

Kandahar Review

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Simulations and war games present valuable opportunities to explore conflicts, and present an invaluable opportunity for students to learn about the major issues and tradeoffs that policymakers face during conflicts. The wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a major shift in military doctrine for the forces engaged in these conflicts, which recognized that in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, the active support of the population is crucial determinant of whether the government or insurgents are the victors. *Kandahar* is a board game that is based on the theoretical underpinnings of population-centric COIN in the province of Kandahar, Afghanistan beginning in 2009. The complex game for 3 to 6 players provides a comprehensive overview of the major issues that are central to COIN in Kandahar, including the key actors, nature of operations, and major policy issues and tradeoffs, and therefore has the potential to be a valuable instructional tool for students when coupled with a comprehensive debriefing.

The game has done an excellent job of representing the multitude of actors in the insurgency in Kandahar. The two key players are the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), however there are also ISAF forces, criminal gangs, non-state militias and NGOs. This range of actors highlights the complexity of the insurgency in Kandahar, and goes beyond the simplicity of David Galula's 'triangular model' of an insurgency that generally only focuses on the insurgents, the counterinsurgents and the population.

The three main actors – the GoA, QST and criminal gangs achieve victory largely based on their political support level, which represents the level of political legitimacy of the population, although the criminals achieve victory by converting unused operations points, which represent assets, time and resources. This is an excellent model of COIN theory, particularly that of the United States Military *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* which espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of winning the support of the population. The GoA can also gain points by limiting the QST's kinetic operations and maintaining the per economic stability level. This victory model is an excellent reflection of COIN theory and population-centric approaches in terms of limiting violence and promoting stability, strong institutions and development, however in terms of playing the game, it leaves the other players somewhat lost as they have no concrete objectives. Although 'winning' for the NGOs and ISAF might not be the same as for the QST and GoA, giving these players concrete objectives that would enable them to 'win' or achieve victory points would allow the player to have a better understanding of the challenges and tradeoffs that those organizations face in Kandahar in the pursuit of their specific objectives.

As a representation of late 2009, the 'basic scenario' accurately represents the relative strengths and asymmetry of the competing forces and the attitudes of the populations in the various districts in terms of the GoA and QST. Likewise, even the 'full intervention' scenario for ISAF troops is a relatively accurate representation of the relative strength of the force, which up until 2009 was only around 3 000 troops for the entire province. This is an important aspect of the game because although it highlights the political costs for the GoA of excessive foreign intervention, it also forces the two players to work together, which demonstrates the importance of coordination between the ANSF and ISAF in Kandahar in order to have sufficient manpower to hold the territory as part of operations to 'clear hold and build'.

The non-state militias operate based on an automatic set which is determined by the violence levels, and add a valuable element of uncertainty and randomness to the game that mirrors the complex web of the actions of non-state militias, vigilantes and private security companies that act autonomously in Kandahar and contribute to violence levels. The uncertainty created by this player is complemented by the 'random events' phase of the turn, in which a variety of events, such as incoming opium crop and district elections can alter the direction of the game. It would be very beneficial in a debrief of the game to have a full discussion of this seemingly minor player and what issues the random events are designed to represent, because this network of non-state actors have played a critical role in the COIN efforts, particularly because of the contribution to the levels of violence.

One minor weakness in the design of the various players was that of the NGOs, the character that was designed to represent the personnel and assets of the agencies for humanitarian aid, organizations that support the civilian government, as well as civilian companies with contracts to conduct development work. In the game, the NGO's are able to operate anywhere on the board, although they may become victims of an attack by criminals or the QST. Although this mechanism captures the dangers of conducting development work in Kandahar, it ignores the fact that many major NGOs do not permit their workers to conduct operations 'outside the wire' of government or ISAF controlled areas. NGO's such as CIDA and the UN have strict safety guidelines for their personnel that are often criticized for limiting the impact of their development programs. Furthermore, the situation in Kandahar became so insecure, by early 2010 the UN shut down its mission in Kandahar, which exemplifies the impact of insecurity on the projects conducted by the development and aid communities.¹ Perhaps the game could be amended to incorporate these restrictions and perhaps to only permit NGO units to operate in areas controlled by the GoA of ISAF forces, or areas with limited violence.

