstone for the two biggest nuclear powers. Reykjavik has shown to the whole world where the sides stand. While the USSR set forth in Iceland bold and radical plans for deep balanced reductions in nuclear potentials and their subsequent rapid abolition, the United States came to Reykjavik actually empty-handed.

Judge for yourself whether the US stand is reasonable or not. Washington has brushed aside all Soviet proposals and rejected nuclear disarmament in favor of the Star Wars program. For all the efforts to camouflage its line in Reykjavik, it is clear that Washington wants to let the “jinni of space weapons” out of the laboratory as soon as possible and to achieve military superiority, in other words, to guarantee US security at the expense of the Soviet Union’s.

However, things are not as simplistic as Washington sees them. In this nuclear and space age, the security of one or several countries cannot be achieved at the expense of others. Security can be only equal, mutual and comprehensive. Security can be only international. The world is one and its security indivisible. The United States will never win military advantage for itself at the expense of other nations’ security. The Soviet Union will take all the necessary practical steps and will not permit the military-strategic parity to be upset. The American side should have no illusions about this.

The package of major compromise proposals the Soviet Union advanced in Reykjavik remains in force. The main obstacle to their realization is SDI. It is either SDI or nuclear disarmament, a new round in the arms race related to SDI or cuts in nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union hopes that the US political leaders will look at the existing situation in a sober way and, finally, take a realistic stand to remove the threat of nuclear conflagration from the human race. Reason must triumph while there is still time.