A second minor issue in terms of the players in the game is the design of the three-player game, in which only the QST, government and criminals play, and the GoA player controls ISAF and the NGOs. Obviously in a situation with a limited number of players, a greater amount of simplification is required. This scenario, however, may overlook the challenges of coordinating the government, ISAF and NGOs and their conflicting interests, although simply excluding them would ignore the impact of the broad range of organizations participating in the COIN operations. It would be very important in a debrief of a three player game to include a discussion of how the outcome of the game might have been different if ISAF and the NGOs were controlled by different players to develop a better understanding of the dynamics between these organizations and institutions.

Overall, the diverse range of players in the game highlights the diversity of the theater of operations in the COIN operations in Kandahar. The main interaction between the players is carried out in the infiltrate/build/train phase of the turn in *Kandahar*. In each district, the various boxes in each district are necessary for the insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, indicating forces that are underground (UG), on patrol (PTL), available for operations (OPS), or have completed operations (OC). In this part of the turn, players determine the extent of foreign aid, place infiltrators, build new units and civic units, train units and check for the non-state militias. The ability to place informers and gather intelligence to conduct operations underscores

¹ In April 2010 the UN closed its mission in Kandahar, and many of the 200 employees were transferred to Kabul after a surge in attacks and assassinations in Kandahar. Ismail Sameem, "U.N. shuts Kandahar mission as security worsens," *CBC News* (Apr 27, 2010) online at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/27/us-afghanistan-kandahar-idUSTRE63Q12020100427?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=22&sp=true> (accessed April 4, 2011).

the importance of clandestine operations and gathering intelligence to defeat their opponents, particularly from the perspective of the GoA.

The infiltrate/build/train phase is followed by the operations phase, in which the players are able to conduct missions in the various districts and much of the interaction between the three main players occurs. The QST and the criminals in the missions phase may conduct a variety of missions each turn, including ones that are both kinetic and non-kinetic. Of the non-kinetic missions, the QST can conduct propaganda campaigns, intimidation, subversion, purging and desertion. The non-kinetic missions are more representative of the more local Taliban, or tier 2 fighters and the ‘village underground,’ a cell of a few people led by a village elder that operates clandestinely to gather intelligence while intimidating locals, managing weapons caches and acting as a shadow government.² The kinetic operations, including bombing campaigns, robberies, and attacking units and infrastructure are more representative of Tier One fighters are full time, ideologically motivated fighters, who are often responsible for directing large operations and coordinating logistics.³

Similarly, the GoA and ISAF can conduct both kinetic and non-kinetic operations throughout the game. Of the non-kinetic missions, the GoA can conduct propaganda campaigns, subversions, desertion, and intelligence gathering. In the kinetic missions, the government and ISAF have relatively fewer options than the QST and criminals, which is an accurate reflection of the fact that they are constrained by the law, and therefore can only attack units, purge or react to other units.

The interaction of these players throughout the infiltrate/build/train phases and their operations missions highlights important aspects of population-centric COIN operations and highlights important issues in Kandahar. Playing *Kandahar* and understanding the key mechanics of the game highlights key issues including political legitimacy and the provision of infrastructure, economic development, violence, security sector reform, support of armed forces, and corruption.

One of the most critical elements to the game is the political support level, which is used to represent the level of public legitimacy at the provincial level the population is willing to give either player, and is measured in political support points (PSPs). The government and the QST maintain political support separately, and both can have high or low support, to indicate if Kandahar is a highly polarized society or a society that has distaste for both parties. The extent of popular support is broken down into districts, and the attitude of the population is indicated by the popular attitude level (PA), which is in large part determined by the amount of infrastructure and services in the area.

The acknowledgement of political support at both the provincial and district levels is important for two key reasons. Primarily, it highlights the integral role of maintaining public support and legitimacy in the eyes of the population in a counterinsurgency. As David Galula and others have argued, the active support of the population is crucial to the success of the COIN, which can be achieved by strengthening the legitimacy of the government through the provision of basic services and infrastructure, which is directly reflected in this game mechanic. Secondly, the game makes the important distinction between the popular attitudes as they vary from district to district, and reflects the importance of considering the rural population by awarding victory points to the player with the most PA levels in favour of them. The Kandahar

² David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pg. 84-85.

³ Ibid.

map is a representation of the districts of Kandahar, and thirteen areas represent the key districts of Kandahar, and four represent the quarters of Kandahar City. This division of Kandahar was meant to approximate the 'human terrain', and the districts are characterized as remote, populated or urban to indicate the population density. As the majority of the population of Kandahar is rural, a successful population-centric COIN effort must address the population as a whole, and not simply the urban areas such as Kandahar City, which is reflected in this component of the game.

One of the most important tradeoffs of the COIN operations in Kandahar identified by the game is the extent of ISAF intervention and the effect on the legitimacy of the GoA. Although the ISAF troops are of elite quality, and as the extent of the intervention increases from limited to a full intervention, the number of potential operating points to conduct missions increases significantly, the political costs also increase substantially. The greater the extent of the ISAF intervention, the more political support points the government automatically loses, representing the loss of political legitimacy among the population. This tradeoff exemplifies the challenge of agency in conducting COIN in Kandahar, where the most able troops are perceived as the least legitimate, and the reliance on the more relatively more legitimate troops are less likely to secure the population and ensure the delivery of services. The player must essentially make the 'least bad' compromise between the two in choosing between expertise and legitimacy.

The implications of this tradeoff are further developed in the 'basic scenario' of the game wherein if the GoA is not winning in terms of victory points by the end of round 10, there is an automatic full intervention by ISAF forces. This automatic event is meant to represent Gen. McChrystal's troop surge in 2010 that reinforced the ISAF troops in Kandahar. As an automatic caveat, this mechanism highlights the extent to which much of the decision-making is beyond the power of the GoA. It would be valuable in a debrief at the end of the game to discuss this tradeoffs in terms of the legitimacy and agency of the local government and its implications for COIN.

The acknowledgement of the importance of the level of infrastructure and services available to the people in the various districts or areas, such as healthcare, housing and employment prospects is another important concept demonstrated by the game. The initial civic level on the board, which is marked by 'civic chits,' correctly represents the current context and the fact that Kandahar City enjoys the majority of infrastructure, while the outlying districts are very underdeveloped. In the game, the presence or increase of these services benefits the government, and the absence or destruction of them benefits the QST and criminals by improving their recruitment programs.

This mechanism highlights the critical importance of the provision of services and development programs to the success of the COIN efforts. The mechanism, however, in some ways misses the extent of governance that the QST offers to the population in areas that they control. In insurgent held areas, the QST have sought to win popular cooperation of the rural population through the creation of a shadow government by providing ordered governance through the establishment of a judicial system, regularized taxation, oversight mechanisms, complaints committees, and the protection of opium growers.⁴ Although the QST does engage in the destruction of government infrastructure and disrupt their governance and development campaigns, they have also created their own services in an effort to win popular support and

⁴ Carl Forsberg, "The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar." *Institute for the Study of War: Afghanistan Report No. 3* (2009), available at <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/talibans-campaign-kandahar> (accessed March 1, 2011), pg. 33.

project the perception that as an organization they are beneficial in everyday life. For example, In a reversal from the ‘War of Schools’ in which the Taliban systematically destroyed schools, the Taliban took control of government-built schools in certain areas and are using them to promulgate their own curriculum, which includes the provision of textbooks.⁵ Although these programs are not as expansive as the governments, they are a significant in the everyday life in rural Kandahar and should not be ignored. For a more complete understanding of the QST’s campaign in Kandahar, it would be beneficial to use the optional inclusion of QST civic chits, which could recognize the importance of the provision of these services to the population.

The economic support level (ESL) is used to measure the economic climate in Kandahar, which is indicated by a scale from 0 to 99. ‘Par’ level (50) is used to represent an atmosphere in which civilians can conduct normal economic activity and the local government can collect taxes. The initial ESL is determined at the beginning of the game, but the formula is such that it is generally below the par level, which is an accurate representation of the extremely weak state of the economy in Kandahar. The GoA player strives to improve the ESL because it creates operational points to conduct missions and creates political support and victory points for every 5 points the ESL is above the ‘par’. The QST may drive the ESL down by intimidation, riot and bombing Campaign missions primarily in order to deny the GoA the benefit. This mechanism highlights the critical importance of economic development and growth in Kandahar and its ability to contribute to the strength and legitimacy of the GoA, as well as the relative ease of the QST to disrupt the economy.

The implications of the extent of missions carried out in Kandahar are measured by ‘violence chits’ which are essentially traces of kinetic activities, such as bombings or shootings, which cause the population to be less favourable to the side which accrues more chits in each district. Violence chits permit the emergence of criminal networks and non-state militias, and enable that player to build cadres and auxiliaries only in areas where the violence chits outnumber the civic chits. This is an important consideration that is missed in other COIN games, such as Battle for Baghdad, in which violent campaigns can be launched with no repercussions in terms of popular support. These chits highlight the tradeoffs between conducting missions that may eliminate enemy units and the loss of political support in the district, which is crucial in population-centric COIN. This trade-off is further exacerbated by the introduction of the concept of ‘firepower’, which is based on the premise that ISAF forces and non-state militias or international security contractors are heavily armed or target indiscriminately and therefore are perceived as extremely violent by the population. Accordingly, if the non-state militias or security contractors conducts attack missions, two violence chits are placed in the district, or if ISAF forces are the targets of an attack, violence chits are added to represent heavy return fire. The addition of ‘firepower’ highlights the dilemma faced by the GoA in requesting ISAF forces conduct missions, as there will be political consequences in the district and the potential emergence of more gangs and criminal networks that could exacerbate the insurgency.

An interesting extension of the concept violence chits is the introduction of the ‘time marches on’ segment of the turn. At the end of the turn, in any area of the map that has violence chits, one third of them are removed to represent the passing of time. This segment is based on the premise that the temporal distance from the violence will make it less poignant in the eyes of the population. I think that is an interesting mechanism particularly from the perspective of population-centric COIN, but I think that it may overestimate the speed at which people would

⁵ Sean M. Maloney, “Taliban Governance: Can Canada Compete?” *Policy Options* (June 2009): 63-69.

be willing to forgive and forget violence, which in the case of the game is after a single turn, which represents only about a month. This mechanism could be amended to have a lesser impact on the removal of violence chits. Instead of removing a third of the chits, which as violence grew people would be theoretically ‘marching on’ more quickly, perhaps if a player does not conduct any kinetic operations for a turn a violence chit could be removed. That being said, I think that the ‘time marches on segment’ introduces a very interesting psychological element to understanding population-centric COIN. Furthermore, this could lead to an interesting discussion in a debrief after having played the game, and understanding the determinants of popular support in countries that are afflicted by violent conflict.

Although it is difficult to incorporate security sector reform into the game mechanics, the cohesion level of the various forces, along with their training status demonstrates some of the aspects of security sector reform in Kandahar. The ‘Cohesion Level’ is a measure of the operational security, discipline, efficiency and moral for the QST, and the GoA police and army, which can be increased by spending operations points in order to increase the effectiveness of the forces. The government can increase the cohesion level by sending individual units to training camps to train them to a higher level from recruit to line to elite. For both the QST and government, all new units begin at a recruit level, and accordingly using them in kinetic operations incurs costs in terms of political support, and the initial cohesion level is generally quite low (no higher than six out of fifty). This mechanism might make more sense if the limitations of the recruits was reflected in a negative dice roll modifier, rather than incurring political costs. Overall, however, the cohesion level of the government troops underlines one of the most significant obstacles to the COIN efforts in Kandahar and the challenges of reforming the ANSF. These challenges could be discussed in a debrief, because despite billions of dollars of investment in the ANSF, weak recruiting and retention policies, inadequate logistics, insufficient training and logistics, and inconsistent leadership have undermined the combat readiness of the force.⁶ Accordingly, in 2009, when the game is set, only 39.6% of total security operations were executed by the ANA.⁷

The training mechanism for the ANSF is an essential component of the game and is representative of the current security sector reform efforts by ISAF forces. For both the police and the army, the recruits may be trained up to the elite level, which can no longer be the target if subversion or desertion operations. One of the most important aspects of the training process for the GoA is the role of the ISAF player. When training troops, if there are ISAF cadres are matched with ANA or ANP units in the training camp, the number of operations points required is reduced, and upon graduation the ISAF forces have the option of remaining matched to the ANSF units. This mechanism highlights the critical role of ISAF in assisting in the training of the ANSF. For example, the Canadian forces in Kandahar offered significant assistance in the training of the ANSF in the form of Operational Mentor Liaison Teams for the ANA and ANP with representatives from the military and RCMP, as well as the provision of Focused District Development Training, which is an eight week training program for ANP units.⁸ Both of these

⁶ International Crisis Group, *A Force in Fragments – Reconstituting the Afghan National Army* (Asia Report N°190 – 12 May 2010) online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/southasia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx> (accessed April 4, 2011).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Canada, “Benchmarks: Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of April 1 to June 30, 2011,” online at <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/progress-progres/benchmarks-reperes/priorit1.aspx> (accessed January 19th, 2011).

mechanisms in the game highlight the critical importance of security sector reform to the success of COIN operations and the role of ISAF in the process as a whole.

The game also introduces the concept of ‘maintenance’ and ‘depreciation’ for the QST, GoA and the criminal gangs. In this part of the turn, the players must pay for the maintenance of their static and mobile units using operations points, and if there are not sufficient operations points, the units will be eliminated. This is a valuable aspect of the game, and highlights the challenges of maintaining the salaries and operating costs of an armed movement or military, particularly in a country with such a weak economy. An interesting extension of this concept could be for the ISAF troops and the extent of international support in continuing the mission that could affect the cost of maintaining units or the number of units permitted, or even the requirement to withdraw, as the Canadian ISAF forces are currently doing.

The game also attempts to model the corruption that is rampant in Kandahar. The ‘Depreciation’ mechanic is the result of holding on to a lot of operations points and is designed to model the corruption in Kandahar. This is a very important element of the game in terms of its pedagogical value, as corruption has been identified as the Achilles heel of Kandahar. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2009 ranked Afghanistan 179 out of 180 countries.⁹ Local elites, such as Ahmed Wali Karzai dominate the domestic political scene through patronage and corruption, and Kandahar City has been described as a “warlord dominated kleptocracy that pretends to run the city.”¹⁰ Money from drug trafficking, coupled with money pouring in from the US, Canada, UN and NGOs with little or no fiscal control and no meaningful transparency has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars being wasted, diverted or stolen.¹¹ Accordingly, while corruption inhibits the effectiveness of the local actors, it also affects the operations of the international actors, and the concept of ‘depreciation’ could be extended to include international security contractors, ISAF troops and NGOs, who are similarly affected by corruption.

Although corruption is a crucial consideration in COIN in Kandahar and it is in some ways reflected in the depreciation mechanism, it would be valuable is a debriefing discussion to discuss the shortcomings of this model in terms of patronage and corruption and their effect on population-centric COIN. It would be extremely difficult and potentially impossible to model the complex web of patronage and tribal linkages in Kandahar and how they affect the distribution of resources, however as a learning tool it is important not miss these factors entirely. Although the rule of law and absence of corruption is key to stability in the long term, in some cases local leaders may see patronage-based politics as a key method of pursuing their own narrow personal, political, or economic interests, but also as a key as well as a mechanism of political stabilization in the short term. The informal allocation of resources can be used to win the support or acquiescence of key social constituencies, which is generally perceived as a key element of population centric COIN.¹² For a more developed understanding of corruption and patronage in

⁹ Transparency International, “Corruptions Perceptions Index Report 2010,” online at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/in_detail#1 (accessed March 26, 2011).

¹⁰ Pseudonym “Needed: An Exorcism in Kandahar,” *Small Wars Journal* (2009) online at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/327-vegetius.pdf> (accessed March 25, 2011).

¹¹ Anthony H. Cordesman, “How American Corrupted Afghanistan: Time to Look in the Mirror,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, report online at http://csis.org/files/publication/100907_American_Corruption_Afghanistan.pdf (accessed March 12, 2011).

¹² Rex Brynen, “Simulating Patron-client Politics,” *Paxsims*, entry posted August 3, 2009 <http://paxsims.wordpress.com/2009/10/03/595/> (accessed March 24, 2011).

Kandahar, it would be valuable to discuss the shortcomings of the ‘depreciation’ model in a debrief.

Overall, the game does a tremendous job at highlighting the complexity of COIN in Kandahar, and the broad range of factors that must be understood to have a proper understanding of the challenges and tradeoffs in the conflict, as is an excellent way to learn about Kandahar COIN. As with any simulation, to condense any conflict into a game certain simplifications are required, however there are three minor weaknesses to the game and its use as a pedagogical tool.

One of the most significant weaknesses of the game is that in terms of its use as an educational tool, it highlights many more lessons in terms of population-centric COIN from the perspective of ISAF and the GoA, and the issues they face in terms of the security forces, economic development, lack of infrastructure, and corruption, than some key issues pertaining to the QST and the criminal networks. The existence of the ‘Pakistan Box’ on the map certainly highlights the critical importance of Pakistan, and particularly the ISI to the survival of the QST, however it does not acknowledge the governance efforts of the QST, and the game also misses the highly decentralized nature of the QST as an organization in terms of leadership and membership. While Mullah Omar is the leader of the organization, there are a significant number of ‘tier 2’ local leaders that play a large role in day-to-day operations. There exists the optional rule of introducing leader counters for the QST, however a more interesting way of simulating the QST might be to include a recommendation in the rule book that if there are too many players, place the excess as a team to be the QST. The internal debate and discussion in terms of strategy and operations could in some ways simulate the debates of the *rahbari shura* (leadership council) and the *majlis al-shura* (consultative council) in Quetta, Pakistan.¹³ The potentially divergent strategies of the players could represent the tensions within the QST, particularly between the older and younger members and the decentralization of the organization. These issues could be addressed in a debrief in which students discuss how a decentralized network of commanders and fighters would affect the QST’s strategy.

The design of the game’s board is very clear and the territorial divisions are logical and quite representative of the population breakdown, however it could benefit from a more aesthetically interesting design. Adding colour and perhaps terrain features to the game, and perhaps increasing the scale of the map (but not the combat operations boxes) might leave more space to place the multitude of chits that are used in the game. This might be particularly valuable to non-gamers who might play the game in an instructional setting and might not be accustomed to this kind of game, and would make the board more visually stimulating and less overwhelming to a novice.

The final weakness that limits the pedagogical value of the game is the complexity of the rules. It is the complexity of the rules that enables the game to demonstrate such a broad range of issues, however in a classroom setting it would likely be essential to have at least one or two people who are familiar with the games, or war-gaming in general to assist the non-gamers grasp the rules of the game. Once the rules of the game are understood, the players can enjoy the game and develop a better understanding of the concepts it is trying to convey.

A final caveat to the use of this game as a pedagogical instrument is that it is critical for the students to have a comprehensive debriefing at the end of the game as well as relative familiarity with the topic beforehand. In doing so, students can discuss what the game modelled

¹³ Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University press, 2008), pp. 55-56.

well, and elements of COIN that the game missed or did not thoroughly address. As David Crookhall argues, debriefing is essential for students to thoroughly understand the concepts the game is trying to convey, and in some cases, the debriefing is longer and more engaging than the game itself.¹⁴

In general, *Kandahar* is an excellent game that through a complex variety of game mechanics demonstrates a comprehensive range of issues that are prevalent in the population-centric COIN operations in Kandahar. The emphasis of public support and the legitimacy of the local government drives home the key dynamic that, according to COIN theorists, is the key to defeating an insurgency such as the QST in Kandahar. In doing so, this game, coupled with a comprehensive debrief, presents itself as a valuable tool that can be used in a classroom setting as a way for students to engage in the dynamics of COIN warfare and understand the major issues and tradeoffs that the various parties face in a fun and interesting way.

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¹⁴ David Crookall, "Serious Games, Debriefing, and Simulation/Gaming as a Discipline," *Simulation Gaming* Vol. 41 (2010): 898-922.

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